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ABSTRACT 
Economic sanctions concerning Iran’s nuclear program are not having their intended 
political effect. Uranium enrichment continues, despite sanctions. This thesis argues that 
international economic “smart” sanctions are failing because they are not altering the 
relative positions of power between the factional actors in the Iranian political economy, 
and because the actors who desire to continue enrichment remain in control of the 
economy and state institutions. The Iranian political economy is a clientelistic state, with 
differing rival autonomous patron-actors, and associated client bases, all competing for a 
larger slice of economic rents. Economic sanctions have failed because the more 
conservative actors and their clients have entrenched themselves in the economy and 
control of these rents, thereby diverting the costs of sanctions to their political 
competitors, while simultaneously using sanctions to strengthen their own client base. 
Research indicates that while stronger economic sanctions could be designed, their 
chances of success remain unknown. Only a complete and thoroughly enforced embargo 
on Iranian petrochemical sales, with a simultaneous economic strengthening of reformist 
actors in the political economy, who are open to a nuclear enrichment policy change, will 
result in the political goals sanctions are designed to achieve. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue remains a central obstacle for U.S. and 
worldwide foreign policy. Although, by now, it is likely that Iran has enough low-
enriched fissile Uranium on hand to eventually develop a nuclear weapon, it still must 
continue enrichment to a higher grade to achieve the goal.1 The legitimacy of continued 
enrichment will almost certainly be contested due to the numerous United Nations (UN) 
resolutions requiring Iran to cease this activity.2 As long as a UN zero-enrichment policy 
remains for Iran,3 the imposition of economic sanctions, diplomacy, and military 
containment appear to be the tools of choice by all governments to deal with and resolve 
the issue. Although political leaders insist that all options are on the table, including 
military options, this is unlikely, given the current fiscal, political, and military 
constraints of the day. But current economic sanctions do not appear to be changing the 
regime’s behavior and, in fact, the regime appears to be simply digging in its heels and 
resisting any peaceful change in its nuclear enrichment policy (among other policies). 
Currently, there are no standard methods of assessing the effects of Iranian 
sanctions, which, itself, is a difficult and politicized effort among governments. 
Assessments of effectiveness vary depending upon which political or economic goal is 
being measured for each sanctions regime.4 If there is consistency among governments, 
especially among UN members, it is that sanctions are not working vis-à-vis the Iranian 
nuclear issue.5 Recent announcements about sanctions’ effects against the Iranian 
                                                 
1 Mark Fitzpatrick, “Iran: The Fragile Promise of the Fuel-Swap Plan,” Survival 52, no. 3 (June 2010), 
72. doi:10.1080/00396338.2010.494878. 
2 Mark Fitzpatrick, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Worst-Case Outcomes International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (Oxford: Routledge, 2008), 15. 
3 Ibid., 23. 
4 Kenneth Katzman, Iran Sanctions.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 
(Washington, D.C., 2011), 48. http://opencrs.com/document/RS20871/. 
5 Ibid., 48. 
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economy also indicate failure: “An IMF [International Monetary Fund] statement issued 
June 13, 2011, casts some doubt that international sanctions are seriously harming Iran’s 
economy.”6 Academic assessments of sanctions regimes typically follow case studies 
(usually after the sanctions regimes have ended and all data is available), which are 
detailed but tenuous in their predictive capability due to the multiple variables used,7 
especially in ongoing cases. 
Policymakers have historically used sanctions regimes to achieve certain foreign 
policy objectives against their target state. When used against an authoritarian state, an 
assumption made by these policymakers is that sanctions are best used in a way that 
eliminates the capabilities and/or strengths of the target state (i.e., revenues, resources), 
thus achieving a change in policy by default. In reality, when sanctions are used in this 
manner against an authoritarian or autocratic state, the success rate is low.8 In the case of 
Iran, as an example, historic sanctions have been used to “cripple the productive base of 
the economy … curtail Iran’s ability to support international terrorism or acquire 
sophisticated military hardware. Economic hardship and fiscal austerity would 
demoralize the population and turn it against the regime.”9 It was hoped that the loss of 
popular support, resources and financing would alter the regime’s foreign policy, and this 
has not happened.10 
The use of economic sanctions has historically come in two types: comprehensive 
sanctions and smart sanctions.11 Comprehensive sanctions are a broad sanctions regime 
and usually cover a wide range of actions (boycotts, embargoes, asset freezes, travel 
bans). They are also unpopular (and often ineffective) due to the massive economic 
collateral damage caused to the civilian population, as well as the ability of the regime’s 
                                                 
6 Kenneth Katzman, Iran Sanctions: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 
(Washington, D.C., 2011), 50. http://opencrs.com/document/RS20871/. 
7 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd, Expanded ed. Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, 2007), Washington, D.C.: 55–56. 
8 Ibid., 166. 
9 Jahangir Amuzegar, Adjusting to Sanctions, Foreign Affairs 76, no. 3 (1997), 31. 
10 Ibid., 31. 
11 Hufbauer, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 138. 
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leadership (usually authoritarian) to stay in control by allocating the remaining scarce 
resources and shifting the costs of the sanctions onto the populace.12 Smart sanctions 
(i.e., targeted sanctions or designer sanctions) are an alternative sanctions regime, the use 
of which is relatively new internationally. Smart sanctions attempt to achieve a foreign 
policy goal with a very narrow sanctions regime by minimizing the economic collateral 
damage to the population and general economy and targeting “specific officials or 
government functions.”13 Examples include: the freezing of a specific asset or assets used 
by the regime leadership; a ban on specific exports to the target state; the suspension of 
aid, or; banning travel for certain regime officials.14 Their humanitarian sentiment 
notwithstanding, these sanctions do not have a good track record against autocratic 
regimes such as Iran,15 and are better as a “signaling device than as a coercive 
measure.”16 Smart sanctions are “not a magic bullet for achieving policy goals,”17 as 
there are many variables for failure. Often, in the case of authoritarian regimes, sanctions 
are sidestepped with black markets or diverted so that internal power rivals absorb the 
costs. In some cases, they require too high a level (and length) of international 
participation and administration before seeing results, or are simply ignored altogether by 
the regime—like Iran, which is actively taking measures to withstand economic 
sanctions.18 The net result in these cases of failure is that the underlying political-
economic structure of the target state is not changed. The regime leadership targeted for 
the specific policy change remains in political and economic control of the state and, 
therefore, refuses the intended change in policy. A new approach is therefore needed.  
This thesis will propose a new method of assessing current Iranian smart 
sanctions regimes, specifically analyzing the effectiveness of the sanctions regime against 
                                                 
12 Hufbauer, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 138. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 167–169. 
16 Ibid., 139. 
17 Ibid., 141. 
18 Jahangir Amuzegar, Sanctioning the Islamic Republic: A New Global Wave, Middle East Economic 
Survey (27 December 2010), 3–4. 
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political actors in Iran. This new approach will recognize that while Iran is an 
authoritarian state, it has factionalized elite (versus a highly concentrated elite, as in 
Hussein’s Iraq) with multiple actors who have differing voices in policy. The use of 
smart or targeted sanctions against the correct actors could result in a change in the 
structure of the political-economy, leading to a policy change. Research will take the 
form of an actor-centered approach and look at the key actors (factions, clients, and 
institutions under their control) in the Iranian political economy, identify how sanctions 
affect their interests, attempt to determine what the effects on the overall Iranian political 
economy are, as well as recommend a new sanction regime better tailored to take these 
interactions into effect. The Iranian economy, as will be shown in subsequent chapters, is 
overly reliant upon its petrochemical sales, which generate 20 percent of its $870 billion 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and accounting for 80 percent of government 
revenues.19 The actors and their intermediaries involved at the top of this political 
economy—the Shiite clerics and the security forces—have both been specifically targeted 
in the various iterations of sanctions currently on the books, but it appears that these 
sanctions are still failing to alter Iranian policy. This thesis will address the following 
questions: Who are the key actors in the Iranian political economy? What are their 
interests? How do these actors interact with one another (i.e., does the structural power of 
capital exclude some actors from having a full voice in state policy)? What are possible 
changes in these actors’ utility schedules likely to have on overall policy decisions? How 
might targeted sanctions differently impact these actors? If these actors’ interests are 
impacted, could that be translated into a change in policy, specifically the nuclear policy? 
Can economic sanctions be selectively targeted to this level? 
This thesis will recommend alternative levels of sanctions and/or other foreign 
policy or diplomatic options to influence key actors within the Iranian political economy 
who have a voice in Iranian state policy. Economic and diplomatic actions by third 
parties (third countries, institutional actors, the UN) will also be assessed when gauging 
the appropriate policy recommendations. This thesis will also assess the actual worldwide 
potential for a successful implementation of such actions, as the political appetite by each 
                                                 
19 Katzman, Iran Sanctions, 6. 
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individual actor to participate in collective action, may not exist. In its conclusion, this 
thesis will present the authors recommended options for success given the worldwide 
political and economic constraints. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Resolving the Iranian nuclear issue is of the highest importance to U.S. and 
worldwide security. Iran’s Islamist/revolutionary sentiment, strategic location alongside 
vital energy shipping lanes, large supply of energy reserves and potential for interfering 
or disrupting its neighbors (who happen to be key U.S. allies) can turn a tactical 
miscalculation into strategic failure. Iran’s history of interference in its neighbors’ affairs, 
and its continued sponsorship of terrorist organizations, also makes the handling of 
diplomatic overtures or punitive economic sanctions a delicate issue. 
Economic sanctions appear to be the tool of choice to deter and alter Iranian 
behavior, specifically the Iranian nuclear enrichment issue. However, material gathered 
to support this thesis indicates that no academic or governmental consensus exists as to 
the exact types of sanctions (and associated diplomatic actions) that are required to 
achieve the political effect desired (i.e., the cessation of nuclear enrichment). Excellent 
assessments of the current state of the Iranian economy are available and key institutional 
actors in critical sectors of the Iranian economy can be identified. Yet, current economic 
sanctions only appear to strengthen the regime’s hand and deeper entrench its position, 
actually having the exact opposite political effect intended. 
This thesis warrants research due to the widespread cases of smart sanctions’ 
misalignments in an authoritarian political-economic model. Current sanctions regimes 
are designed to change the policies of a specific state through the weakening of the 
regimes’ finances, access to resources, or legitimacy, while minimizing the effect on the 
population. As discussed, when used against an authoritarian state, these efforts usually 
fail to bring about a change in the political economy of the state. This method would have 
profound policy implications and could eventually lead to an academic consensus on 
sanctions regime recommendations against a targeted state. Concluding the research of 
this thesis, the most feasible recommendation of translating economic sanctions into the 
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political reality of coercing Iran to abandon its nuclear enrichment pursuits will be made. 
An Iranian change in its nuclear enrichment policy (the dependent variable) could take 
several forms, to include: cutting a deal with the international community to conduct 
Uranium enrichment offshore (as in the proposed Russian fuel rod swap) or even a 
complete abandonment of its enrichment program and a surrendering of all its stockpiled 
low-enriched Uranium. This thesis will examine whether economic sanctions can achieve 
these effects, based on an actor-centric approach, and what levels of economic sanctions 
would be required to do so. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
1. HYPOTHESIS #1: Analysis of Whether Sanctions’ Effects Should Be 
Actor-Centric 
Certain institutions within the economy, such as the Iranian revolutionary guard 
corps (IRGC), have “extended their influence into virtually every sector of the Iranian 
market.”20 Other institutions, including the foundations (bonyads), while not directly 
controlled by the IRGC but linked to it, and the ruling clerics, are also well integrated 
into the Iranian economy.21 These institutions are linked to four primary actors in the 
Iranian political economy today—conservatives, neoconservatives, pragmatists, and 
reformists—who have discernible economic interests in fighting over economic rents that 
have allowed their growth and further expansion into other sectors of the Iranian 
economy, often at the expense of another. The correct applications of sanctions can 
impact these actors, and if impacted, there will be policy consequences that can be 
predicted through the use of a political economy model. Literature on current Iranian 
sanctions indicates that one of the main reasons sanctions are not working is because they 
keep foreign investment out of Iran, which allows these powerful internal actors to take 
over the financing and development of projects, expanding their economic clout and, 
                                                 
20 Frederic M. Wehrey, The Rise of the Pasdaran [Electronic Resource]: Assessing the Domestic Roles 
of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, National Defense Research Institute (U.S.) (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2009), 55. 
21 Ibid., 57. 
 7
therefore, control of policy.22 The IRGC’s hard-line stance on the nuclear issue also 
encourages sanctions, which weaken their own internal political enemies, such as are 
found within the wealthy reformers of the bazaar class.23 A new sanctions regime must 
take all actors into account in the political economy and be used selectively to 
specifically weaken hard-line actors on the nuclear issue while promoting reformers. 
Such sanctions could weaken these hard-line actors enough to allow for an open dialogue 
in government, possibly leading to a reversal in the Iranian nuclear policy. 
2. HYPOTHESIS #2: Sanctions Must Alter the Current Asymmetric 
Balance of Power in the Iranian Political Economy to Achieve Their 
Political Objectives 
Current literature indicates the more conservative Iranian actors control the 
economy and are reorganizing the economy to withstand severe economic sanctions. This 
reorganization is designed to keep the conservative actors in power and the nuclear 
enrichment program on track.24 A sanctions regime that continues to keep foreign 
investment out also keeps entrenched institutions such as the IRGC in virtual control of 
the economy via expansion and seizure of development projects, while ensuring no other 
domestic competition emerges from other actors.25 The conservatives have launched an 
aggressive information operations (IO) campaign to garner domestic support for the 
nuclear program despite potential economic hardships.26 High oil prices also inhibit the 
effects of sanctions, as “many believe the economic effects of international sanctions can 
be tolerated by the regime as long as world oil prices remain high, at over $90 a barrel in  
 
 
                                                 
22 Ali Alfoneh, All the Guard’s Men: Iran’s Silent Revolution, World Affairs 173, no. 3 
(September/October 2010), 78. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Omid Memarian, Iran: Revolutionary Guards Tighten Economic Hold, Global Information Network 
(30 December 2009). 
25 Alfoneh, “All the Guard’s Men: Iran’s Silent Revolution,” 78. 
26 Scott Peterson, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Tightens Grip, The Christian Science Monitor, 9 
December 2009. 
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July 2011.”27 Research will show how entrenched actors are vulnerable, and that 
competitor actors in the Iranian economy could, once in power, bring about the political 
objectives of the sanctions regimes. 
3. HYPOTHESIS #3: Economic Sanctions, Diplomacy, and Military 
Containment are the Best Options for a Solution 
This thesis will take the starting position that economic sanctions, diplomacy, and 
military containment will remain the tools of choice for states seeking to solve the Iranian 
nuclear problem, as appetite for a third major theater war by a UN-sanctioned coalition in 
the Middle East is not politically or fiscally realistic. Thesis analysis will recommend 
alternative levels and avenues of each and assess reactions by Iranian domestic actors and 
leadership. Iranian political actors and their constituencies will be assessed as to the 
effects of an overarching sanctions regime combined with diplomatic overtures and 
ongoing military containment. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
Continuous UN and Western policy debates surround the Iranian nuclear issue 
and exactly what to do about it. This is especially true in the U.S., which has had a 
history of imposing economic sanctions since World War II, throughout the world in 
various and increasing forms. Economic sanctions have been applied against Iran since 
the 1979 Islamic revolution and have continued under successive U.S. presidents to 
“punish Iranian malfeasances.”28 Given this history and the perceptions that existing 
economic sanctions toward the Iranian nuclear issue have failed, it is not surprising that 
as the issue intensifies and no resolution is forthcoming, more severe sanctions are the 
                                                 
27 Katzman, Iran Sanctions, 50. 
28 Suzanne Maloney, Sanctioning Iran: If Only it Were so Simple, The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 1 
(January 2010), 138–139. doi:10.1080/01636600903430673. 
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answer.29 The historic use of economic sanctions, with some successes and some failures 
across the world, raises questions: Who are the main actors in the Iranian economy who 
control policy, specifically the nuclear enrichment policy? Why are current sanctions 
regimes failing to influence these actors and alter this policy? How are sanctions regimes 
best assessed? What change in sanctions regime is required to achieve policy goals? To 
answer these questions, recent literature is sampled with differing opinions; some 
literature advocates continuing and/or expanding sanctions; some literature recommends 
mixing sanctions with diplomacy in a “carrot and stick” approach; other literature 
recommends abandoning sanctions altogether, as they will have no influence on actors. 
The dependent variable in this study is the change in the Iranian nuclear enrichment 
policy, the independent variable is the level of economic sanctions, and the intervening 
variables are the actors, to include Iranian domestic actors, as well as international actors. 
2. Background 
During initial research, comparisons of current Iranian sanctions literature against 
past sanctions literature was attempted. These past cases, where sanctions have been 
applied with both unsuccessful outcomes (North Korea, capability to make nuclear 
weapons;30 Cuba, democratization)31 and successful outcomes (Libya, ending of nuclear 
research program;32 Sudan, ending support to terrorism;33 and South Africa, ending 
apartheid)34 were reviewed. While these case studies were enlightening, more important 
was the discovery that the comparison of differing international sanctions campaigns with 
different objectives and variables is a major research gap. In other words, the political 
effects desired (i.e., independent variables) are often so dissimilar—there is no identified 
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common way to compare the many variables involved in economic sanctions from one 
country and apply them to an analysis of future success or failure with another country. 
Economic sanctions are used against target countries in three main ways: limiting 
exports of the target country, restricting imports from the target country, and impeding 
the flow of finance to the target country.35 In essence, for a successful sanctions regime 
to work, the “costs of defiance borne by the target must be greater than its perceived costs 
of compliance.”36 Sanctions are always undertaken by the sender nation(s) with some 
foreign policy goal in mind. These have varied in objective, duration, and scale, since 
economic sanctions were first used in the modern international arena, by President 
Wilson in the First World War to boycott German goods.37 
Foreign policy goals associated with sanctions are diverse and their use as a tool 
for foreign policy remains controversial. The most common foreign policy goals in the 
last century that have been associated with economic sanctions include: changing a 
target-country’s internal policies (human rights, support to terrorism); changing a target 
country’s foreign policies (cessation of territory, redrawing a border); change a target 
country’s regime (destabilize governments, democratize); disrupting a target country’s 
military potential (development of weapons of mass destruction); and disrupting a target 
country’s military adventure (assisting a revolution, destabilizing an occupation).38 
Although unspoken by political leaders, economic sanctions often are used to satisfy 
other foreign and domestic objectives to “do something.” The use of economic sanctions 
against a target can be enormously satisfying to a domestic and international audience, 
even if the mechanics are ultimately ineffective against the target country itself. “The 
mere act of initiating sanctions justifies the rhetorical campaign against a foreign power, 
provides a rallying cry for stronger measures, and gives domestic lobbies some leverage 
over the foreign regime.”39 
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How then are economic sanctions’ impacts best assessed and better tailored to 
meet these political goals? Most sanctions regimes tend to focus on these external 
variables in relation to some political goal and do not take into account the true effects on 
the actors and their intra-relationships within the target state. This actor-centric approach 
is critical to focusing sanctions to achieve the political effects desired. This approach 
takes economic sanctions analysis down another level, and can lead to a more productive 
approach. 
A brief understanding of the Iranian political economy is necessary before 
continuing further. The state has grown to control 80 percent of the economy, which 
subjugates the enfeebled private sector, making it dependent upon the public sector.40 
The actors that control this public economy are linked to the highest levels of politics. 
Since the ascension of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to the office of supreme leader in 1989, 
the internal balance of power has changed significantly among actors in Iran.41 The 
largest beneficiaries of this change were the conservative elements of the military-
industrial complex to specifically include the security services of the IRGC and Basij, 
whose patronage was cultivated to counterbalance other actors in the system who 
opposed Khamenei’s ascension, based on his weak religious credentials.42 These security 
services began branching out into business transactions in the 1990s to spur development 
and have “accelerated even more during Ahmadinejad’s presidency.”43 This expansion 
was accompanied by the use of an informal network of former IRGC officials and 
veterans, who often run the subsidiaries, and remains linked to the IRGC via patronage.44 
This phenomenon is not new in Iran, as the clerically controlled bonyads, the largest of 
which are overseen directly by the supreme leader,45 control vast wealth, ostensibly for 
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charitable purposes, and have operated in a similar fashion since the Shah’s reign.46 It is 
through these networks that the state controls so large a percentage of the Iranian 
economy today, where political actors have both public and private ownership of the 
opaque economy. Privatization efforts, ostensibly supported by the supreme leader in 
2005, to reduce the size of the government’s public holdings, have not truly privatized the 
economy. These efforts have only resulted in these same elite individuals increasing their 
own private holdings via expanded crony capitalism.47 Sanctions are having an impact on 
these actors, raising their costs of imports and production, requiring the government to 
pay cash subsidies directly to the populace to offset the increase in prices.48 But these 
actors are also entrenching further to capitalize from the sanctions, as the IRGC controls 
“a vast shadow economy of illicit enterprises that are hidden from public view.”49 These 
enterprises, engaged in black-marketeering, assist in the avoidance of sanctions while 
making a substantial yearly profit for the IRGC,50 all the while allowing legitimate 
sanctions enforcement to undermine their domestic competition and enemies at home.51 
This literature review of sanctions therefore focuses on the ongoing debate 
between the differing groups of academics regarding Iranian sanctions, and in doing so, 
three areas of consensus with the objective of convincing Iran to abandon its nuclear 
weapons pursuit have been identified: Iranian economic sanctions need to be draconian in 
their application to achieve their objectives; sanctions need to be supplemented with more 
diplomacy to achieve their objectives; and economic sanctions need to be abandoned 
altogether in favor of other alternatives to achieve their objectives. 
It is also important to provide a brief background of recent developments with the 
Iranian nuclear issue before delving into the differing opinions surrounding the use of 
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economic sanctions against Iran. The main concern of the UN is that Iran is engaged in a 
deception campaign against the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—an 
autonomous organization that reports to the UN—designed to enrich enough Uranium 
Hexafluoride (UF6) to the 90 percent High Enriched Uranium (HEU) threshold required 
to make a nuclear weapon (also known as weapons grade). To achieve this goal, Iran will 
need to enrich 1200 kilograms of its 3.5 percent (low enriched) Uranium (LEU) to make 
one nuclear weapon.52 As of May 2010, Iran is estimated to have twice this amount of 3.5 
percent LEU in its stockpile.53 In February 2010, President Ahmadinejad announced Iran 
would begin enriching its Uranium stockpile to 20 percent to provide fuel rods for its 
Tehran Research Reactor,54 which has legitimate medical uses in cancer treatments.55 
This is alarming because it brings Iran one step closer to the 90 percent weapons grade 
mark, provided Iran continues enrichment, which would only take a few weeks to 
complete (from the 20 percent mark), since most of the effort of Uranium enrichment 
occurs in the beginning stages.56 Also, Iran does not have the fuel-fabrication capability 
to turn this 20 percent enriched Uranium into fuel rods for its research reactor and this 
raises questions as to its true intentions.57 Iran will need outside assistance to produce 
these fuel rods and be required to send its enriched Uranium beyond its borders to 
complete the process, but has consistently delayed in its negotiations to do so. 
International critics contend that “as long as the [LEU] remains within Iran’s borders, 
whether under IAEA seal or not, it would be susceptible to seizure and diversion to 
weapons use.”58 
Given this alarming situation, one can understand the imperative for the UN to 
respond. In 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows it to 
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develop research concerning the production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.59 
Iran argues that its activities are indeed in pursuit of such peaceful policies. However, as 
a signatory, Iran is also required to give the IAEA prior notification of any Uranium 
conversion or enrichment activities.60 Iran failed to report even the existence of its 
Uranium enrichment facility at Natanz in 2002 and failed to report its initial conversion 
(a precursor to enrichment) activities beginning on 8 August 2005 at the same location.61 
These failures form the basis of the IAEA noncompliance findings as of September 2005, 
and the subsequent UN demand, in 2006, that Iran halt its enrichment activities62 
(UNSCR 1696) and follow-on sanctions in 200763 (UNSCR 1737 and 1747), 200864 
(UNSCR 1803) and 201065 (UNSCR 1929). These waves of sanctions have “primarily 
targeted Iranian persons, entities, and banks that [UN] council members determined were 
involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.”66 Unilateral U.S. sanctions targeting 
Iran’s energy sector, as seen in the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) and 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) 
amendments also seek to alter the regime’s nuclear policy. 
Going into the full economic impacts and details of the successive waves of 
sanctions will be addressed in the main body of thesis research and is outside the scope of 
this literature review, but comes full circle to the point—will economic sanctions and 
diplomatic efforts be able to change Iranian political policy with respect to its pursuit of 
enriched Uranium, presumably to produce a nuclear weapon? If current efforts are not  
 
                                                 
59 Zehra Nilufer Karacasulu and Irem Askar Karakir, “Attitudes of the International Community 
Toward Iran’s Nuclear Puzzle,” Journal of International and Area Studies 15, no. 2 (December 2008), 4. 
60 Taylor, Sanctions as Grand Strategy, 63. 
61 Ibid., 63. 
62 J. Crook, “Continuing U.S. Efforts to Discourage Iran’s Nuclear Program,” The American Journal 
of International Law 101, no. 3 (July 2007), 666. 
63 Ibid., 667. 
64 Taylor, Sanctions as Grand Strategy, 66. 
65 Katzman, Iran Sanctions, 6. 
66 Peter Crail, “West may Seek Alternative Sanctions on Iran,” Arms Control Today 38, no. 9 
(November 2008), 55. 
 15
working, what will? What effects will these sanctions have on the regime leadership, and 
what will their reactions be? And what new sanctions can be adopted to achieve political 
effects? 
3. Expanded Sanctions Can Have Political Effects 
The first academic consensus group argues that existing economic sanctions 
should be used to their fullest extent and that additional aggressive (i.e., draconian) 
economic sanctions should be imposed on Iran as soon as possible to change their nuclear 
policy. This group argues that Iran is currently extremely vulnerable to the present 
economic downturn and subsequent decrease in worldwide energy prices, as well as to 
the additional pressure brought on other segments of their economy (external financing 
and suppliers, insurance, and imports), and would bring Tehran back to the negotiating 
table.67 They also argue that Iran is politically vulnerable following its general post-2009 
election unrest.68 They contend that the U.S. is still in a commanding position in the 
global economy and that even expanded unilateral sanctions would have a global effect 
since 1) New York is still the global financial center, 2) the dollar remains the clearing 
currency for petroleum, and 3) regulatory steps taken by the U.S. are mirrored in 
international markets.69 Obviously, such steps would raise concerns for an international 
consensus to all these sweeping sanctions, but this group feels that Iran’s trading partners 
would clearly choose the U.S. over Iran if given an ultimatum.70 This group has 
identified several steps to be taken as a way ahead: The UN sanctions track should be 
pursued more aggressively and even expanded; the UN should better enforce existing 
sanctions on its books (i.e., establish an independent UN team to monitor Iranian 
compliance to sanctions); and the U.S. should independently utilize its full sanctions 
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powers as authorized by recent congressional legislation.71 One aspect of Iran’s economy 
identified as being particularly vulnerable is its imports of refined petroleum, of which 40 
percent is imported from abroad.72 U.S. congressional legislation has recently been 
passed allowing for the sanctioning of actors in this sector of the economy.73 In 
summary, this group argues that “an approach that incorporates aggressive financial 
pressure remains the most likely path to success,”74 with success presumably being 
defined as Iran being brought to its knees, financially, and forced to change its behavior 
with respect to its nuclear enrichment program. 
4. Sanctions Can Have Political Effects If Used with Diplomacy 
An alternative academic argument to forcing Iran to alter its behavior through 
punitive economic sanctions is to coerce it to do so via existing sanctions and expanded 
diplomacy (i.e., an aggressive “carrot and stick” approach). This group argues that it is a 
common mistake to look for sanctions to achieve results on their own, especially if not 
followed up with appropriate reinforcement for negotiation at the bargaining table.75 
Specifically, economic sanctions can complement diplomacy when they give a country an 
incentive to bargain.76 Sanctions should also be specifically tailored to achieve goals, and 
should be balanced to achieve multi-national support and sustainability.77 Economic 
sanctions also need to be flexible and adjusted quickly when objectives are not met 
(expanded), or when they are met successfully (reduced or removed).78 This group argues 
that existing U.S. sanctions and rhetoric “create the perception that U.S. sanctions are 
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focused on regime change [rather] than restarting negotiations.”79 Therefore, current 
sanctions strategies against Iran are flawed from the outset as they lack a coherent 
strategic goal, which is to coerce Tehran to negotiate away its pursuit of enriched 
Uranium in exchange for other concessions. This group also argues that the existing set 
of complex sanctions also lack the capability to quickly reward or punish additional steps 
taken by Iran on this issue.80 Finally, this group argues that the current International 
support for further sanctions against Iran (and third parties) will likely not last and that 
only carefully crafted sanctions with these carrot and stick approaches will be agreed to 
in the future.81 
5. Sanctions Should Be Abandoned and Will Not Have Political Effects 
The final group of consensus argues that sanctions ’will not work against Iran at 
all and should be abandoned as the Iranian regime will not alter its pursuit of enriched 
Uranium based on a financial threat. Their first point is that economic sanctions against 
Iran are legally controversial in that it cannot be proven that Iran’s Uranium enrichment, 
is not, in fact, for peaceful purposes.82 Secondly, economic sanctions, as they currently 
exist, are weak, and while they have hurt the economy, they will not provide a deterrent 
to Iranian behavior.83 Thirdly, economic sanctions against Iran are not sustainable in that 
most countries simply will not embrace them, and will continue to trade with Iran—
especially in the oil and gas sector.84 They also argue that the use of economic sanctions 
against Iran also presents a double-standard, in that Israel (who never signed the nuclear 
nonproliferation treaty) has nuclear weapons and there are no economic sanctions against 
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them.85 Why is the world not concerned about Israel when Iran has already agreed by 
treaty to only use enriched uranium for peaceful purposes? They also argue that further 
sanctions, specifically targeted against Iran’s petroleum sector will backfire—as Iran has 
beefed up its refining petroleum reserves and implemented a quota and rationing program 
designed to limit domestic consumption.86 This has resulted in Iran reducing its 
dependence on foreign-supplied refined petroleum from 40 percent to 20 percent.87 
Neighboring countries, seeing an opportunity for profit, would also assist Iran to “bust 
the sanctions”88 and Russia and China will almost certainly water down further proposed 
sanctions, as they have with the first three rounds of UN sanctions, and the ultimate 
strategic objective will continue to elude the UN.89 Given this set of arguments against 
sanctions, this group has also identified several steps to pursue as a way ahead: first, 
back-channel negotiations should be employed in future negotiations so Iran does not 
appear to be publicly pressured;90 second, a new diplomatic forum needs to be used 
instead of European Union (EU) negotiations (such as a UN-sponsored Gulf Security 
Conference) where regional states are brought into the discussion;91 third, the U.S. should 
employ a high-level envoy to kick-start the process;92 fourth, the U.S. should improve on 
the Palestinian situation and take the initiative away from Iran on regional issues;93 and 
fifth, the U.S. should continue to take the moral high ground with respect to Iran, and 
make public speeches on positive developments on the Iranian enrichment situation, 
versus making threats against Iran.94 Actual engagement with Iran should focus on 
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security guarantees, economic benefits and support for the right of peaceful nuclear 
technology and ways to assist in achieving this end.95 
6. Literature Review Conclusion 
This review highlights a few key points with respect to the Iranian nuclear issue. 
First, there is no common academic consensus on how to proceed, although the Obama 
administration appears to be favoring the sanctions and diplomacy approach.96 Secondly, 
all parties agree that the Iranian leadership (and their negotiators) have consistently stated 
that they will not negotiate away their enrichment rights, no matter what is offered or 
threatened against them. This would indicate that the independent variable (sanctions) 
will have absolutely no effect on the dependent variable (change in behavior). One would 
then consider alternative independent variables to achieve this effect. Surprisingly, one 
thing all parties agree on is that a military strike against Iran (by any nation) to eliminate 
its nuclear facilities is the absolute worst possible option, given Iran’s ability to project 
power in the Persian Gulf region, disrupt shipping lanes, and unleash potential terrorist 
attacks across the world. “In the aftermath of an unprovoked attack, Iran could be 
expected to withdraw from the NPT and engage the full resources of a unified nation in a 
determined nuclear-weapons-development programme.”97 The most incomplete area of 
research found with this literature is that there are no existing estimates or data as to 
exactly what level of financial “pain” the Iranian leadership is willing to tolerate before it 
changes its policies. Applications of sanctions are only effective if they achieve a 
political goal. Other gaps include the level of population tolerance to prolonged (severe) 
economic sanctions, costs to countries imposing sanctions (both economic and political),  
and other potential areas of political vulnerability the regime faces dealing with 
prolonged economic hardship. More research into this subject would have profound U.S. 
policy implications. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The analytical approach that will be taken in the research and production of this 
thesis will include a historical study of past sanctions cases, specifically the Iraqi and 
South African sanctions regimes as unitary actor and democratic states, respectively. 
Iranian sanctions will also be reviewed, and the current effects on their factionalized 
political economy will be examined. Research will draw conclusions as to the efficacy of 
these current and historical economic sanctions regimes on altering Iranian policy and 
recommending alternative or additional sanctions regimes (including accompanying 
diplomatic policies) to achieve intended political results. A closer examination of the 
Iranian political actors and their client constituencies will also be presented, to 
understand the actors’ behaviors, determine their interests, and identify their 
vulnerabilities. Finally, the efficacy of Iranian sanctions will be assessed and new 
recommendations will be presented to achieve a change in the Iranian political economy. 
This will include an analysis of new sanctions’ potential chances of success given the 
political and economic constraints they will face. As stated previously, the official policy 
of the UN remains to deny Iran the legitimacy of its enrichment programs (i.e., zero-
tolerance for enrichment),98 let alone developing the “physics packages” needed to 
weaponize such Uranium while continuing development on long-range delivery 
systems.99 Sanctions regimes must alter the political economy to an extent to achieve 
these goals. 
Important works that specifically address the Iranian sanctions case include: 
Shrewd Sanctions by Meghan O’Sullivan; and Feeling Good or Doing Good with 
Sanctions by Ernest Preeg. Numerous academic and governmental publications also 
supplement these primary sources.  
Other important research available on the Iranian Political Economy include: 
Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East by Clement Moore 
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Henry and Robert Springborg; and A Political Economy of the Middle East by Alan 
Richards and John Waterbury. Numerous academic and governmental publications also 
supplement these primary sources.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis observes the standard convention of five chapter delineations to 
include: An introductory chapter, three chapters of research and background, and a 
concluding analytical chapter where new findings are put forth to address the observed 
gap in knowledge. Chapter II will review historical sanctions cases, including Iraq, South 
Africa, and Iran to compare unitary, democratic and fragmented political economies. 
Chapter III will identify the actors and their constituencies in the Iranian political 
economy, as well as their behaviors, interests and vulnerabilities. Chapter IV will review 
the past and current sanctions regimes targeted at Iran, and assess their effects on the 
political economy, and recommend alternative economic sanctions regimes and 
diplomatic activities to achieve the political effects desired. Finally, Chapter V will 
present the recommended sanctions course of action given this actor-centric approach to 
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II. REASSESSING SANCTIONS REGIMES 
Economic sanctions are defined as “deliberate, government inspired withdrawal, 
or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations.”100 Policymakers in the 
U.S. (and diplomats in the UN) are quick to impose economic sanctions upon other states 
in response to their government’s unfavorable policy decisions. Sanctions are a common 
coercive means of diplomacy that have become the primary tool of choice when 
censuring states and their policies. “Sanctions are part and parcel of international 
diplomacy, a tool for coercing target governments into particular avenues of 
response.”101  
In sum, the imposition of sanctions conveys a triple signal: To the target 
country it says the sender(s) does not condone the target’s actions; to allies 
it says that words will be supported with deeds; and to domestic audiences 
it says the sender government will act to safeguard the nation’s vital 
interests.102 
A survey of the historical use of sanctions by the United States indicates a number 
of reasons for their use: 
Sanctions have been deployed to pursue a number of foreign policy goals 
other than those related to warfare and national security… during the Cold 
War these episodes often found a superpower pitted against a smaller and 
formerly friendly country gone “astray.”103  
Following World War I, the idea that economic sanctions could be used as an 
alternative to armed conflict gained worldwide recognition and popularity, yet “through 
World War II, the objectives sought with the use of sanctions retained a distinctly martial 
flavor.”104 Economic sanctions have become a prominent part of U.S. foreign policy, 
participating in 118 cases of unilateral and/or joint sanctions cases between 1914 and 
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2007 (out of a total of 187 worldwide cases).105 Most cases of sanctions after the Cold 
War have had varying objectives, but regime change (specifically encouraging 
democratic reforms or the restoration of democracy) has been the main objective in 
almost half of the cases, with a few successes, but most cases ended in failure.106 Other 
objectives of sanctions during this period include efforts to “settle expropriation claims, 
to counter drug lords, and to combat international terrorism.”107 
Sanctions have a troubled track record achieving their objectives due to a number 
of variables. Often, the political objectives of the sanctions are not met, despite the 
economic success of the sanctions against the target country. Yet, sanctions continue to 
be used as a form of state censure, as alternatives are viewed as unacceptable. “Military 
action would be too massive and diplomatic protest too meager.”108 This chapter will 
examine these variables, review past sanctions cases, including the Iranian case specific 
to this work—and propose factors for future success. 
In the case of Iran, there is evidence that sanctions are having economic effects 
towards their intended economic objectives, but are still not achieving their intended 
political objectives. This chapter will begin to investigate the Iranian case by identifying 
the framework of all the variables of sanctions and their weaknesses and characterize 
ways to sharpen “smart sanctions” to achieve their intended political effects. 
A. VARIABLES IMPACTING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SUCCESSES AND 
FAILURES 
Reviewing the literature, there are five main reasons that economic sanctions have 
historically failed to alter the policy behavior of states. These reasons will be discussed, 
and to them will be added a fifth reason that is often inadequately considered by 
designers of sanctions. Smart sanctions can be made “smarter” by designing and 
implementing sanctions with these considerations taken into account. Additional 
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measures supporting sanctions need to be taken by governments in support of sanctions 
to ensure smart sanctions are effective (i.e., media coverage showing realities of 
sanctions, law enforcement activities, and diplomatic initiatives). 
These variables were primarily drawn from Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, a 
recent work by Dr. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, who has written extensively on international 
trade, global investments and finance and economic sanctions issues. A number of other 
authors frequently cite his works on sanctions, in particular, for their own assessments of 
sanctions cases. Specific to Iran, and independent of Dr. Hufbauer, other scholars have 
put forth very similar assessment-variable criteria, to include Dr. Nokolay A.Kozhanov’s 
assessment that Iranian sanctions are failing (primarily) due to variables three (weak 
sanctions enforcement) and four (unpopularity of sanctions internationally) below.109 
Similarly, Dr. Meghan O’Sullivan’s assessment of Iranian sanctions failures cites 
variables one (inadequate sanctions) and five (structure of the political economy) as the 
primary variables.110 
1. Sanctions Are Inadequate 
Sanctions themselves are most often simply inadequate to accomplish their 
intended political goals.111 “The goals may be too elusive; the means too gentle; or 
cooperation from other countries, when needed, are too tepid.”112 Meeting foreign policy 
objectives with smart sanctions is in itself a difficult concept. Economists can identify 
areas of an economy and design smart sanctions to target those areas and have economic 
impacts. Weak areas of an economy, where supplies of a number of commodities are 
deficient, could be severely impacted with economic sanctions or embargoes. Strong 
areas of the economy can also be identified, where exports of the state’s commodities 
could be limited by sanctions or prevention of further investment to exploit resources or 
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commodities. However, this is irrelevant if the regime in power refuses to be deterred by 
sanctions due to the perceived importance of the policy goal. 
2. Sanctions May Strengthen the Legitimacy of the Targeted Leadership 
If the sanctioned state’s leaders have embarked on a policy that is highly popular 
across the state’s policy, the sanctions are doomed to failure and will not result in the 
policy change the sanctions are designed to coerce. The costs of sanctions will be gladly 
borne by the population and can easily be used by the leadership to shore up their own 
legitimacy against opposition groups. “In particular, economic sanctions may unify the 
target country both in support of its government and in search of commercial alternatives 
[to the sanctioned commodities].”113 This is especially true if the leadership maintains 
tight control of the dialogue over the policy via control of the media and press. 
3. Enforcement of Sanctions is Weak 
Multilateral enforcement of sanctions is also of vital importance. If sources of 
imports and outlets for exports can be found by the sanctioned state, the sanctions 
imposed can be mitigated, and the sanctions have only symbolic value. They would not 
achieve their intended economic effects and, therefore, have no political effects beyond 
serving a domestic and international imperative for some kind of action to be taken. 
“Sanctions may prompt powerful or wealthy allies of the target country to assume the 
role of ‘black knight,’ their support can largely offset whatever deprivation results from 
sanctions themselves.”114 This kind of sanctions avoidance can take the form of direct 
trade by nonsanctions participating states, or via the grey area of third country 
intermediaries—foreign subsidiary companies acting as intermediate shipping agents to 
move sanctioned commodities in and out of third countries to their ultimate destination 
—the sanctioned state itself. It is critical that states sending sanctions use accompanying 
measures in support of sanctions to enforce them, such as extensive international law-
enforcement cooperation to curtail smuggling. 
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4. Sanctions are Unpopular among Sending States 
Political and economic goals may not be shared with all sanctions-imposing 
states,115 and the degree of the sanctions costs may not be equitable among all imposing 
states. This can lead to misunderstandings between imposing states, in the best cases, and 
to falling-out between them that lead to sanctions mitigation in the worst cases. A states’ 
national interest has always tended to trump its foreign alliances, and this includes 
agreements on multilateral sanctions. Past examples of the worst cases of sanctions 
misunderstandings regarding objectives have seen anti-sanction legislation introduced by 
some of the imposing states that actually mitigates the very sanctions (economically and 
psychologically) they are supposed to be enforcing.116 Economic costs of sanctions to 
domestic businesses are also a serious concern, especially if they are perceived as 
inequitable by the business community. In the past, business interests have successfully 
lobbied for exceptions to sanctions laws to prevent a loss of sales, business reputation, 
and reliability.117 “After the first flush of patriotic enthusiasm, such complaints can 
undermine a sanctions initiative.”118 Attempts to ensure multilateral cooperation via 
unilateral sanctions legislation has also created a severe backlash internationally and 
more waiver options for sanctions that mitigate the intended economic and political 
effects of sanctions. Past sanctions against Iran have led to amendments to U.S. sanctions 
laws to allow for waivers that prevent “a potential clash over extraterritorial application 
of U.S. law.”119 Economic sanctions should therefore be undertaken by sending 
governments with supporting efforts. These measures include: showcasing the economic 
and political goals of the sanctions—and solidifying domestic and international support; 
using extensive media coverage to show the realities of sanctions in the target country  
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(attempting to avoid humanitarian disasters being blamed on sanctions, versus the target 
country’s own economic choices) and; better diplomatic initiatives to gain international 
support for sanctions. 
5. Structure of the Target State’s Political Economy 
The structure of the target state’s economy is often not given enough attention by 
policy makers when fashioning sanctions. Intimate knowledge of the number of political 
elite actors and their degree of control over sectors of the economy is critical to 
fashioning sanctions that achieve their political objectives. The wealth of the targeted 
state is included in this assessment, as financial and trade sanctions do have a significant 
impact on the relative wealth of both resource poor and rich states. 
Financial sanctions [in the form of withholding aid to poor countries, or a 
restriction of international finance to wealthy states] offer the potential for 
greater effectiveness as a foreign policy tool because they are easier to 
enforce, harder to evade, and may spur market-reinforcing effects.120  
However, even the most draconian of these types of sanctions have failed to achieve their 
political objectives. Most states targeted with these types of sanctions have a unitary 
political elite faction (i.e., a dictatorship autocracy that emasculates or eliminates all 
political opposition) and is able to withstand the economic effects of these types of 
sanctions, suppress the internal dissent resulting from them, and thus elude the political 
goals—even if imposed for a long period of duration. 
These types of sanctions have historically been broad in their application and 
mostly target the economy as a whole, or assets and resources of the political elite. “Asset 
freezes are also becoming more popular as a means of targeting the leaders of ‘rouge’ 
regimes, corrupt autocrats, and their associates.”121 It is hoped that these types of 
sanctions will coerce the leadership into the desired policy change. Often, the leadership 
is able to deflect the actual costs of sanctions away from its own assets and resources 
towards its political competitors or other sectors of the economy. Economic and political 
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factors of the targeted state can be a factor in the ability of the leadership to mitigate 
these sanctions.122 If the state is, initially, economically healthy, with normal ranges of 
inflation and unemployment—and the leadership remains in firm control of the state—
then these costs are easier to absorb. Political dissent will be easier to suppress by the 
leadership, and the policy objectives of the sanctions will be more difficult to achieve. If 
the state is, initially, economically unhealthy, exhibiting a multitude of economic 
problems, and the leadership’s hold on power and government is questionable, it may be 
more willing to negotiate to end the sanctions, with the resulting achievement of the 
political objectives. If the state has abundant resources for export, and the political elite 
can maintain control of those resources, then dislodging or altering their policies will 
prove more difficult to do without a very tight sanctions regime that prevents smuggling. 
If there are legitimate political challengers to power in the state (i.e., a fractured elite), a 
sanctions regime will more easily achieve its political results. 
In cases of democracies, or an autocracy with fragmented elite actors such as Iran, 
this type of reasoning should find more applicability as at least a nucleus of legitimate 
political dissent exists within the leadership.  
A related finding [in examining sanctions cases] is that sanctions seeking a 
modest change in policy are more successful against target countries that 
are relatively more democratic … democracies are by definition more 
open to voices advocating a policy shift than autocratic countries. If 
important internal groups see merit in a policy change, that view is more 
likely to find advocates within the top circles of a democratic 
government.123 
Therefore, the costs of sanctions targeted against legitimate democracies would not be 
long tolerated as the political economy is diffused among many actors with a voice in 
government. “Past experience suggests that punitive sanctions are most likely to be 
effective in societies where there is some degree of democracy and social openness.”124 
                                                 
122 Hufbauer, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 62. 
123 Ibid., 67. 
124 Euclid A. Rose, “From a Punitive to a Bargaining Model of Sanctions: Lessons from Iraq,” 
International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (September 2005), 470. 
 30
In an autocracy with a fragmented elite, this concept is still sound, but sanctions 
are often misapplied as if a unitary elite were in complete political and economic control 
of the state. Sanctions designed to weaken the assets and resources of the biggest political 
actor (usually the actor most resistant to the desired policy change) are designed and 
implemented, and while their economic effects can be argued on a case-by-case basis, 
usually result in failure. The largest political actor usually has the most control of the 
political economy and can shift the costs of sanctions to other actors (and sectors of the 
economy under their control) while preserving their own assets and resources. Similar 
sanctions that limit foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign aid, and punishment of 
human rights abuses are targeted too broadly and are usually ineffective against a 
political economy with a fragmented elite. 
B. BRIEF ECONOMIC CASE STUDIES 
In order to lay a framework for these variables, a brief review of several cases of 
economic sanctions against targeted states is necessary. These cases will examine the 
sources of failure and determine their impacts and reasons for failure in achieving their 
political objectives. Cases reviewed will include a unitary autocracy (Iraq), a democracy 
(South Africa), and a fragmented autocracy (Iran). 
1. Sanctioning Iraq 
Iraq under Saddam Hussein can easily be characterized as one of the most brutal 
dictatorship autocracies in history. Brooking no dissent, political oppositionist actors to 
the Baathist regime were ruthlessly eliminated. Potential political opposition was co-
opted and coerced to become the regime’s closest supporters. This was done with 
patronage, outlays of capital and rents dispensed from the regime to these actors, while 
simultaneously (and ultimately) threatening them with elimination should any hint of 
threat or independent power base manifest itself behind any of these actors.125 The power 
of this “sword” and the ability to eliminate rivals became the ultimate guarantor of 
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Saddam’s structural power in Iraq.126 As a unitary actor firmly in control of the political 
economy, Saddam Hussein’s regime and the co-opted network of family, 
military/security apparatuses and connected tribal leaders—all acting in unison—
weathered years of economic sanctions, which were devastating, economically, to the 
Iraqi state and failed in all their political objectives. 
Detailing the waves of economic sanctions and their micro-level economic effects 
is beyond the scope of this work. But a broad examination of sanctions relative to the 
historic reasons for failure is necessary, and this examination will reveal that, ultimately, 
a unitary actor firmly in control of the political economy can more easily influence the 
other variables to frustrate the political goals sanctions are designed to achieve. 
Economic sanctions against Iraq from 1990–2003 fall in two broad periods: the first from 
1990–1996; the second from 1997–2003.127 These periods will be briefly examined for 
the variables most responsible for their failure. 
a. Iraqi Sanctions 1990–1996 
Iraq’s economy was already severely weakened prior to the onset of 
sanctions in August 1990 due to the Iran–Iraq war. Iraq was heavily in debt to its Arab 
neighbors and its economy severely damaged from the war.128 Policymakers assumed 
that sanctions would, therefore, quickly bite and Saddam would fold to UN demands. 
“They anticipated that Iraq would grudgingly, but quickly, comply with UN resolutions, 
paving the way for the lifting of sanctions and the resumption of more normal, if guarded, 
relations with the international community. None of these expectations materialized.”129 
Further damage from the six-week Desert Storm campaign, designed to disrupt the Iraqi 
military’s command, as well as its logistical, petroleum, and industrial capabilities, 
further damaged the entire economy.130 
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Economic sanctions imposed during this period therefore, had a head start 
and did achieve their economic objectives, and came close to achieving their political 
ones by 1996. “The multilateral, comprehensive sanctions regime put in place terminated 
virtually all legal, nonhumanitarian trade—both military and civilian—between Iraq and 
the rest of the world.” Virtually isolated from the outside world during this period, 
Saddam’s regime did what it could to maintain its patronage networks, while keeping the 
population at the subsistence level. “Efforts to maintain food supplies and to accumulate 
foreign exchange from any source were crucial to Saddam’s efforts to protect his inner 
circle [during this time].”131 These financial and trade sanctions were devastating 
economically, and in choosing its own survival over the welfare of his people, Iraq’s 
humanitarian crisis worsened. 
By the middle of the 1990s, sanctions and Saddam’s mismanagement of 
the economy had caused a major economic crisis.132 Hyper-inflation, the growth of a 
sizable shadow economy (to include smuggling oil) and especially the inability to pay for 
food imports had forced Saddam to implement austerity measures and begin negotiations 
for the Oil for Food Program, finalized in November 1996.133 Without this agreement 
(acceptance of UN Resolution 986, the oil for food program), Saddam’s ability to 
stabilize the economy—his ability to maintain his patronage networks while keeping the 
population at subsistence level—would have evaporated and his regime would have faced 
“economic collapse and political turmoil.”134 This eventuality was not an objective of the 
sanctions during this period and humanitarian concerns outweighed the economic effects 
on the regime. Sanctions had almost achieved their political goals. 
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b. Iraqi Sanctions 1997–2003 
“Until the Oil for Food program got underway in 1997, hardly any goods 
crossed Iraq’s borders in either direction.”135 Economic sanctions had severely weakened 
the Iraqi economy, but the start of the oil for food program untied one of Saddam’s 
hands. Previously contending with food rationing and paying for food with limited 
foreign receipts to keep the population at subsistence level, this program freed him to 
instead focus on maintaining and expanding his patronage networks to his potential rivals 
and key supporters, especially his armed forces.136 His ability to fully rebuild his armed 
forces, however, remained limited to funding from illicit activities.137 
Sanctions continued to incur huge costs on the Iraqi economy despite the 
oil for food program, but Saddam used this to his advantage, blaming economic problems 
both internationally and domestically on the sanctions versus his own economic priority 
choices. “In the absence of sanctions, Iraq could have expected to export more than $250 
billion in oil and other goods from 1990 to 2000—approximately $200 billion more than 
it actually did even when the exports under the Oil for Food program are taken into 
account.”138 Saddam, instead, co-opted oil smuggling networks and expanded them to 
bring in extra cash to his regime, as this proved to be extremely profitable and kept his 
regime in place.139 
Sanctions on oil—the key to achieving the political goals—were busted 
directly through the oil for food program as well, as Iraq was able to increase its oil 
production capabilities, and regional neighbors assisted with the smuggling abroad.140 
“Illicit sales rose as oil production increased and the legal export of oil under the Oil for 
Food Program made smuggling more difficult to detect.”141 Iraq also sought petroleum 
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development project contracts (under the oil for food program) specifically with states 
influential at the UN who had a vested interest in ending the sanctions,142 and with 
“foreign companies seeking to market Iraqi oil,”143 many of whom were: 
Unknown … many of them apparently based in countries more 
sympathetic to Iraq. Less subject to international scrutiny than major oil 
companies, these firms allowed Iraq to continue exporting oil through 
favored middlemen with less oversight from the UN or western 
governments.144 
The worsening humanitarian situation during this period, of which 
sanctions were perceived as being the only culprit, was also influencing worldwide public 
opinion toward sanctions. Multiple studies and reports blamed the worsening 
humanitarian situation in Iraq squarely on the “punitive” economic sanctions in place,145 
versus the economic choices of a brutal dictatorship intent on staying in power at any 
price. These studies blamed sanctions as being solely responsible for the plunging of 
Iraq’s per capita income and the caloric intake of its citizens to the lowest in the world 
(i.e., Bangladesh, Haiti, and Ethiopia), increasing diseases and premature child deaths 
and destroying the societal safety net of the country.146 The perception that sanctions 
alone caused the worsening humanitarian situation prompted even successive UN 
secretary generals to question the legitimacy of economic sanctions at all.147 
c. Iraqi Sanctions Assessment 
Adequacy of Sanctions: Sanctions during this time were adequate for 
accomplishing their economic objectives, but inadequate for the political objectives set 
(i.e., modifying regime behavior), primarily because the structure of the Iraqi political 
economy was controlled by a unitary elite. Sanctions were not left in place long enough 
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to weaken Saddam enough to contend with a rival to power (one who would cooperate 
with UN demands), and Saddam was given an out based on humanitarian concerns via 
the oil-for-food program (in which Saddam played a part in spreading the propaganda 
that sanctions were solely responsible for).148 Also, the sanctions structure provided 
Saddam with no incentives to comply with the political demands.149 The outlet provided 
by the oil for food program gave Saddam a way to maintain his hold on the political 
economy due to his unitary hold on economic activity and the allocation of resources to 
favored actors. Sanctions did have some success weakening the regime. Income from oil 
exports was virtually nonexistent from 1991–1996,150 and Iraqi aggression was certainly 
contained. Important resources were kept out of the hands of the regime, especially 
military equipment, both conventional and unconventional.151 However, with the 
increase of smuggling enabled by willing regional state and nonstate actors and abuse of 
the oil for food program, Saddam was able to maintain his patronage networks, 
“providing the elite with access to luxuries and commodity items.”152 
Strengthening of Legitimacy: Sanctions, in the long run, did not strengthen 
the legitimacy of Saddam’s rule—but this is irrelevant due to his control of the political 
economy and security apparatuses. It can be argued that sanctions strengthened the 
legitimacy of Saddam’s regime and his policies, at least in the first few years. 
Saddam did find a number of ways to turn sanctions to his domestic 
advantage in the short term. Sanctions created an external enemy in the 
form of the U.S. (more so than the UN) and perpetuated a “siege 
mentality” in Iraq, both of which the regime exploited to deflect criticism 
from its rule and to justify its own repressive behavior.153  
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Sanctions allowed Saddam to appear to be the people’s benefactor via the distribution of 
free food rations (with the exception of the Kurdistan region).154 But domestic legitimacy 
was severely eroded in the long term as sanctions continued to bite, causing serious 
economic difficulties to the population, while simultaneously weakening the strength of 
the regime.155 “More than a decade of sanctions narrowed his base of support 
considerably, as multiple coup attempts and tribal rebellions over the period suggest.”156 
Enforcement of Sanctions: Iraqi sanctions were not universally enforced, 
primarily due to regional sanctions fatigue, Saddam’s ability to “advance his political 
agenda through the economic links made possible through the Oil for Food Program,”157 
and the extremely lucrative smuggling activity, which Saddam’s regime enabled and 
depended upon, itself. 
Popularity of Sanctions: The popularity of Iraqi sanctions was certainly 
weak, for several reasons, some for which the United States deserves a measure of 
responsibility. The breakdown of the Oslo Peace Process in the late 1990s made 
continuing enforcement of Iraqi sanctions untenable by regional Arab states.158 Also, 
Saddam’s propaganda did a far better job of shaping debate and international public 
opinion on sanctions to his favor than the United States did. “The United States made 
only feeble efforts to counter Saddam’s well-orchestrated propaganda campaign to 
convince the world that sanctions—not his own indifference—were responsible for the 
suffering of Iraqis.”159 This is also due to the fact that there was no political opposition in 
Iraq to provide an alternative view. “Perhaps nothing could have shored up international 
support for sanctions better than a more effective, continuous, and concerted effort…[to 
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showcase Saddam’s] actions to frustrate international humanitarian relief efforts and his 
preference for spending Iraqi resources on nefarious rather than charitable purposes.”160 
Structure of the Political Economy: Ultimately, the lack of political 
opposition (due to Saddam’s ruthless suppression of it), as well as his unchallenged 
control of the economy shaped all the other factors relative to assessing Iraqi sanctions. 
Iraq was an impossible nut to crack with sanctions alone due to the structural power of 
the regime, based on its complete control of resources, patronage networks, security 
services, and information. Sanctions were not coupled with incentives to comply, nor 
were they coupled with further punishment for noncompliance. Instead, little action was 
taken against Iraq’s failures to comply with political demands due to the fractured nature 
of the international community over sanctions, which can be attributed to Saddam’s 
ability to divide it, politically, with his ultimate control of the Iraqi political economy.161 
“Sanctions were less effective against the dictatorial regime in Iraq because domestic 
opposition groups were unable to exert pressure for political change.”162 
2. Sanctioning South Africa 
South Africa is a unique sanctions case, due to its democratic history. But this 
history is skewed due to the structure of its political economy—one where only a small 
racial white minority had all voice in an otherwise open parliament. Non-whites could not 
vote, had no representation based on the constitution, and were sequestered to their own 
areas of land—and only allowed passage on white lands to work.163 This white racial 
minority comprised approximately 15 percent of the population by 1980, but “earned 
two-thirds of the income and controlled over 80 percent of the land.”164 The 
unrepresented majorities fought for participation in that government and integration into 
the broader political system. Prior to the lifting of sanctions in April 1994, the state’s 
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white racial minority found itself under siege from the international community to both 
end its apartheid policy and to end South African regional aggression—particularly in 
Namibia, which was under South African occupation—which were the primary goals of 
the economic sanctions.165 
Some have argued that sanctions alone did not and could not have brought about 
the change in the political economy of South Africa, which allowed for the ending of 
apartheid. This is primarily because South African sanctions in the 1980s were porous, 
and could be fairly easily avoided by paying a premium. “The direct impact of trade 
sanctions was limited. South Africa developed extensive measures to circumvent the 
sanctions, although these sometimes involved costly import-substitution.”166 The 
ongoing industrialization of South Africa, and the need for a larger volume of unskilled 
labor that came from nonwhite minorities, was also certainly a factor for this 
demographic to demand representation in the democracy.167 Changing demographics also 
contributed as the white population was shrinking relative to the nonwhite population, 
and apartheid could not continue forever.168 As time went on, reformist politicians also 
came to power in South Africa, arguably as a result of the perceptions of international 
sanctions and their changing normative views on apartheid. 
a. South African Sanctions 
Forms of South African sanctions had been ongoing since the 1960s, to 
include an arms embargo during that period, as well as an oil embargo in 1973 by the 
Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC). Iran ignored this embargo, becoming 
South Africa’s primary oil provider until 1979, undercutting the costs of sanctions.169 
Riots and protests against apartheid policies, as well as military incursions into Angola in 
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the late 1970s undermined the perception of political stability in South Africa, resulting 
in restrictions on private sector loans from concerned multinationals, as well as some 
governments formally banning direct investment, as well as advocating disinvestment 
during this time.170 South Africa weathered some of this storm by borrowing from the 
International Monetary Fund and by relying on commodities exports (especially a rising 
price in gold) to maintain its balance of payments.171 However, by the early 1980s, 
before the multilateral economic sanctions were put in place, the damage to South 
Africa’s reputation had been done and many private lenders began pulling out based on 
fears of “political instability and a deteriorating economic situation”172 touching off a 
liquidity crisis. 
It is important to note South Africa’s foreign loan requirements at this 
time, which it needed for its policy of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). South 
Africa’s industrialization, which it viewed as a necessary step in economic development, 
was changing its political economy and making its policy of apartheid increasingly 
untenable. Not only did this policy make South Africa more vulnerable to international 
sanctions to meet its borrowing and trade finance requirements, it was the primary means 
that the nonwhite majority became politicized.173 The policies of segregated racial labor 
laws and living locations advocated by apartheid were increasingly impossible to manage 
as the country industrialized, and the new nonwhite proletariat class sought increasing 
political representation in the closed democracy. This factor, combined with a decreasing 
relative percentage of the white population and the labor/wealth distortions across the 
economy led to the development of an “effective political movement against the 
apartheid government,”174 ultimately leading to the achievement of the political goals of 
the sanctions regime. 
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By the time sanctions were put in place, starting in September 1985, the 
political and financial crisis had reached a near boiling point. Fresh rounds of multilateral 
sanctions on banning FDI, lending, and trade were issued, specifically targeting natural 
resource commodities produced in South Africa.175 However, “The anti-apartheid 
sanctions regime was, in addition to being a patchwork of both voluntary and mandatory 
prohibitions undertaken by a multitude and variety of actors, extremely “leaky”; goods 
still found their way into and out of South Africa and many white South Africans were 
able to retain their individual contacts with the rest of the world.”176 
b. South African Sanctions Assessment 
Adequacy of Sanctions: Multilateral, government-sponsored sanctions 
were inadequate to achieve their economic and political objectives alone. South African 
merchants found ways to bust sanctions with higher-cost import substitution and 
transshipments through nonparticipating states.177 Furthermore, evidence indicates that 
sanctions caused the government of President Botha to intensify repression of nonwhites 
and dig in harder against perceived foreign interference.178 Evidence also indicates that 
unprompted private sector withdrawal of capital and credit was far more economically 
damaging to South Africa than the public mandates were,179 but the apartheid regime was 
able to weather this economic effect as well. 
Strengthening of Legitimacy: The most important contribution sanctions 
made to achieving their political objectives were in delegitimizing the apartheid 
government and providing much needed legitimacy to the nonwhite oppositionist 
movement. “The sanctions signaled the extent to which South Africa was isolated in the 
international community … although sanctions in one form or another had been in place 
for a long time, those of the mid-1980s included key South African allies, such as the 
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United States, in a nontrivial way.”180 Black opposition leaders all made statements to the 
importance of maintaining the sanctions regime during their struggle, which gave their 
own cause legitimacy.181 
Enforcement of Sanctions: The enforcement of sanctions was satisfactory 
by participating states, but “sanctions never completely isolated South Africa or white 
South Africans.”182 This was due to the ability of the South African business elites to 
anticipate and adapt to upcoming sanctions.183 As stated, nonparticipating states took full 
advantage of multilateral (public) sanctions to adjust international trade, and trade with 
them somewhat balanced losses from standard trading partners.184 
Popularity of Sanctions: Sanctions against South Africa were almost 
universally popular due to the normative perceptions of apartheid, as well as to negative 
perceptions of South African aggression. Popular culture embraced the multilateral 
sanctions and they were portrayed as a humanitarian cause, strengthening the legitimacy 
of nonwhite oppositionist movements. 
Structure of the Political Economy: Sanctions had an important supporting 
role but were not the primary reason for achieving political goals. The primary reason 
that political goals were achieved was due to the changing structure of the South African 
Political Economy; the simultaneous weakening of the white praetorian class and the 
strengthening of the nonwhite proletariat class due to industrialization and demographics, 
which ultimately delivered the political goals of economic sanctions in South Africa. 
Over time, the changing structure of the political economy gave the proletariat class 
access to education and capital via early reforms in the labor market, which was 
translated into an unstoppable political movement further strengthened with the 
legitimacy sanctions bestowed upon it. Other external factors of the political economy 
that helped achieve both political goals of sanctions was the end of the Cold War and the 
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withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, which further delegitimized the apartheid 
regime and its necessity of maintaining its hold on power and its military adventures.185 
The communist threat from their neighbors, often overlooked, was a significant external 
reason why the white praetorian class desired to hang onto power, despite international 
condemnation of their policies and economic sanctions related to them.186 Once the 
communist threat was removed, a powerful incentive for negotiating a share of 
governmental power, including an ending of apartheid, presented itself.187 
3. Sanctioning Iran 
Iranian sanctions, in various forms, have been in place for three decades, 
undergoing five major rounds of expansions under differing U.S. administrations.188 The 
current economic and political goals of sanctions go beyond the nuclear issue and there is 
still debate among policymakers and analysts as to all the goals sanctions are meant to 
achieve in Iran.189 Economic and political goals of current sanctions include:  
Taking a moral stance against human rights abuses in Iran; deterring other 
countries from taking the same nuclear route as Iran; signaling 
international disapproval [for Iran’s foreign and domestic policies]; 
delaying and disrupting Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs; helping 
the democratic opposition; crippling the country [economically], or at least 
the government; using sanctions as leverage to open fruitful negotiations 
on the nuclear issue or perhaps on a broader set of issues [opposition to the 
Middle East peace process], and; persuading Iran to halt its uranium 
enrichment efforts.190 
The structure of the Iranian political economy is fractured and is not composed of 
a unitary elite like Saddam’s Iraq, and certainly not a democracy like South Africa 
(despite significant segments of the population being excluded from participation in the 
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government for most of the period of economic sanctions). More detail on the political 
actors in Iran will be provided in subsequent chapters, but at this point, it is worth 
mentioning that there is political opposition in Iran to the conservative elites who have 
the most hold on power, patronage networks, and the security apparatus. Despite early 
difficulties of enforcement, multilateral economic sanctions are now (circa 2010) having 
a significant effect on the Iranian economy and are compounding problems resulting from 
their own internal economic mismanagement. However, as in the other cases, the key to 
achieving the political goals of sanctions (short of armed conflict) lies in using sanctions 
to strengthen oppositionist movements in the political economy who will bring about 
political change, including the political goals of sanctions themselves. 
a. Iranian Sanctions 
UN and worldwide bilateral sanctions on Iran (the latest of which are 
imposed by Resolution 1929, adopted June 9, 2010) are a relatively recent 
(post-2006) development. U.S. sanctions, on the other hand, have been a 
major feature of U.S.-Iran policy since Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution.191  
The Obama administration’s policy, in coordination with Congress, has 
been to pursue engagement with Iran on the nuclear issue and increase the bite of 
sanctions incrementally to coerce such a settlement, while not alienating key international 
sanctions partners for additional sanctions against Iran.192 Existing sanctions against have 
been building on each other for many years, to include overlaps with UN and allied 
states’ sanctions regimes to compel Iran to negotiate on multiple issues, especially the 
nuclear issue.193 
A brief review of current Iranian sanctions should begin with the 
declaration of Iran as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in January 1984 and the subsequent  
 
 
                                                 




imposition of sanctions to halt foreign aid, dual use (military and civilian) items, and 
requires the U.S. to oppose international loans or foreign assistance (except in disaster 
aid).194 
Sanctions were extended during President Clinton’s administration with 
proscriptions on U.S. participation in Iran’s petroleum sector development and 
investment,195 and with the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which “authorized U.S. 
penalties against foreign firms, many of which are incorporated in countries that are U.S. 
allies.”196 These extra-territorial sanctions were designed to provide a disincentive for 
foreign firms to invest in Iran and “became a high profile [foreign policy] issue in U.S. 
relations with Europe and Russia,”197 leading to their international unpopularity. 
During the Bush administration, the president’s authority to impose 
sanctions in relation to Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs was greatly 
enhanced with the passage of the 2006 Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation 
Act, allowing for the sanctioning of individual persons and corporations and enabling 
these capabilities in Iran, especially their security services.198 This supplemented earlier 
executive orders sanctioning state and nonstate actors providing WMD proliferation and 
assistance to Iran.199 Other executive orders during this time froze “assets of firms and 
individuals said to be involved in Iran’s support for terrorism.”200 At this time, the Iran 
Freedom Support Act of 2006 was also passed, which sought to aid Iranian dissident 
democratic movements by providing financial assistance with media outlets that “strive 
for peaceful transformation of the regime and criticized Tehran’s nuclear stance.”201 
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In June 2010, the Obama administration signed the Comprehensive Iran 
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA). This amended previous U.S. 
sanctions acts and expanded sanctions “by targeting the supply of refined petroleum 
products sent to Iran by non-U.S. firms,”202 and also sanctioned, among other provisions, 
the sale of “gasoline production related equipment and services to Iran, and to restrict 
international banking relationships with Iran.”203 CISADA also strengthened previous 
efforts by the U.S. treasury department to cut Iran out of the international banking system 
by banning third country banks that do business in Iran from operating in the U.S.,204 
Following the contested June 2009 election results, CISADA amendments also include 
measures to use targeted sanctions to promote the domestic opposition in Iran.205 
“Several measures to support the opposition’s ability to communicate, to reduce the 
regime’s ability to monitor and censor Internet communications and to identify and 
sanction Iranian human rights abusers, were included in CISADA.”206 
UN resolutions, which include sanctions against Iran, have been 
progressing in their frequency, criticism, and international acceptance as well. Six UN 
Resolutions concerning Iran have been passed since 2006, progressively increasing 
pressure on Iran to cease its Uranium enrichment and its ballistic missile development.207  
UN sanctions have progressively targeted officials, government branches 
and businesses linked to Iran’s nuclear program and military. The 
resolutions have included travel bans and asset freezes on individuals, 
front companies, and banks… [they] have also increasingly targeted the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)… an alleged driver of the 
country’s nuclear program.208 
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b. Iranian Sanctions Assessment 
Adequacy of Sanctions:  Iranian sanctions, as they exist today, are 
inadequate to meet their economic and political goals of changing the regime’s behavior, 
specifically with regard to several of the sanctions objectives. Despite their 
comprehensiveness, the multilateral sanctions that exist today do not appear to be altering 
the regime’s behavior to negotiate seriously regarding its nuclear enrichment issue, or 
other issues, to include: ending of human rights abuses and support for terrorism; 
delaying or disrupting their long range missile programs; significantly helping the 
democratic opposition; and kick-starting nuclear negotiations.209 
Furthermore, since there is no precise agreement among U.S. officials on 
the specific political goals of sanctions, assessing their economic effects relative to 
political goals is difficult from the outset.210 Sanctions have slowed down Iranian access 
to global finance and foreign investment, as well as some of Iran’s weapons procurement 
and development.211 “U.S. officials believe that Iran’s economy will inevitably begin to 
suffer as U.S. and partner strategy shuts Iran out of the global financial system, raises the 
costs for Iran of financing its transactions, and causes international firms to exit Iran.”212 
Since there is only anecdotal evidence that (counter-proliferations type) sanctions are 
physically slowing down Iran’s nuclear program213 and that the economic effects from 
sanctions (causing substantial foreign capital flight and reduction in energy sector 
development) are still not changing Iranian behavior, sanctions must be assessed as 
inadequate. “There is a consensus that U.S. and UN sanctions have not, to date, 
accomplished their core strategic objective of causing a demonstrable shift in Iran’s 
commitment to its nuclear program.”214 Additional goals of sanctions, specifically to 
promote domestic opposition in Iran, are also inadequate due to the political and financial 
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weakness of opposition groups in Iran. Should such efforts fail, it would lead to greater 
diplomatic difficulties with the conservative clerics now in control—possibly perceived 
as another Operation Ajax circa 1953, and should such efforts succeed—without a strong 
constituency to provide financial and political support to the oppositionist group, they 
would not last long.215 
Recent changes to the government’s subsidies program, specifically the 
phasing out of gasoline and other energy subsidies by 2015, is not assessed to be linked 
to sanctions despite some literature attributing the change to sanctions potential 
mitigation. Subsidies have consumed a large percentage of Iran’s GDP (25 percent) in 
2009, and past efforts to curb these sanctions have met with a  political backlash—
including riots, unrest, and attacks on energy infrastructure.216 Ahmadinejad’s successful 
campaign to end subsidies—and transfer their wealth in the form of cash payments to the 
poor—have spiked inflation, eroding the purchasing power of his own constituency that 
he was trying to help,217 as well as weakening the overall competitiveness of Iranian 
industry, which depends on subsidies for cheap energy inputs.218 
Strengthening of Legitimacy: Economic sanctions are having a mixed 
effect confirming the legitimacy of the clerical conservative actors who currently control 
the government in Iran. Domestically, the conservative factions’ attempts to use 
economic sanctions to their advantage, and confirm the legitimacy of their government, 
appear to be working across the broader Iranian society, due to their control of the media 
and portrayal of their nuclear program as peaceful. Internationally, however, continued 
sanctions and UN resolutions are weakening their legitimacy. “Proposals [of multilateral 
sanctions and UN resolutions] to target the Revolutionary Guards for sanctions… 
represent one facet of the trend toward measures that undermine the legitimacy of Iran’s 
regime and support Iran’s domestic opposition.”219 
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Enforcement of Sanctions: Enforcement of Iranian sanctions is stronger 
internationally than it has ever been, but Iran is utilizing significant gaps to maintain the 
status quo. “Implementation appears to be somewhat less complete in Iran’s immediate 
region, perhaps because its neighbors do not want confrontation with Iran and are hesitant 
to disrupt traditional relationships among traders and businessmen in the region.”220 The 
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) is Iran’s fifth largest trading partner, holding 8 percent of 
its foreign trade.221 U.S. diplomatic efforts with the U.A.E. have resulted in increased 
sanctions enforcement there, raising the costs of legitimate imports,222 but smuggling 
persists. Outside of Iran’s regional neighborhood, China’s appetite for energy security 
can only be satisfied by Iran, and this relationship undermines American sanctions.223 
China is Iran’s second largest trading partner (15 percent of foreign trade) behind the 
European Union (EU) at 21 percent.224 The U.S.’s own dependence on Chinese trade 
relations precludes it from utilizing strict sanctions measures against Chinese firms 
involved in trade with Iran, despite some recently demonstrated examples.225 The 
Republic of Korea, Iran’s sixth largest trading partner at 7 percent of foreign trade, has 
also further increased its economic ties to Iran.226 
Popularity of Sanctions: Iranian sanctions adopted by the UN have finally 
gained near-universal international support, at least in spirit—as room for improvement 
exists in sanctions’ practical application. European allies have grown increasingly 
concerned with Iran’s behavior and the nuclear impasse. 
U.S. allies have generally supported and joined the Obama 
administration’s sanctions toward Iran, in part because the approach is 
perceived as not purely punitive, and in part because their own concerns 
about Iran’s nuclear advancement have increased … as of 2010, an 
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unprecedented degree of global consensus has emerged on how to deal 
with Iran. There is a degree of consensus among experts that many 
countries, not only allies of the United States, are complying with the 
provisions of UN sanctions.”227  
China continues to voice its sanctions concerns, and does not support sanctions outside 
those adopted by the UN.228 “As a UNSC member, China traditionally has spared no 
effort to emasculate UNSC resolutions so that they cannot create any problems for the 
developing cooperation between [China and Iran].”229 
Structure of the Political Economy: The structure of the Iranian political 
economy is the ultimate inhibitor to sanctions effectiveness. As will be shown in the next 
chapter, the conservative factions’ control over the sources of economic wealth in Iran, 
and the lack of access to wealth by reformist actors are ultimately preventing the 
accomplishment of the goals of economic sanctions. Sanctions, as they currently exist, 
are having an economic impact on Iran and the actors who control this economy, but are 
not adequately promoting the ability of opposition groups to gain sources of wealth that 
could be utilized to challenge the more conservative factions for control of government. 
As previously discussed, incomplete sanctions enforcement is further inhibiting sanctions 
effectiveness of limiting wealth from reaching the entrenched conservative actors in the 
political economy. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined some methods for analyzing sanctions variables for 
success and failure, and reviewed specific examples of historical sanctions cases, and 
drawn conclusions as to reasons for their failures and successes. The role of the actors in 
the political economy must be taken into account when designing smart sanctions, with 
the goal of using sanctions to empower oppositionist movements to challenge the 
established actors who are resistant to the political goals sought with sanctions. 
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Iraqi sanctions, despite being in place for a decade, failed due to their inability to 
permanently link oppositionist movements to needed capital and constituency bases to 
challenge Saddam. The sanctions did achieve their economic goals of hurting the Iraqi 
economy, but Saddam’s hold on power in Baghdad was not overcome. Conversely, South 
African sanctions were viewed as successful due to their ability to confer legitimacy on 
oppositionist movements, to establish a power base (among the industrial proletariat) in 
the political economy. The nonwhite oppositionist actors used this newfound capital to 
organize into an unstoppable political force that was eventually able to overcome the 
established actor, the white Afrikaners in Pretoria.  
Iranian sanctions have an opportunity to work due to the fragmented structure of 
the political economy, with multiple actors, each with their own capital base. However, 
current sanctions are inadequate to support this kind of growth of an opposition—due to 
their primary focus on blunting the economic base of the conservative actors (IRGC, 
etc.), and due to outside states continuing to enable the conservative actors to maintain 
their power base by continuing their substantial trade. 
Economic sanctions against Iran also have primary and secondary consequences, 
which set in motion further linked events within the political economy. The most glaring 
example is the growth of the IRGC into economic endeavors as a result of sanctions and 
the limitations of the private sector to accomplish reconstruction and defense-related 
production following the Iran-Iraq war.230 Other examples include the growth of 
smuggling networks, due to sanctions, and their cooption by political actors as a 
constituency. This makes assessments of sanctions’ effects more complicated, and 
political and economic sanctions’ analysis more difficult to determine.  
A further examination of Iranian actors is therefore necessary to flesh out this 
argument further, as an understanding of the power bases upon which an actor relies is 
necessary. This will be the focus of the next chapter. 
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III. CURRENT ACTORS OF THE IRANIAN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
To Western eyes, Iran appears to be a monolithic, conservative clerical regime 
that has a unified political agenda. Its conservative leaders, whose abrasive and 
controversial comments get the most airplay, appear to represent the views of the entire 
polity. By peeling back the layers of rhetoric and the selective sampling of comments by 
Western media and domestic lobby groups, a different picture is painted. This picture 
portrays a regime that has split into four broad political actor elite groups, each with its 
own constituencies and patronage networks that provide the actor elites political support. 
Khomeini’s doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, which was built on earlier works of 
Islamic socialist economics, espoused a panacea for all of Iran’s political and economic 
problems.231 Therefore, once in power, he and his supporters did not envision (and would 
not tolerate) more than one actor group (termed, the radicals)232 participating in 
government and the political economy. The radicals, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, “called 
for a classless society, export of the Islamic revolution, and a socially and economically 
interventionist state.”233 His regime thus devolved into a nationalized state-centric 
economy, reliant upon petrochemical exports to provide for government revenues to 
maintain employment and patronage networks, while relying on an ever increasingly 
draconian security apparatus to suppress with political dissent. But among the elite, 
differences of opinion and policy emerged that would eventually form into their own 
actor factions.  
Though the Islamic Republic curtailed the liberty of Iranian society and 
especially its political opponents, the internal culture of the political elite 
was sufficiently free to allow different opinions to be played against the 
others. Combined with a constitutional framework that counterbalances 
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mutually independent institutions, this culture of disagreement 
[eventually] led to the emergence of four main political factions.234 
Upon Khomeini’s death in 1989, the new elite actor factions began to openly 
emerge in politics for the first time, challenging the radical actor faction for control of 
government and of the political economy. These actor groups had to develop their own 
constituencies—complete with the traditional trade-off of political support for 
patronage—to survive the life or death world of Iranian politics. “Because the state is the 
main source of income, groups compete to occupy governmental positions and gain 
influence in society.”235 Within a few years of Khomeini’s death, the radical faction 
would disappear and evolve into newer actor groups—as loyalties and beliefs of its 
members changed over time and issue. Iran’s key political positions for 25 years of its 
revolutionary history were held by clerics, and only since 2005 have laymen played a 
significant part—due mostly to the fracturing of political discussion among the clerical 
elite themselves, as more reformist politicians grew more and more popular among the 
polity. Ayatollah Khomeini was revered as a modern day Imam and was considered the 
greatest among the clerical equals of his day (although devout Shia have stated the use of 
the Imam title was an affectionate nickname, as the last true Imam is still in occultation 
and the devout are awaiting his return). Upon his death, new Supreme Leader 
Khamenei’s clerical peers did not give this same amount of deference to him,236 as their 
religious credentials often exceeded his and they had shared the same educational and 
revolutionary experiences. Reformist politicians, often with more religious credentials 
and public support, were a significant threat. The emergence of the neoconservative 
actors as a political actor has largely eliminated this threat. 
Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005 was conditioned by the rise of the 
military-security second stratum [neoconservatives] of Iran’s new political 
class and reflects its aspirations. It is as a representative of the hardliners 
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from the second stratum that he has contested the pragmatist and the 
reformist definitions of Khomeini’s heritage in seeking to articulate the 
consciousness of this new political class and its aspiration to rule Iran 
indefinitely.237 
This chapter will closely examine these actors in the Iranian political economy, 
determining their strengths, weaknesses, interactions, and constituencies. This analysis 
will allow for a renewed analysis on the impact of economic sanctions in the final 
chapter, and how better to tailor them. In conducting this analysis, this chapter will 
attempt to validate the first hypothesis (Analysis of sanctions effects should be actor 
centric) and second hypothesis (Sanctions must alter the current asymmetric balance of 
power in the Iranian political economy to achieve their political objectives). 
A. IRANIAN ACTORS AND INTERESTS 
As previously stated, the Iranian political system is characterized by highly 
factionalized actors with separate constituencies, each pursuing differing agendas in the 
political economy. 
The factional political system has created room for discretion and 
arbitrariness in the design and implementation of rules and regulations. 
This lack of state autonomy has stimulated rent seeking, favoring well 
connected public and quasi-public enterprises and hindering private 
investment.238  
This chapter will examine each actor in detail to determine their interests, and potential 
vulnerabilities to economic sanctions that could produce political results. The overall 
political system is also examined to determine each actor’s interactions with each other 
and identify possible areas of conflict between them. “At its core, the Iranian system is 
closed, secretive, informal, and clannish … also intensely fractured and multipolar, in 
some cases by accident, in others by bureaucratic design.”239 The actors’ disagreements 
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are often issue dependent and require mediation (often by the supreme leader) to find 
common ground and move forward with policy.240 
The nuclear issue remains as controversial among the Iranian actors as it does 
internationally. “The weapons component of the program has never been debated or 
acknowledged … since 2009, factions take positions that do not reflect their real 
preferences, mainly to thwart political rivals.”241 The more conservative actor groups 
accuse the reformists of selling out nuclear enrichment rights,242 and the reformists 
criticize the conservatives’ “nuclear policy as provocative and costly to Iran, despite the 
supreme leader’s explicit support.”243 The larger public supports the program due to the 
way it is presented to them—as a peaceful means to obtain energy independence and 
make scientific progress—while asserting Iranian sovereign rights to enrich Uranium.244 
“The program has not been subjected to informed debate or public discussion about its 
ultimate goals, the costs, and the relationship with Iran’s other objectives. Consensus 
[among the actors] ends where specifics begin.”245 “Rival factions … criticize the nuclear 
programs costs and centrality to Iran’s development goals. Iran’s nuclear program had 
become a domestic political football.”246 
1. Conservatives and Their Constituents 
Current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the nominal head of this 
actor group, which is constituted by the elite clergy (the patrons), with a political  
constituency, very broadly speaking, of the lower clergy and the bazaar (the clients).247 
Most state institutions in Iran are controlled by this group, who also control a majority 
stake in the political economy. 
                                                 
240 Ibid. 
241 Wright et al., The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, 85. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid., 83. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Bjorvatn and Selvik, Destructive Competition: Factionalism and Rent-Seeking in Iran, 2317. 
 55
Economic sanctions, as they exist today, will fail to alter the behavior and control 
of the government of the conservative actor group. The conservative actors are cushioned 
by the redundancy of income the conservatives enjoy from the bonyads and their 
redundant control over differing economic sectors, while also continuing to receive 
political support from the bazaaris who are still able to circumvent import sanctions via 
their smuggling networks. These two powerful constituencies have provided the 
conservative actor group its base since the revolution, as well as their ability to play off 
the other actor groups against each other to maintain control, despite a worsening 
economic situation and decreasing legitimacy. 
a. Interests of the Conservatives 
The conservatives were the first group to emerge as a dissenting voice to 
the radicals of the 1980s, who favored “private property rights, revolution in one country, 
and traditional Islamic jurisprudence over state-led remaking of society.”248 This actor 
group became the preeminent group in Iranian politics following the abandonment of the 
radical party after Khomeini’s death, and will remain the dominant party for the 
foreseeable future due to its hold on majority memberships within the reform-busting 
nonelected institutions such as the Guardian Council and Expediency Council (due to 
direct appointments from the supreme leader). The conservatives are also in a position to 
act as arbiter among the other parties and often use their control of the highest offices to 
ensure they maintain control of other nonelected political institutions. As the oldest and 
most entrenched actor group in the Iranian polity, they balance out the political landscape 
and other actors (allowing them a lesser degree of access to rents and political offices) to 
prevent greater unrest against their own political hegemony.249 The conservative actors’ 
interests, therefore, are to: maintain their central political position within the state, keep 
an entrenched majority in the important nonelected institutions in Iran (where power 
ultimately resides); resist globalizing economic policies that they cannot co-opt, control, 
or profit from and; maintain the independence of the clergy and their bonyads from 
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populist movements to maintain their patronage networks. “Their primary concern is not 
a U.S. military invasion, but rather a political and cultural campaign to undermine 
theocratic rule through a ‘soft’ or ‘velvet’ revolution.”250 This group, like all groups, 
relies on access oil sector rents to provide patronage to its constituents. 
The conservatives strongly support the continued enrichment of Uranium, 
despite international opposition, while denying this enrichment has any military 
connection (i.e., enrichment to weapons grade). Supreme Leader Khamenei’s statements 
remain ambiguous, but it is clear that this is intentional. “He has rarely pronounced on the 
nuclear program except in generalities. He insists that there is an unspecified fatwa 
against the development of nuclear weapons, but has supported policies that make it 
impossible to verify this fatwa in practice.”251 A nuclear weapon, however, would 
provide his regime with a significant measure of security against external intervention. 
“For Khamenei, the nuclear program has come to embody the revolution’s core themes: 
the struggle for independence, the injustice of foreign powers, the necessity of self-
sufficiency, and Islam’s high esteem for the sciences.”252 Historical precedent also lends 
credence to this idea; recent reports indicate it was then President Khamenei who, in 
April 1984, secretly announced to top Iranian officials the reactivation of Iran’s nuclear 
program (based upon guidance from then Supreme Leader Khomeini),253 and now he, as 
the current supreme leader, “has ultimate say over Iran’s nuclear program, and all major 
decisions on the nuclear issue require his approval.”254 Since Iran has not agreed to 
comply with the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
disclose its enrichment activities, his position can be inferred. Constituents of the 
conservatives (lesser clerics and the bazaaris) who have an interest in keeping them in 
power, also generally support this policy. Lesser clerics support it due to the security it 
provides their patrons, and thus, their positions. The bazaaris would theoretically support 
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any policy that provides them a better business environment, and as will be shown, there 
are indications that sanctions related to the nuclear issue are increasing their business 
costs. But the historical tie between the bazaaris’ lobby groups and the conservatives go 
deep, and as will be shown, the most important bazaaris are allowed access to profitable 
Western goods largely by connections to their clerical elite patrons, who in many cases, 
have become family. 
b. Economic Assets and Constituents of the Conservatives 
The conservatives are unique actors in that their constituents control the 
hundreds of bonyads across the country (usually headed by lower level clerics appointed 
by the supreme leader or other elite cleric), and these constituencies provide rents of their 
own. “Many bonyads seem like rackets, extorting money from entrepreneurs. Besides the 
biggest national outfits, almost every Iranian town has its own bonyad, affiliated with 
local mullahs.”255 Successful local entrepreneurs who fail to do exclusive business with 
and/or provide bribes to their local bonyad leadership can find themselves before a judge 
explaining a trumped up religious infraction.256 The bonyads are the Iranian economy’s 
dominating revenue generating entity outside the oil sector,257 mushrooming in size and 
scope of operations over the years. “Monopolizing wide swaths of trade and business… 
[bonyads] alone control 25 percent of GDP.”258 The conservative actor group receives 
exclusive rents from these organizations. In return, the clerical elites provide patronage to 
their lesser clerical constituents (who nominally head each bonyad) in the form of 
legislation and orders to other institutions that prevents bookkeeping scrutiny and 
emasculates their private sector competition. As patronage disguised in religion, the 
bonyads—as religious foundations—are “exempted from taxes and government control… 
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[and] also receive direct transfers through the budget.”259 The bonyads connections to the 
elite clerics have allowed them to “enjoy preferential access to bank credit, hard 
currency, government licenses and lucrative contracts, thus crowding out more 
productive private sector activities.”260 Banking and finance sectors of the economy are 
also still controlled by this actor with government ownership at 89 percent of bank 
assets,261 an outgrowth of the nationalizations during the revolution. The perception of 
clerical corruption across Iranian society is widespread, given the clerical access to “hefty 
government stipends, as well as other exclusive and profitable privileges,”262 while the 
rest of the Iranian society suffers a net decreasing standard of living (as represented by 
economic growth per capita hovering just in the negative since the revolution, (–0.1 
percent).263 
The other constituency of the conservatives is the bazaar, whose 
relationship with the elite clergy has endured since joining forces during the 1979 
revolution to oust the Shah. While the bazaaris are not a monolithic group, and some 
certainly are aloof from politics, analysis of this group’s historical lobbying places them 
in the conservative camp.  
The alliance between mosque and bazaar had historical roots. It was 
reinforced in the 1970s because, despite their newfound wealth, the bazaar 
classes harbored numerous grievances against the policies pursued by the 
Shah’s government and also against the new industrial and entrepreneurial 
elite whose interests these policies helped to promote.264  
This relationship was further cemented during Rasfanjani’s presidency, when he 
“attempted to organize the pro-capitalist entrepreneurs in both industry and trade,  
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offending traditionalist merchants.”265 This clever (attempted) reorganization of political 
patronage, away from the clerics, caused a backlash, and “in order to avoid a further 
assault on their power, bitter fundamentalist merchants were encouraged to join forces 
with senior fundamentalist ‘ulema,’ or clergy, in opposing Rafsanjani’s cultural and 
economic policies.”266 Over time, some of these relationships between influential clergy 
and bazaaris have been cemented by intermarriage, leading to the awarding of monopoly 
licenses and other influential governmental positions.267 “The [conservative] regime is a 
religious oligarchy related by blood and financial ties to the bazaar and merchant 
class.”268 The term bazaari is used to describe the “heterogeneous commercial class 
located in historical urban centers.”269 It is important to note that not all bazaaris have 
connections to the regime, and in recent years, this constituency group has lost some of 
its previous political influence. This is due to several factors, the primary one of which is 
the slow and unstoppable force of globalization. With the slow but steady growth of air-
conditioned shopping malls near residential areas, coupled with a shift in consumer 
tastes, specifically the bulging youth population in Iran, who prefer Western styles and 
products (even Asian copies), “fewer wealthy Iranians living far from downtown are 
willing to travel to the bazaar to make major purchases.”270 
As a client member within the conservative camp, the bazaaris lobby their 
patron clerics to open up trading opportunities, specifically for “more laissez-faire 
policies that would remove state tariffs and regulations on trade.”271 This lobbying is 
carried out via two influential business organizations (that share memberships)272 in 
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Iranian politics: the Islamic Coalition Association (ICA), and the Society of the Islamic 
Associations of Tehran’s Guilds and Bazaar. The ICA originated in the bazaar in the 
1960s as an oppositionist movement against the Shah (supporting Khomeini), and “after 
1979, ICA members were placed in high government posts and took staunchly 
conservative positions in factional battles.”273 Evidence of this patronage relationship can 
be seen during the green movement protests of June–July 2009, where the bazaaris were 
especially quiet, not taking part in the protests against the clerical leadership and their 
perceived fraud and corruption.274 Since bazaaris would presumably form the nucleus of 
an emerging middle class in Iran, it would seem plausible that they would be among the 
first to protest an opaque and corrupt government, but this did not happen. Instead, their 
most vocal activity is to continue to lobby for the removal of tariffs and regulations that 
inhibit the imports and exports of finished goods.275 Possible further evidence of this 
patron-client union can be seen with the inclusion of the bazaaris and their employees 
into the generous Social Security Organization’s self-employed pension program,276 
passed in September of 2004 as part of the 4th (5 year) Development Plan (2004–2009), 
shortly after the conservatives took back control of the Majles, in May of that year. 
Richard McKnight argues, very persuasively in his thesis, that economic 
sanctions over the last two decades have resulted in the creation of a shadow smuggling 
economy controlled by the IRGC, leading to its further entrenchment in the political 
economy. His research indicates smuggling networks have grown up in Iran, bringing in 
Western goods (through IRGC controlled ports and airports) that avoid paying the high 
state tariffs and benefiting their affiliated business organizations.277 That the bazaaris are 
also involved in the smuggling of Western goods into Iran is an almost certainty. Seventy 
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percent of foreign clothing for sale in Iran is smuggled in278 and the bazaaris maintain 
connections with Iranian expatriates in the U.A.E. to obtain the most fashionable Western 
products.279 Direct IRGC linkages to specific bazaaris are unknown, as is the specific 
involvement of the bazaaris to their own independent smuggling operations. What is 
known is that there is tension between the bazaar-founded ICA and the neoconservatives 
in government, as evidenced by the closing of many bazaars across Iranian cities to 
“protest over the Ahmadinejad government’s attempts to raise and collect more taxes 
from bazaar shops … [which] resulted in the government backing down to the demands 
of the bazaaris.”280 In other words, another political actor in the Iranian political 
economy (the neoconservatives) had tried and failed to weaken the constituency of 
another actor group (the conservatives), likely due to top-cover from their political 
patrons and push-back from the constituency itself. 
c. Behavior and Motives of the Conservatives 
Conservatives are concerned about reforms that will undermine their hold 
on power, the retaining of which is their highest motive.281 Therefore, conservatives 
behave in a manner towards other political actors that ensures they remain preeminent, 
and other factions’ levels of influence are subordinate and balanced with each other. “By 
making sure that politicians from different factions are appointed to different institutions, 
the [Supreme] Leader undermines challengers to his own predominant position and 
especially counterbalances the power of the systems number two—the president.”282 
Conservatives discredit reformists in order to handicap their legitimacy and appeal—
often by accusing their reformist policies as being Western in origin,283 especially 
economic ones that would create true private sector reforms. Conservatives continue to 
tow the party line that the revolution and its ideals are sacred, and regard any discourse 
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otherwise as a threat—especially their concept of a religious welfare state that deems 
“society’s underprivileged must remain at their religious mercy.”284 Conservatives have 
also not altered their approach of using the most brutal methods of force to suppress 
dissent,285 for which they have increasingly relied on the neoconservatives and their 
security force constituents to provide.286 Conservatives also rejected and suppressed the 
proposed economic reforms of the pragmatists when their own share of the political 
economy was threatened. 
Conservatives, especially those entrenched in the bonyads, bitterly and 
successfully opposed a home-grown structural adjustment program that 
President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani [of the Pragmatist actor group] 
had launched shortly after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini.287 
Banking and finance sectors of the economy are also still controlled by the 
conservative clerics, an outgrowth of the nationalizations during the revolution, with 
government ownership of 89 percent of bank assets.288 Cheap credit has been one of this 
actor’s preferred means of distributing patronage. Access to this credit is preferential and 
based upon the client’s connections to the actor who can influence the state banks. 
Money is often used for purposes other than intended, sometimes not repaid at all, often 
without any consequences to the client receiving the loans.289 Iran is fully integrated into 
the global financial system;290 therefore, multilateral efforts to shut Iran out of the 
international banking system have significantly “complicated Tehran’s ability to engage 
in International business, commerce, and finance.”291 There are reports that Iranian 
bazaari merchants face significant cost increases for conducting business through Dubai, 
which requires significant amounts of credit, if they are able to get financing or shipping 
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availability to avoid sanctions at all.292 The president of the Iranian chamber of 
commerce “acknowledged in October [2010] that sanctions were driving up the costs of 
imports by 15 to 30 percent.”293 Control of the banking sector has, therefore, been a 
source of conflict as other actors (specifically, the neoconservatives) have attempted to 
replace the banks’ conservative leadership with their own loyalists to distribute patronage 
to preferred clients.294 
2. Neoconservatives and Their Constituents 
The neoconservatives are a group of actors who emerged as a reaction to the 
(attempted) reform period of President Khatami. They are an elite group of mostly war 
veterans who cut their teeth as patriotic foot soldiers in the security and military services 
during the revolution and subsequent war with Iraq. This group is nominally headed by 
President Ahmadinejad and other elite members of the security forces and, broadly 
speaking, their constituent clients are the lower ranks of the security forces, specifically 
the IRGC and Basij, and include other active and retired officers in the military 
(including veterans),and the socially deprived.295 While the security forces have existed 
as a pillar of the regime since the revolution, they have truly become an independent 
force since the election of Ahmadinejad and their marked expansion in their own right 
into the political economy.  
Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005 was conditioned by the rise of the 
military-security second stratum of Iran’s new political class and reflects 
its aspirations ... [their] alternative definition of Khomeini’s heritage 
highlights what was left unclaimed by the previous two groups 
[pragmatists and reformists] of the children of the Islamic revolution: 
populism, social justice, and unflinching loyalty to the martyrs of the 
revolution and war.296  
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Perhaps the best way to describe the rise of this group of actors is by pointing out that the 
deeply conservative (nonclerical) elite security service veterans, seeing the decadence 
and failures of the clerics to contain the reformist movements of the late 1990s, took it 
upon themselves to ensure the survival of the ideals of the Islamic Revolution. This was 
done by a soft usurpation of economic and, later, political power from the clerics, while 
remaining nominally loyal to one—Supreme Leader Khamenei—whose own weak 
religious credentials (and the eroding of the legitimacy of the clerical leadership in 
general) have meant this power shift in the political economy was a fait accompli. 
Ahmadinejad [as one of the neoconservative elites] has been able to build 
a base of support among the very constituencies on which Khamenei 
depends: The Revolutionary Guards, the paramilitary forces, the security 
agencies and the judiciary … they are claiming an increasingly larger role 
in political affairs.297 
Economic sanctions against this actor group, as they currently exist, are counter-
productive in weakening their control of government or altering their policies, given the 
clout of their security clients and the political and financial support they can generate via 
their economic enterprises and control of smuggling.  
The Guards’ reported involvement in illicit economic activities may also 
cushion them from the full effects of sanctions. Ironically, tougher 
sanctions would undoubtedly further damage Iran’s overall economy, but 
may strengthen the very force now driving their national security policies, 
including their nuclear program.”298 
In other words, sanctions must be designed in a way to weaken this actor’s hold on 
political power, versus punishing this actor for bad behavior. 
The IRGC also has a clear economic interest in a general sanctions 
regime, which has removed foreign direct investments in Iranian 
businesses and removed foreign competitors from the Iranian oil and 
natural gas market, thereby helping the IRGC expand its economic clout 
through the seizure of major projects.299 
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Current sanctions also weaken the bazaar and the pragmatist-connected technocrats and, 
“as these players retreat from the Iranian market, the IRGC not only fills the economic 
vacuum they leave behind, but also gains their political influence.”300 
a. Interests of the Neoconservatives 
The neoconservatives, while pledging loyalty to the supreme leader, 
believe the clerics of the conservative actor group have been lax in their leadership and 
have strayed from the original ideological values of “strict moral enforcement, social 
justice, and anti-imperialism.”301 This actor group’s interest is to usurp control from 
other actor groups (to include, specifically, the conservatives) in “all social, political, and 
economic realms of the Islamic Republic.”302 Due to the nature of the Islamic Republic 
as a rentier state, this competition required them to grow and develop their own patronage 
networks. The IRGC, other security services and poor voting constituents have filled this 
void as clients to the neoconservative patrons. The neoconservatives swept to 
governmental power from 2003–2005 with the help of their clients. 
In the presidential elections of June 2005, the IRGC and the Basijis 
perfected the new function of bringing [poor] voters to the ballot box, 
something they had begun experimentally in the municipal elections of 
2003, and the Majles elections of 2004. The 2005 presidential elections 
could indeed be accurately described as their first electoral coup d’état.303  
These same security clients have also, historically, assisted the regime by effectively 
putting down political dissent. As recently as the February 11, 2010, planned green 
movement protests, which were to coincide with the anniversary of the Islamic 
revolution, “the advance crackdown [by security forces] was so pervasive that leaders of 
the movement called it off. Public demonstrations were basically over.”304 Similarly, the  
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1999 student protests, starting at Tehran University and spreading to other cities across 
Iran, protesting the curbing of press freedom, were similarly shut down by the threat of 
IRGC intervention.305 
The neoconservative growth in political power has been a source of 
tension between the conservatives and neoconservatives, of late, as the neoconservatives 
have moved to take over more political offices and political institutions of government to 
further expand their own bases of support and implement their own domestic and foreign 
policies. This political conflict was best seen in June of 2011 with a widening split 
between President Ahmadinejad and the supreme leader, including an open discussion in 
the Majles of impeaching Ahmadinejad.306 
The neoconservatives also support Iran’s right to the enrichment of 
Uranium, but deny any military linkages (i.e., enrichment to weapons grade). 
“[Ahmadinejad’s] government pushed ahead with its nuclear fuel enrichment program, 
despite new UN and U.S. sanctions between 2006 and 2010.”307 Most enrichment 
activity has occurred on the neoconservatives government watch during this period, and 
international negotiations to halt enrichment have similarly been rebuffed by the 
neoconservative government.308 Neoconservative constituents among the security 
services also support this position, which sees a nuclear weapon as the ultimate deterrent 
to U.S. or coalition intervention and an end to their position of power in Iran. 
b. Economic Assets and Constituents of the Neoconservatives 
 The IRGC’s growth from praetorian guard to becoming an economic 
client of the neoconservatives is rooted in the need to maintain the IRGC’s military 
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strength at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, while at the same time, spurring reconstruction 
in a resource-constrained environment.309  
The Guards currently dominate most sectors of the economy, from energy 
to construction, telecommunication to auto making, and even banking and 
finance … linked to dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of companies that 
appear to be private in nature but are run by IRGC veterans. So the Guards 
economic influence activities encompass a broad network of current and 
former members rather than a single official or centrally administered 
organization.310 
 Economic sanctions have only provided the neoconservatives with a 
convenient excuse to expand their economic interests and solidify their own patronage 
base at the expense of the other actors. The engineering arm of the IRGC, the Gharargah 
Sazandegi Khatam al-Anbia, better known by its acronym, GHORB, has been effectively 
privatized and now gains contracts across lucrative sectors of the economy, including the 
petrochemical sector, since foreign direct investment is unavailable because of 
sanctions.311 Since winning the 2005 presidential elections, IRGC economic interests 
have expanded further, as their affiliated companies have “[been] awarded hundreds of 
no-bid government contracts in addition to billions of dollars in loans for construction, 
infrastructure and energy projects.”312 The neoconservatives have also taken advantage 
of Supreme Leader Khamenei’s decision to privatize $120 billion worth of public assets 
in 2005, purchasing larger stakes in formerly conservative state-controlled institutions. 
Purchases of privatized assets were “conducted by [IRGC] credit and finance institutions 
… and their subsidiaries.”313 The growth in the use of the Internet in Iran (estimated at 38 
percent of the population in 2009),314 has led to the growth of pro-democracy blogs and 
other anti-regime material on the Internet, but has also justified the security services 
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expansion into the technology sector. “In September 2009, a firm called the Mobin Trust 
Consortium, which was partially owned by the IRGC, bought 51 percent of shares in the 
Telecommunications Company of Iran … the largest sale in the history of Iran’s stock 
exchange.”315 This purchase was then followed by the passing of laws (using the 
neoconservatives’ political clout based on the IRGC) requiring all private Internet service 
providers (ISPs) to connect to this central hub, which gives the security services the 
ability to monitor all Internet activity in Iran.316 
 As discussed, the IRGC is also involved in illicit smuggling of goods into 
Iran to avoid sanctions and to line their own pockets with an estimated $12 billion a year 
with the fees collected from servicing smuggling operations.317 The IRGC operates a 
number of docks, primarily located in southern Iran, to service the smuggling fleet vis-à-
vis the U.A.E. and other Gulf states.318 It is also believed they have import/export sites at 
over 20 major airports across Iran that also contribute fees from smuggling operations.319 
 The neoconservatives and their security service clients have also 
developed their own finance networks to facilitate the purchase of public assets: 
The transfers [of asset holdings] are conducted by their credit and finance 
institutions, such as the IRGC and Basij Cooperative foundations and their 
subsidiaries. The latter has its own subsidiaries … these institutions 
describe themselves as noninterest or Islamic banking institutes, but they 
engage in everything but giving interest free loans. They function as 
financial arms of the IRGC and the Basij on the Tehran Stock Exchange 
(TSE) and elsewhere, using their leverage to purchase shares of Iranian 
companies.320 
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c. Behavior and Motives of the Neoconservatives 
Since the 2005 election, the neoconservatives have sought to increase their 
control and influence in the economy, expanding their economic enterprises to become 
the de-facto power of the republic, while creating the conditions for a soft-coup of 
political power from the clerical conservatives. “Ahmadinejad rewarded the 
Revolutionary Guards handsomely for electing him [in 2005]. There was an immediate 
74 percent increase in the development budget designed to help the Basij win government 
contracts.”321 As they have since 2005, the neoconservatives and their security clients 
will continue to take advantage of the divestment of public resources and companies to 
build up their own holdings: 
In practice, privatization of these assets has meant the Iranian leadership’s 
expansion from relatively transparent parts of the public sector to parts of 
the public sector shielded from public scrutiny, especially the IRGC and 
its subordinate volunteer militia, the Basij.322  
Where previously there had been a distinction in Iranian politics between the ruling 
master clerics and their security force servants, this distinction is now blurring, to look 
more like a pure military dictatorship run by the security forces (specifically, the IRGC), 
with the clerics as figureheads. “IRGC support of Khamenei has not come cheap, and in 
return for its assistance against reformist groups such as the Green Movement, Khamenei 
has had to bribe the IRGC with political, economic, and even ideological influence.”323 
While remaining loyal to one cleric who appoints and approves their highest 
leadership324—Supreme Leader Khamenei—the neoconservatives have: 
Purged the regime of its countervailing center of power in the [remaining] 
clergy; it has badly weakened the [Reformist] Green Movement; it has 
engaged civilian supporters of Khameini in a battle for influence; and it is 
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quickly transforming the Islamic Republic into a military dictatorship as 
Khamenei has nowhere else to look for support.325 
Having won the executive branch in 2005, the neoconservatives—with 
more help from the IRGC in intimidating their opponents and disseminating 
propaganda—won control of the Majles legislature in 2008.326 Their client security 
services also “crushed the Green Movement that emerged to protest the contested 2009 
[presidential] election.”327 This could not have been possible without Khamenei’s 
approval and support. Therefore, the neoconservatives will position themselves to be an 
indispensable resource to the supreme leader, while continuing their expansion in the 
economy (gaining further political clout) at the expense of the other actors. 
3. Pragmatists and Their Constituents 
The pragmatists emerged as a political actor following the dissolution of the 
radical faction with the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. Currently, as an actor, they 
appear to have been effectively sidelined for the time being by the supreme leader,328 and 
their reform agenda was similarly “overcome by events” due to the economic gains made 
by the IRGC in recent years (effectively ending any realistic chance for true private 
sector reform). This actor group’s primary benefactor and elite personality—Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani—being 77 years of age and failing in his last chance at running for 
President in 2005, has now been made chairman of the Expediency Council (he also 
resigned from the Council of Guardians in March 2011). This actor group still exists 
today, but their heyday was in the 1990s during Ayatollah Rafsanjani’s presidency. 
Members now blur between the conservative and reformist actors (mostly conservative). 
The pragmatists “voice the concerns of technocrats and businessmen.”329 Their 
                                                 
325 Alfoneh, “All the Guard’s Men: Iran’s Silent Revolution,” 79. 
326 Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors, 154. 
327 Wright et al., The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, 19. 
328 Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors, 151–152. Arjomand indicates 
Ahmadinejad’s 2005 victory (and Rafsanjani’s loss) was due to IRGC intervention based on instructions 
from the Supreme Leader. 
329 Bjorvatn and Selvik, Destructive Competition: Factionalism and Rent-Seeking in Iran, 2317. 
 71
constituents, therefore, are close family and trusted associates who can participate in a 
client relationship (in any capacity) with their elite masters in Tehran. 
Sanctions against this actor’s constituency are (technically) currently in place, 
targeting key sectors of energy and construction, which are controlled by this actor’s 
patrons. Partial success can be claimed with the reduction in FDI and slowing down of 
some investment projects. But dislodging this actor from its span of control of the 
political economy, or altering its behavior, will require simultaneously handing over the 
same levers of power and constituencies to another actor. 
a. Interests of the Pragmatists 
The pragmatists, as a group, are harder to define based on the opacity of 
both their membership and the business dealings that define their patronage networks. 
Also, their current clout in the political economy appears to have been eclipsed by the 
neoconservatives who emerged after Rafsanjani’s terms as president ended in 1997. The 
pragmatist actor elites can be described as technocrats (either clerical or secular), who 
primarily favor reforms that support a free market to rebuild Iran’s industry and economy 
(to include domestic and foreign investment in the private sector).330 These actors also 
favor reforms that ease social and cultural norms, but they do not favor political 
reforms,331 (which are distinct from the reformist actor group). They also prefer the 
normalization of diplomatic relations with regional neighbors and global players, 
downplaying the revolutionary zeal of their government, which has led to its isolation332 
(distinct from the conservative actor group—who still holds onto this aspect as a source 
of legitimacy). Some of these pragmatist elite actors, but not all, pursue reforms strictly 
to advance a hidden crony capitalistic agenda, irrespective of any “good sense” religious 
or economic reasons. “By their nature, the pragmatists [are] not overly concerned with 
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Islamic or revolutionary credentials: their whole point [is] to pursue policies that they 
thought best for Iran on technical grounds regardless of religious or other ideological 
purity.”333 
It is difficult to gauge the individual intentions of the pragmatist elites on 
the nuclear issue, but some assessments can be drawn by words and deeds of its elite. 
Past statements attributed to Rafsanjani have: 
Alluded to the need for Iran to be prepared for the unexpected in defense 
matters, and [he] most likely led the decision to hedge by seeking a 
weapons option … on the nuclear issue [today], he is more likely to seek a 
pragmatic accommodation with the world than to accelerate 
enrichment.334  
Perhaps, like any political actor anywhere else in the world, the pragmatist elites tepidly 
support the nuclear program if it helps their reelection prospects (to include not getting 
shut-out by the Guardian Council for opposing the program), but would be willing to 
negotiate internationally, once in office, to comply with Iran’s enrichment requirements 
per the NPT, to avoid a conflict, in opposition to the conservative and neoconservative 
position of no compromise. Their constituents, seeking a better business environment 
internationally (as well as protection domestically), would likely support this position. 
b. Economic Assets and Constituents of the Pragmatists 
The exact economic assets and constituents of this actor are hard to 
determine, and likely now blend in with the other actors, especially the clerical 
conservatives. This includes familial relationships within the bonyads, the bazaar, and 
some IRGC-affiliated businesses, recently purchased from government privatization 
efforts. Most literature focuses on the familial holdings and business dealings of Ali 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as the archetypical pragmatist elite actor. Upon close 
examination of these privatization efforts, however, Rasfanjani and his pragmatist 
associates, over the years, have ensured their insiders got the best deals. Their clients 
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received the best properties, contracts, and import license connections, while ensuring 
that billions in exchange-rate fraud benefitted the wealthiest families.335 Rafsanjani’s 
own family, “who rose from modest origins as pistachio farmers,”336 became very 
wealthy themselves following the 1979 revolution, with relatives “operating through 
various foundations and front companies.”337 Some relatives also occupy key 
governmental positions in various ministries; others head various state construction and 
energy projects through their control of engineering companies.338 
The pragmatist actors have had considerable influence over the ministry of 
petroleum and the NIOC since the revolution,339 and their associates have been termed 
the “oil mafia.” Access to oil rents is, therefore, critical for the Iranian political actors and 
is a source of contention between them, since all actors depend on it. The 
neoconservatives, specifically Ahmadinejad, made a bid to take control of the oil 
institutions after their election in 2005: 
Once in power, he quickly sacked the Oil Minister but ran into problems 
when trying to nominate a successor. In a protracted political fight 
revealing the post’s sensitivity, the Parliament rejected three suggested 
candidates before settling for a compromise.340  
The neoconservatives also attempted to curb the pragmatists’ hold on “banks, insurance, 
and state-run companies”341 similarly by firing their leadership and attempting to fill 
replacements with neoconservative loyalists. 
c. Behavior and Motives of the Pragmatists 
The current motives of this actor group are unclear, but they will likely 
continue to attempt to push through reforms based on past precedent. Rasfanjani and his 
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pragmatist allies did make some legitimate attempts of economic reform during the First 
(1989–1993) and Second (1995–1999) Five-Year Development Plans. The party’s 
structural adjustment programs (SAP) introduced during Rafsanjani’s terms as president: 
Included an orderly exchange-rate unification, increased fiscal and 
monetary disciplines, trade and business deregulation, streamlining of the 
state bureaucracy, privatization of money losing enterprises, and the 
establishment of budgetary control over the semi-independent pastoral 
bonyads.342  
These and other reform efforts were largely frustrated by the conservatives and their 
clients when they infringed upon their interests. These efforts were equally botched in 
terms of their poor execution by the pragmatists, as well as by their own greed and 
favoritism of the intended recipients.343 
Some literature describes these actors as “Mullahcrats,”344 given their 
preference to provide the bulk of reform benefits to clerical insiders, their associates, and 
their own families.345 While not all pragmatist elite actors are corrupt—it could be said 
that as a rule of thumb they seem to push for reforms that will bring about private sector 
reform that will strengthen the Iranian economy—but oppose reforms that will alter the 
political balance that exists in government. They are less concerned with reforms based 
entirely on religious morality, and desire to see an “easing of social and cultural 
controls.”346 Some corrupt elements are concerned with simply increasing their own 
wealth and the strength of their patronage networks via reforms and privatization, but 
their distinction from the conservative actor group is difficult to discern. 
4. Reformists and Their Constituents 
The roots of the reformist actors (and the green movement) can be traced to the 
clerical works of the dissident Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri and the 
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sociological works of Ali Shariati.347 Montazeri, who assisted drafting the original 
revolutionary constitution, and originally a radical himself, eventually took a different 
view of the absolute powers of the supreme leader—believing the “[Supreme Leader] 
office holder was meant to arbitrate and guide … whose function was to manage the 
[political] system and restore balance when necessary.”348 This view conflicted with the 
conservatives, who ultimately dismissed him as Khomeini’s heir apparent in 1989, but his 
later works from Qom, criticizing the revolutionary government, inspired future 
reformists.349 The reformist label eventually became “a new name for the old-time 
radical faction, which had gone through an ideological transformation and rethought its 
political creed.”350 Montazeri’s death in December 2009, coinciding with the green 
movement protests, sparked further massive demonstrations.351 
The reformists formally emerged in 1997 with the election of President Khatami. 
The reformists are the weakest of the four actors in the Iranian political economy, but 
present the best hope for change given their record of the advancement of peaceful 
dialogue and level of worldwide support. The recent green movement is associated with 
this political actor as it has “embodied the frustrated aspirations of Iran’s century-old 
quest for democracy and desire for peaceful change.”352 Its current leaders are Mir 
Hossein Mousavi, the loser of the 2009 presidential elections, his activist wife, Zahra 
Rahnavard, reformist politician, Mehdi Karroubi, and former president, Khatami.353 
Many other activists and leaders exist, hundreds of which were put on televised trials in 
the fall of 2009 and forced to confess that “the Green Movement was a creation of the 
United States and its goal was to weaken the Islamic Regime.”354 
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Broadly speaking, the Reformist’s clients are students and lay intellectuals355 and 
also include a few left-leaning clerics based out of academic institutions.356 Support for 
this group is often issue dependent. “The social basis of this group is vast and diverse… 
generally, as part of the modern sector of society, eighteen different political parties 
represent the reformist’s social base.”357 Prior to the 2004 Majles elections, the 
reformists were the dominant party in the legislature, but have lost ground to the 
neoconservatives. 
Economic sanctions, as they exist now, are not benefiting the reformist actor 
groups. “Smart sanctions focused on weakening the regime’s ideological and oppressive 
apparatus can facilitate the maturation of this [reformist] movement. A military assault 
could sideline or kill the movement for the foreseeable future.”358 While sanctions do 
reduce the overall amount of available rents to other actors, the reformist groups are not 
the beneficiaries. The overall effect of sanctions is to reduce the size of the overall 
“economic pie” of Iran, but the reformist slice has not gotten bigger as a percentage of 
the whole because of them. Specific CISADA sanctions provisions to strengthen the 
opposition exist and partners have imposed similar sanctions, but their effect on the 
political economy is negligible. Details on specific sanctions will be presented in the next 
chapter, but specific to sanctions passed in legislation by the U.S. Congress [not 
authorized funding of reformist actors to promote democratic change via black 
operations] to support democratic change or alter Iranian Foreign Policy exist, but are 
largely symbolic in value. These include sanctions “to support the opposition’s ability to 
communicate, to reduce the regime’s ability to monitor and censor Internet 
communications and to identify and sanction Iranian human rights abusers.”359 
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a. Interests of the Reformists 
The reformists’ interests, at least among the elites, are better foreign 
relations with nations who mutually respect Iranian interests360 and an economic, 
cultural, and political liberalization to include: an independent judiciary; curtailing the 
security services role in the economy; full parliamentary oversight of all appendages of 
government, and limits on the supreme leader’s extra-constitutional power.361 
“Reformists are specifically concerned with the removal of restrictions on socio-cultural 
aspects of human life. A reformist interpretation of the constitution forbids the 
government from interfering in the private life of the populace.”362 
Unlike the other actor groups, the reformist elites believe real reform must 
include domestic political reform in society, which will create a better business 
environment for domestic and foreign investment. “Reformists … believe political 
reforms are necessary to set the preconditions for reforms in all other spheres of life and 
in economics, in particular. As a result, they believe the root cause of economic 
downturns is the insecurity to invest.”363 
Regarding the nuclear issue, the reformists are believed to be the best 
group who would legitimately negotiate over the issue, which would not include giving 
up Iran’s right to peaceful enrichment. Discussing the nuclear issue, green movement 
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reasonable accommodation with the international community,”364 which can be 
interpreted to mean a willingness to work within the NPT to reach an ending to the crisis. 
However, internal politics and the reformists’ desire to simply survive, politically, have 
gotten in the way. Discussions of an Iranian fuel enrichment swap for Tehran’s reactor, 
hammered out in Geneva in October 2009, was initially accepted by Ahmadinejad’s 
government: 
But the reactor deal was soon criticized by Iran’s new Green Movement 
opposition, as well as conservatives in the regime, largely for political 
reasons. Ahmadinejad’s opponents did not want the president to get credit 
for any agreement favorable to Iran. Some leaders also may have feared 
that any change in the Islamic-Republic’s underlying anti-Americanism 
would threaten the existence of their system.365 
Among their constituents, of whom the educated youth is the largest 
client, the reforms desired are more economic in nature. Discontent with poor 
employment opportunities, as well as achieving more social and political freedoms, 
constitute their chief concerns. Support for negotiation on the nuclear issue can be found 
among the clients of the reformists—the educated youth and intelligentsia who see 
peaceful Uranium enrichment as a right, but largely do not support enrichment to 
weapons grade. 
b. Economic Assets and Constituents of the Reformists 
Being that the clients of the reformists are primarily students and 
intellectuals, their economic base is decidedly slim. These clients “lack access to the 
parallel power centers and “shadow” economic forces like the religious foundations and 
the Revolutionary Guard.”366 However, like the pragmatists, the reformists have “built 
extensive ties with private entrepreneurs during their years of formal control of the state 
apparatuses under Khatami’s Presidency.”367 These exact ties are not clear, but it is likely 
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that they overlap in some degree with the pragmatist actor group who desire to see the 
conditions set for a better business environment: 
An indication of the strength of these links came with Ahmadinejad’s 
cold-shouldering of the business elite after his 2005 rise to power. The 
neoconservative president made thinly veiled accusations that leading 
private investors had made their wealth as protégé’s of pragmatic 
conservatives and reformists, and said that he would allocate resources to 
small-scale enterprises instead of big actors.368 
The youth are now considered clients of the reformists for several reasons, 
mostly because of demonstrated action versus stated ideology, which has shifted to 
support differing candidates at different times. While it is true that pro-regime youth 
organizations exist in Iran, such as those associated with the Basij, the group is not 
monolithic and the majority of the youth in Iran desire political and social freedoms that 
happen to coincide with the reformists’ interests. Iran’s first organized student 
movements’ agendas have evolved over the last three decades: 
From a focus on Islamic ideology to individual rights under Islamic rule. 
The group’s calls for political and social openings contributed to the 
reform movement’s birth in the late 1990s. Members were involved in the 
1999 student protests, [which were] the largest demonstrations until the 
2009 elections.”369  
The youth constitute the largest bloc in the green movement and, as a constituency, faced 
the largest share of the conservatives and neoconservatives’ crack-down over it.370 
The youth constitute 40 percent of the electorate and this percentage is 
slowly rising.371 
Youth is the largest population block in Iran. Over 60 percent of Iran’s 73 
million people are under 30 years old… Iranian youth are among the most 
politically active in the 57 nations of the Islamic world. As the most 
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restive segment of Iranian society, the young also represent one of the 
greatest long-term threats to the current theocratic rule.372  
What the youth have in numbers and potential votes, they lack in 
economic wealth: 
The government generates only about 300,000 of the roughly  
1 million jobs needed annually to absorb young people entering the labor 
market… unemployment among youth has almost doubled since 1990. 
Young people between 15 and 29 make up 35 percent of the population 
but account for 70 percent of the unemployed.373 
It is important to note that the reformist actor group does not necessarily 
resonate with the working and lower-middle classes. These demographics largely still 
remain the clients of their neoconservative patrons who have steered resources in their 
direction at the expense of the bigger private sector actors.374 Ahmadinejad has 
campaigned on a populist platform to distribute patronage and largesse to these 
constituencies in the name of social justice375 and has cut general subsidies and used the 
savings to direct cash handouts to these demographics instead, which have actually hurt 
this demographic due to the rise in inflation.376 Campaigns of free market reforms have 
simply failed to capture the hearts of these demographics, which prefer the candidate who 
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“Ahmadinejad’s populist message of economic equality won over the promises of 
neoliberal economic projects espoused by other candidates, even those running under the 
conservative banner.”377 
c. Behavior and Motives of the Reformists 
The reformist elites desire political, social, and economic change to 
benefit Iranians and have organized and led peaceful protests to do so. However, so far 
they have refused to operate outside the constitution or the law to achieve their 
objectives. This is one of their greatest weaknesses, as no reformist leader can be found 
for the reformist constituencies to galvanize behind to achieve their goals. Leaders who 
exhibit any of these qualities are quickly eliminated by the regime anyway, usually 
through arbitrary arrests and lengthy jail sentences. President Khatami’s failure to 
respond to friendly diplomatic overtures from the West during the Clinton administration, 
and support the violent student protests that broke out across Iran during the summer of 
1999, was an early indicator of the limits of the reformist elites. “The hard liners had 
digested the lesson from the [1999] summer that Khatami would not lead a revolution and 
would back down when faced with a choice between doing so or giving in. That gave 
them the upper hand, and they used it.”378 More recently, Mir Hossein Mousavi’s 
“unwillingness to criticize Khamenei and his insistence on working within the 
constitution convinced some Iranians that he no longer reflected the [Green] movements’ 
views.”379 
As stated, the youth now constitute the greatest constituency client of the 
reformist elites and they represent the greatest threat for a velvet revolution to the regime. 
By 1997, their growing numbers helped elect reformist President 
Mohammad Khatami. But as he failed to produce change, the young 
pulled back. The partial youth boycott of the 2005 presidential election 
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was key to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election. Their reentry into politics 
into politics in the 2009 election seriously altered Iranian politics.380  
By 2009 they were more willing to take matters into their own hands and defy the 
conservative and neoconservative leadership. “Many Iranian youth have for a long time 
felt alienated from the Islamic Republic, and recent electoral fraud has decreased their 
faith in change through democratic means. Yet the [reformist] movement is still largely 
nonviolent.”381 Use of the Internet and blogs to air grievances has now become the 
primary method to air grievances against the regime, which the youth lead.382 “Iran is 
one of the most tech-savvy societies in the developing world, with an estimated 28 
million Internet users, [which is] led by youth… Iran boasts between 60,000 and 110,000 
active blogs, one of the highest numbers in the Middle East, led by youth.”383 
B. SOURCES OF RENTS AND COMPETITION BETWEEN THE ACTORS 
It is important to note that petrochemical exports play a significant part in the 
Iranian political economy and have played a significant role in shaping the political 
system. Iran is a founding member of OPEC and is now that organization’s second 
largest producer and exporter of crude oil, after Saudi Arabia.384 Iran is also the fifth 
largest global producer of oil (5.3 percent world market share in 2009)385 and the second 
largest producer of natural gas386 (4.4 percent of world market share in 2009).387 Iran has  
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about 10 percent of the world’s total oil reserves,388 the third-largest in the world389 —
and about 15.8 percent of the world’s total natural gas reserves,390 the second largest in 
the world.391 The Iranian Ministry of Petroleum controls the NIOC, which has struggled 
to keep up production at 3.5 million BPD.392 
Access to oil is, therefore, critical for the Iranian government and this sector of 
the economy remains a target for sanctions, since all actors depend on it for maintaining 
its control of the state. “Iran’s petroleum sector generates about 20 percent of Iran’s GDP 
(which is about $870 billion), 80 percent of its exports, and 70 percent of its government 
revenues.393 Yet, tracking the exact intra-governmental allocation of government 
spending is difficult,394 and information on IRGC and IRGC-affiliated black-market 
contributions is impossible.395 This is by design, as this allocation is intentionally 
opaque. 
Whatever actor can gain control of state offices can control the allocation of oil 
rents for patronage and thus further their control of the economy. Bribery and favor-
seeking is also a part of Persian culture and brings new clients for the actor. “Competition 
for positions in the Mayor’s office and similar jobs is fierce. Similarly, firms spend 
resources to court bureaucrats in order to obtain privileges and favors.”396 These actors 
either control the rents directly or put pressure on the regulatory or bureaucratic bodies 
that allocate funds to preferred parties.397 “The most important channels for distributing 
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oil rents are development projects and subsidized loans.”398 In the past, subsidized 
energy had also served the actors in providing patronage to their clients. 
1. Development Projects 
Development projects, steered by the actors to their favored clients and/or 
contractors, are a major way the actors distribute patronage. Often, these are given 
directly in the form of no-bid contracts. 
 One way to create rents from development projects such as dams, roads, 
and hospitals is for the bureaucrats running the project to make a generous 
estimation of the projects costs. The difference between the official cost of 
the project and the actual cost may then be split between the contractor 
and the bureaucrats.399  
Many of these types of no-bid contracts have been awarded to the IRGC’s engineering 
arm, GHORB, an entity that remains sanctioned under U.S. executive order 13382, also 
coincident with sanctions under UN Resolution 1929400 (Katzman and Library of 
Congress; Congressional Research Service 2011). Other firms that engage in this activity 
also remain sanctioned. 
2. Subsidized Loans 
Cheap credit is another means of distributing patronage. Access to this credit is 
preferential and based upon the client’s connections to the actor who can influence the 
state banks. Money is often used for purposes other than intended and sometimes not 
repaid without any consequences.401 As has been observed, the conservatives have the 
most influence on the control of nationalized banks, with the neoconservatives slowly 
developing their own parallel banking and finance capabilities. It is unclear where these 
two capabilities overlap, but both actors still use subsidized loans to their favored clients 
as a form of patronage to further their own political influence.  
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The Iranian government has direct control over lending and investment 
activities of commercial banks… in addition, most of the financial 
intermediaries loan portfolios are comprised of low-return loans to state-
owned enterprises and quasi-government agencies, such as the bonyads.  
By IMF estimates, nonperforming loans have amounted to more than one-
fifth of Iranian banks loan portfolios… in economic sectors in which the 
Iranian government is involved in directed lending.402 
3. Cash Transfers to Client Constituencies 
General subsidies are scheduled to be phased out by 2015, following an 
agreement reached between the factions in 2010.403 Repeal of these subsidies was 
difficult but necessary—as their costs had risen to approximately $83.75 billion or 
25 percent of GDP in 2009. In the new arrangement, the savings from subsidies will be 
used as a new form of cash payments to targeted constituencies: 
50 percent for direct cash payments to people who qualify for aid; 30 
percent to industries that rely heavily on subsidies, and to improve they 
energy sector and public transportation, and; 20 percent directly to the 
Treasury to cover government costs of implementation and reduce 
dependence on oil revenues.404  
Ahmadinejad initially resisted parliamentary oversight of the distribution of these funds, 
naturally, as they can be manipulated into a form of patronage, but in the final 
arrangement, the parliament will have audit authority.405 
The weakness of distributing cash in lieu of subsidies to the poorest of Iranian 
society, as well as select industries, has been the massive rise in inflation. Inflation has 
increased with these cash handouts to approximately 30 percent in 2008,406 ultimately 
weakening the very constituency (the poor) targeted for assistance by weakening their 
purchasing power. “Ahmadinejad’s profligate spending also drained the Treasury of 
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billions from oil revenues, while contributing little to improve Iran’s aged and ailing 
infrastructure.”407 Inflation also theoretically makes it difficult to ensure payments to the  
security services that are the neoconservative client constituents, but as in all 
authoritarian states, the security services would receive a priority (as a pillar of the 
regime) to see their pay keep parity with inflation. 
4. Monopolies and Tariffs 
Monopolies on the imports and distribution of consumer goods such as rice, tea, 
sugar, and tobacco exist in Iran. Held by the bonyads, they are tolerated by the 
government, even if not officially sanctioned.408 This can be considered a regulatory 
rent,409 especially to the conservative actors who remain in control of the bonyads. 
United States’ sanctions, while banning imports and exports from Iran, maintain an 
exemption for food products.410 
C. IRANIAN ACTORS’ VULNERABILITIES 
Each actor’s patron and client relationships have been examined, as have the 
sources of rents each depends on. This section briefly turns to the sources of competition 
and potential weaknesses, between each actor, to identify possible areas for exploitation 
by smart sanctions. 
1. Infighting between Conservatives and Neoconservatives 
The ascendency of the neoconservatives in Iranian society, both politically and 
economically, is a sign that the broader elite clerical base has lost popular support. 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory was equivalent to another revolution 
within the Islamic Republic, one in which a new generation of hardliners 
were keen on returning Iran to the fundamentals of the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution, when the dispossessed and underprivileged were given hope 
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for a better life. Ahmadinejad argued that the revolution had gone awry, 
privileging clerical rulers who had become far removed from the struggles 
of average Iranians suffering from double-digit unemployment rates and 
rampant inflation.411 
There are splits between the conservatives and neoconservatives, mostly over control of 
appointments to key positions in government, which have led to the apparent loss of 
support from the supreme leader for president, Ahmadinejad. This split has also widened 
between conservatives and neoconservatives in the parliament “to the point at which 
there has been open discussion in Iran’s parliament since June 2011 on impeaching 
Ahmadinejad.”412 International sanctions, or differences in economic or foreign policy, 
do not appear to be the cause of the split413 but rather the neoconservatives push for 
greater control of the institutions of government. Ahmadinejad’s attempts to assert 
greater control over government institutions like banks, insurance and state-run 
companies by replacing their leadership with his own neoconservative associates, is met 
with resistance in the Majles and are a sign of the conflict between the two actors as 
positions of power and control of rents are contested.414 
Ahmadinejad’s (i.e., the neoconservative’s) attempts to control the distribution of 
cash payments without parliamentary oversight is a recent indication of his attempts to 
outmaneuver the conservative clerics to solidify his client constituency among the poor, 
some of whom still hold nostalgia for the clerical revolution and its promise of religious 
leadership. Despite this example ending in an apparent draw, other examples of 
Ahmadinejad and the neoconservatives attempting to assert greater influence include: 
“Expanding credit [to favored clients] and spending in a freewheel fashion; Feuding 
openly with a series of cabinet ministers and Central Bank chiefs; Dismantling the 
[economic] planning bureaucracy, and; Disempowering government technocrats.”415 
These efforts have done more than raise eyebrows among the conservatives, as most are 
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designed to weaken their economic and constituent base. Despite these efforts, the 
conservatives (via the supreme leader), still hold the upper hand by controlling the 
nonelected organs of state power that can overturn legislation and neoconservative 
government appointments. The neoconservatives are mitigating this by showcasing these 
efforts in a populist manner—social justice—to appeal to overlapping constituencies such 
as the poor and the security services. 
2. Corruption of the Pragmatists 
The pragmatists are viewed by the international audience as being an actor with a 
ray of hope in an otherwise intractable sea of conservative ideologues, but the shifting of 
loyalties in Iranian politics makes it difficult to determine who is a pragmatist and who is 
a conservative.416 It is true that during Rafsanjani’s presidency there were efforts at 
international rapprochement, as Iran resumed diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, 
Morocco, and Egypt and he also helped obtain the freedom of American hostages held by 
Lebanese hezbollah.417 The easing of social and cultural restrictions was also seen as a 
sign of a new era in Iran, as was the invitation for outside FDI in Iran’s economy. More 
recently, Rafsanjani and other former pragmatist politicians have called for “more tact 
and management” regarding the conservatives and neoconservatives’ hard-line handling 
of Iranian international affairs, specifically regarding the plot to kill the Saudi 
Ambassador to Washington in October 2011.418 
But the clerics are domestically viewed as corrupt themselves, and despite some 
pragmatist leanings, as a group, they likely would not advance the kind of liberal reforms 
needed to alter governmental policy on the nuclear issue should sanctions somehow 
weaken their competitors. Their vested interests in the economy would also not generate 
true private sector growth to take power out of the conservatives’ and neoconservatives’ 
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hands. With the average Iranian income at $10,600 per capita a year in 2010,419 stories of 
Rafsanjani’s and other mullah’s considerable wealth have been around for a long time. 
The gossip on the street, going well beyond the observable facts, has the 
Rafsanjani’s stashing billions of dollars in bank accounts in Switzerland 
and Luxembourg; controlling huge swaths of waterfront in Iran’s free 
economic zones on the Persian Gulf; and owning whole vacation resorts 
on the idyllic beaches of Dubai, Goa, and Thailand.420 
Journalistic inquiries into Rafsanjani’s dealings have led to lengthy prison sentences, 
mutilations and death.421 
Since the revolution, this actor group has also had considerable influence over the 
ministry of petroleum and the NIOC,422 and their associates have been termed the “oil 
mafia.” The neoconservatives, specifically Ahmadinejad, made a bid to take control of 
the oil institutions after their election in 2005. “Once in power, he quickly sacked the Oil 
Minister but ran into problems when trying to nominate a successor. In a protracted 
political fight revealing the post’s sensitivity, the Parliament rejected three suggested 
candidates before settling for a compromise.”423 The neoconservatives also attempted to 
curb the pragmatists’ hold on “banks, insurance, and state-run companies”424 in a similar 
manner, by firing their leadership and attempting to fill replacements with 
neoconservative loyalists.425 
3. Weakness of the Reformists 
The reformists face a difficult challenge due to the weakness of their primary 
constituencies—the students and intellectuals in Iranian society who have little to no 
economic wealth to draw from. There are indications that some clerics have also become 
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more left-leaning, but these individuals, as has been shown, are mostly associated with 
academia and also lack an economic wealth base. This is obviously due to the 
conservatives’ and neoconservatives’ control of the political economy and the absence of 
an open, free market economy. But what this group lacks in economic power, it makes up 
for in sheer numbers and technical savvy. As has been shown, the youth constitute about 
40 percent of the population but suffer from 70 percent unemployment.426 The economic 
frustration of the youth was translated into the green movement, which “reached its 
height when up to 3 million peaceful demonstrators turned out on Tehran streets.”427 
Despite the youth’s use of the Internet to air its grievances, the regime is able to 
monitor and sensor its use. “The regimes technical filtering and censorship of the internet 
is one of the most extensive in the world.”428 The conservatives have passed legislation 
requiring all Internet Service Providers (ISP’s) to utilize filtering systems, block 
unauthorized sites, and connect through the state-owned telecommunications company, 
which is now controlled by the IRGC.429 The IRGC also established its own Cyber 
Defense Command in 2009 and monitors internet activity.430 United States’ economic 
sanctions have been put in place to assist these activists, which will be discussed in the 
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D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the political actors in Iran and their constituents, as 
well as their sources of rent competition and their potential vulnerabilities. Two broad 
conclusions can be drawn from this analysis regarding the best way to alter Iranian 
behavior and policies via economic sanctions: sanctions should focus on weakening the 
conservative and neoconservative actors due to their infighting over political control, 
rents, and overlapping constituencies and clients and, sanctions should focus on 
supporting the youth, which are largely the clients of the reformists who offer the best 
hope of bringing about change in Iran. As has been shown during the 2009 green 
movement, the youth’s numbers and significant economic grievances have already 
changed the political landscape of Iran. Given that the pragmatist actors have largely 
blended into other actor groups and can now be regarded as nonactive players—sanctions 
should focus on the three remaining actors. 
Smarter sanctions should aim to accomplish these objectives simultaneously for 
the best chance of success. Sanctions, as they exist today, primarily seek to weaken the 
conservative and neoconservative actors and are having some success in limiting the 
amounts of long-term rents available to them and their clients. They have also 
complicated Iran’s business environment, both domestically and internationally.431 
However, these sanctions are also, arguably, increasing these actors’ control of the 
political economy—as the IRGC and other quasi-state actors have moved in to fill 
economic voids left by other departing foreign and domestic investors. These sanctions 
gains have also not translated into increased rents or political clout for the reformist 
actors or their youth constituents, nor have they broadened support for the reformist 
actors among other constituencies. “Some argue that difficult economic sanctions are 
contributing to the political quiescence of Iranian labor because the working class fears 
loss of pay from participation in demonstrations or from regime retaliation.”432 
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Perhaps the best way to envision the Iranian political economy is as a pie, cut up 
into four different pieces. The conservatives and the neoconservatives currently have the 
largest slices of the pie—arguably three-fourths of it. The pragmatist actors, as has been 
shown, have largely disappeared as a coherent actor and have crumbled into the 
conservative piece. The size of the pieces ensures domination of both politics and the 
economy and allows the conservatives and neoconservatives to dictate the Iranian policy 
the U.S. seeks to change. The reformists have the other slice—the smallest piece. As the 
weakest actor, they have little say in the political economy and are more of a nuisance to 
the other actors. Sanctions, as they exist today, are shrinking the size of the entire pie, but 
not changing the makeup of the size of the slices. Smart sanctions, therefore, should 
exploit the seams of the slices, and somehow grow the size of the slice of the reformist 
slice while shrinking the size of the other pieces. How to do this, exactly, is the subject of 
the next chapter. 
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IV. ALTERING IRANIAN SANCTIONS 
As has been shown in Chapter II, economic sanctions regimes have the best 
chance of achieving their goals when the actors in the political economy face political 
competition brought about by an independent economic base of wealth. The Iranian 
conservative and neoconservative actors and their client constituents control most of the 
economic and political activity in the Iranian political economy. The current Iranian 
economic sanctions regime is designed to alter Iranian policies on a number of fronts, 
with the most recent U.S. and UN resolutions and sanctions targeting organizations and 
individuals linked to “involvement in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, or 
affiliated with the IRGC”433 (which are associated with the conservative and 
neoconservative actors). The Iranian nuclear issue is at the forefront of policies the 
international community is concerned about. 
The reformist actor elite, if they could achieve power, offer the best hope of the 
Iranian leadership achieving the desired political goals of the economic sanctions 
currently in place—ultimately, an Iran that abides by international norms and behaviors 
(i.e., becomes a status-quo state). The conservative and neoconservative actors continue 
to resist this change, hanging onto their revolutionary ideals as a source of legitimacy, 
while insulating themselves with further entrenchment in the economy, solidifying 
political control. This control of the political economy has allowed them to emasculate 
the reformist actors, denying them access to economic wealth—and the chance to gain a 
sustained political presence. A sustained political presence would allow for the growth of 
popular support, which would lead to changes in institutions that insulate the 
conservatives and neoconservatives from political and economic threats. 
The goals of economic sanctions should therefore be to grow the strength of the 
reformist actors (and their clients) economically, so their political clout can grow as well. 
A brief review of existing Iranian sanctions and their general inadequacies has been 
provided in Chapter II. Rather than recount the extensive listing of economic sanctions 
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against Iran, this chapter will review the effects of current economic sanctions on the 
Iranian political economy. Special attention will be given to examination of the 
differences between the real and intended effects of these sanctions on the political 
economy and the actors within it. External factors, such as the oil shield and weak 
sanctions enforcement will also be examined as an insulating factor to the economic 
sanctions regime. Finally, recommendations for adjustments in the Iranian sanctions 
policy will be made. 
Although mentioned in Chapter II, it is worth mentioning again that “there is no 
agreement among U.S. officials on the specific objectives of [U.S.] sanctions on Iran, 
which makes it hard to judge how successful they have been.”434 UN sanctions, while 
specific in application and more narrow in focus, are equally difficult to ascertain 
effectiveness in both their economic and political effects. 
Since 2006, the UN Security Council has passed six resolutions critical of 
Iran for its controversial nuclear program. Each resolution was designed to 
increase pressure on Tehran to suspend its Uranium enrichment and 
ballistic missile development programs, two of three critical steps in 
obtaining a nuclear weapons capability.435 
A. EFFECTS OF CURRENT SANCTIONS ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
The current economic sanctions against Iran are designed to impact three broad 
categories, of which the ultimate effects are difficult to determine due to the subjective 
nature of the analysis,436 as well as “disagreements over what sanctions are meant to 
achieve.”437 U.S. and UN sanctions are broadly designed to: slow investment in Iran’s 
petroleum sector, thus decreasing rents to the Iranian economy for other activities; deny 
Iranian (and associated) persons and institutions involved in proliferation and terrorist 
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activities access to the international banking system and; provide a forum of legitimate 
international concern for Iranian policies, specifically its nuclear policies.438 
Official net assessments of U.S. and UN sanctions impacts on the Iranian 
economy (and their effects on the political actors) do not exist439 or are only available in 
a classified format. What sanctions information U.S. agencies do collect (typically only 
on the areas they are responsible to enforce) is uncoordinated and disparate and not 
collated into a final assessment of sanctions effects.440 “Except for Treasury, the agencies 
do not collect data demonstrating the direct results of their sanctioning and enforcement 
actions, such as the types of goods seized under the trade ban or the subsequent actions of 
sanctioned entities.”441 Per the CISADA act of 2010, the administration is required to 
“investigate reports of certain sanctionable activity where credible evidence is received 
and make a determination in writing to Congress whether such activity has indeed 
occurred. The President would then be expected to impose or waive sanctions.”442 Given 
the expansion of sanctions in the 2010 CISADA legislation specifically targeting refined 
petroleum, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) continues to recommend the 
administration establish a baseline of sanctions impacts and conduct an overall net 
assessment of sanctions effects.443 
One aspect of international sanctions remains clear: international economic 
sanctions have not altered Iran’s nuclear enrichment policy and have not applied 
sufficient pressure to induce Iran to negotiate a compromise that would limit their nuclear 
development.444 Sanctions do not appear to be altering Iran’s other policies either, such 
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as support for terrorism and human rights abuses. It can only be reasoned that sanctions 
are not altering the internal balance of power in Iran (in the short term) to promote 
opposition groups who offer the best hope of aligning Iranian policy to sanctions 
objectives (i.e., reformists). However, the recent intensification of conflict among the 
conservative and neoconservative factions, that played out over 2011, fragmented the 
elite power structure, indicates a concern among the elites of the anticipated long-term 
effects of sanctions and reduction of rents. Specifically, the struggle “involved the 
[Supreme] Leader’s pointed reinstatement of senior officials whom the president had 
dismissed, and other tensions over who would exercise the levers of power. It is generally 
felt that Ahmadinejad was significantly weakened by this series of events.”445 This split 
could benefit the reformists, who would stand to gain during the upcoming Majles 
elections in March 2012. 
1. Sanctions Impacts on the Iranian Petrochemical Sector 
A majority of the existing U.S. economic sanctions against the Iranian petroleum 
sector are contained in the Iranian Sanctions Act (ISA) and CISADA amendments. 
Originally called the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), ISA was 
enacted to try and deny Iran the resources to further its nuclear program 
and support terrorist organizations… Iran’s petroleum sector generates 
about 20 percent of Iran’s GDP (which is about $870 billion), 80 percent 
of its exports, and 70 percent of its government revenue.446  
These sanctions target investment in Iran’s petrochemical infrastructure, as well as 
imported gasoline, which constitutes about 40 percent of Iran’s total consumption.447 
“[CISADA Amendments] tightened U.S. Sanctions in several areas and enacted 
numerous legal restrictions previously made under presidential executive orders.”448 Six 
UN resolutions, critical of Iran’s nuclear program, have been specifically passed since 
2006, but they do not specifically target the petrochemical sector. 
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“Oil revenues represent the bulk of both government income and foreign 
exchange earnings in Iran, and thus give the officials and bureaucrats who control the 
petroleum industry disproportionate influence over the economy and the political 
system.”449  Sanctions against this sector of the economy are designed to reduce short 
term and long term rents available to the Iranian government, thus reducing their ability 
to obtain resources for their nuclear program and support terrorist organizations.450 
However, higher than expected oil revenues are allowing for internal investment in the 
energy sector. 
There is no doubt that sanctions have kept foreign investment in the 
countries manufacturing and energy sectors far below its potential. Oil 
revenues, however, have enabled the Iranian government to partially offset 
the shortfall in foreign investment by increasing domestic investment.451  
Estimates of costs of sanctions to Iran from lost oil-related rents are around $80 billion 
annually at $100 per barrel,452 which could, in turn, lower global oil costs by 10 percent 
if normalization of trade resumed.453 Given that IMF projections of net oil revenues is 
$64.4 billion for 2010–2011,454 and that the lifting of sanctions would likely bring about 
further investment in Iran’s energy infrastructure, this cost is staggering, if accurate in its 
projections. Despite these sanctions and their effects on Iran’s energy sector, they have 
still not altered official Iranian nuclear policy. 
2. Sanctions Impacts on the Iranian Financial Sector 
As discussed in Chapter II, financial sanctions have slowly gathered strength 
against Iran and seek to “disrupt Iran’s illicit activities… deter third parties from acting as 
enablers for Iran’s illicit activities…[and] force Iran to recalculate the cost-benefit ratio 
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of—and consider continuing—its illicit activities.”455 These efforts, while achieving 
economic costs, have not achieved political goals as “[Iranian] proponents of the nuclear 
program … believe that pursuing it is well worth the sanctions, particularly since oil 
revenues in recent years have far exceeded the costs of the sanctions.”456 Specifically, 
U.S. sanctions seek to limit Iranian access to the international financial sector by 
blocking U-Turn financial transactions in the U.S., and by the new authorities granted the 
U.S. Treasury in CISADA Section 104.457 Blocking U-Turn financial transactions means 
U.S. banks cannot process Iranian financial transactions submitted by a third party, 
“effectively cutting off [Iran’s] ability to do business in dollars, the international currency 
for oil markets.”458 Section 104 of the CISADA amendments of the ISA also seek to 
eliminate “Iran’s access to the international financial system [making] it more difficult 
for Iran to move its money.”459 These efforts have been supplemented with informal 
efforts by the U.S. treasury department to sign on foreign banks to individually agree to 
reduce or eliminate their involvement clearing Iranian financial transactions due to the 
risks, on which 80 banks had agreed by April 2011.460 These efforts have been so 
successful that President Ahmadinejad declared before the Majles, recently, that Iranian 
banks could no longer process international transactions.461 
What costs are financial sanctions actually imposing on Iran? 
The most important damage to the Iranian economy from the financial 
sanctions is due to the poor investment environment that has resulted. In 
the absence of the sanctions, Iran could have obtained much better terms 
[on energy investment projects via its buy-back contracts] and/or could 
have financed the oil projects by itself. It is tough to calculate the amount  
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of damages to Iran’s economy that has been specifically caused by the 
financial sanctions as various factors are involved and their costs 
unknown.462 
 In other words, financial sanctions make it difficult for Iran to get paid for their exports, 
raise the costs of borrowing, and limit investments that generate new revenues. Some 
varying analyses from the 1990s and early 2000s indicate that the total costs of financial 
sanctions to the Iranian economy each year was $637 million during those years (via 
prohibition from ILSA investments, limits of economic assistance and loans, and oil swap 
and pipeline costs), with some estimates even higher.463 When included with the 
additional costs of lost trade during this period (prohibition of U.S. exports and imports 
due to ILSA), costs were $777 million each year.464 Despite these seemingly large 
amounts, the ultimate effect on the Iranian GDP at the time was a little over a 1 percent 
reduction.465 More recent analysis from 2008 indicates a much larger figure of sanctions 
impacts on Iranian trade, using new projection models.  
On a combined basis, the impact of the US sanctions on Iran’s total trade 
(exports plus imports) amounts to a loss of $16.8 billion, or nearly 19 
percent of Iran’s actual total trade in 2005 ($90.6 billion). Relative to 
domestic output, this total trade loss is equivalent to nearly 9 percent of 
Iran’s gross domestic product in 2005.466 
Therefore, despite the impact of financial sanctions, specifically, a difficulty processing 
transactions on the international financial market; reduction of investment; increased 
borrowing costs; reduction of trade and; a slight reduction of GDP, they have not altered 
Iranian policy.  
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3. Legitimacy and Enforcement of Iranian Sanctions 
Although UN resolutions and sanctions are not designed to decrease rents to the 
regime, they do confer an international consensus for implementing other Iranian 
sanctions (and unilateral sanctions among partner nations) due to worldwide concern with 
Iran’s nuclear program.  
Since 2007, Europe has been involved as the United States in diplomatic 
efforts to secure UN sanctions on dual-use items useful for Iran’s nuclear 
and missile programs. By late 2010, U.S. sanctions on Iran were no longer 
an outlier; other major Western industrial countries imposed similar 
sanctions.467 
Other countries and multinational corporations have thus decided that doing business 
with Iran is not worth the long term risks—and have pulled investments voluntarily. 
“Tehran’s ability to do business as usual has taken a severe hit as banks, multinational 
corporations and insurers end their business relationships with Iran.”468 This new-found 
sanctions legitimacy is a victory for the U.S., given its rocky history with Europe over 
unilateral sanctions in the 1990s via the ILSA sanctions and their extraterritorial effects.  
U.S. allies have generally joined the Obama Administration’s sanctions 
toward Iran, in part because the approach is perceived as not purely 
punitive and in part because their own concerns about Iran’s nuclear 
advancement have increased ... [by] 2010, an unprecedented degree of 
global consensus has emerged on how to deal with Iran.469 
Perhaps this aspect of the current sanctions regime has the most political leverage against 
Iran to alter its nuclear enrichment policy, more so than any financial or trade sanction 
can generate. 
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B. WEAKNESS OF ACTUAL SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT 
Despite the legitimacy and recent consensus of the latest rounds of UN sanctions, 
there are obstacles to their complete enforcement, and some reports indicate that these 
factors are significantly undercutting the effects of current sanctions. 
By now, it is obvious that the U.S. sanctions of 2010, as well as the 
punitive measures adopted by America’s partners against the IRI, appear 
to be less effective than initially expected… [Iran] has been able to 
mitigate their negative effect.470 
The factors undercutting sanctions include: the weakness of partner nations’ enforcement 
among their own private sectors, the role of China and lack of allied consensus. 
1. Weak Private Sector Enforcement 
Iranian trade is shifting eastwards, away from Europe, with China becoming its 
largest trading partner, and one who is able to mitigate sanctions effects.471 U.S. allies, 
whose governments supported the imposition of UN sanctions, also find it difficult to 
“ensure that [their] private sectors will not try and use any opportunity to continue 
economic cooperation with Iran or even bypass sanctions.”472 The withdrawal of 
multinational firms in trading and infrastructure development has also created a vacuum 
that is being filled by smaller companies among Iran’s lesser trading partners473 and the 
IRGC itself.474 
The U.A.E. also faces difficulty curtailing its private sector’s business enterprises 
with Iran, despite their government’s initial embrace of UN sanctions over the summer of  
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2010.475 Initially, the U.A.E. announced the freezing of Iranian persons’ bank accounts 
operating within the U.A.E., a stricter Iranian export policy—getting tough on the export 
of dual-use items and refined petroleum,476 and financial and insurance restrictions 
associated with exports to Iran.477 These restrictions are reportedly having some effects 
on the Iranian business community, driving up the costs of imports in Iran by 15–30 
percent, according to the Iranian chamber of commerce.478  However, there is 
considerable pressure among the U.A.E. business community to lift the sanctions, and the 
authorities have not implemented the draconian embargo on refined petroleum exports to 
Iran, despite American calls to do so.479 “The [U.A.E.] business community itself spares 
no effort to persuade U.A.E. authorities to secure economic ties with the IRI against the 
negative influence of the punitive measures.”480 This is due to the significant 
involvement of Iranians in the U.A.E.’s own economy. 
Close economic relations with Iran (from 2002 to 2008, the [Iranian] share 
of U.A.E. exports was around 15 percent), the existence of a large and 
influential Iranian community in the Emirates (from 300,000 to 800,000 
people), as well as Iranian investments in the U.A.E. economy (around 
$300 billion by 2008, one-fifth or so invested in Dubai trade malls), did 
not allow Arab business circles to support the UNSC or U.S. sanctions.481 
Also, there are reports that other so called “Black Knight” companies (smaller 
firms of third countries that do not do business in the U.S., and therefore do not fear 
sanctions)482 have stepped in to fill the void of withdrawing European companies to 
handle Iranian trade of sanctioned materials.483 Besides the somewhat curtailed activity 
of the U.A.E., smaller firms from various countries such as China, India, Turkey, 
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Venezuela, Singapore, Japan, Ecuador, Brazil and Eastern European countries are 
stepping in to meet Iranian needs following the departure of Western businesses.484 
These needs include international shipping transit locations for sanctioned items and 
production of refined petroleum, and these firms are receiving varying levels of support 
from their governments to conduct this business with Iran, despite international 
sanctions.485 
2. Impact of China 
“Between 2002 and 2008, total trade between Iran and China grew nearly eight 
fold ... it is the largest destination for Iran’s exports and the biggest source of Iran’s 
imports.”486 China’s dependence on Iranian oil is growing considerably and there are few 
alternatives to meet this long-term need,487 creating “opportunities for Tehran to bypass 
American sanctions.”488 China, seeking to hedge its oil bets in Iran, is “striving to invest 
heavily in Iran’s energy sector,”489 to include the “financing of the development of 
Iranian gas fields and road infrastructure.”490 Chinese companies have also signed up to 
replace departing multinational firms previously invested in Iran’s energy sector who 
withdrew due to sanctions.491 Although most of these deals are in the preliminary stages, 
and the backfilling firms are not as technically capable as the withdrawing firms,492 strict 
banking sanctions against Iran are being avoided via the Chinese banking system.  
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China’s banks remain open to Iran493 and “theoretically… allows them to make financial 
transactions not only with the PRC [Peoples Republic of China] but with other 
countries.”494 
China’s status as a UNSC member also allows it additional room to grow its 
relationship with Iran. 
Beijing is not going to support any sanctions against [Iran] except those 
imposed by the United Nations … [and] China has traditionally spared no 
effort to emasculate UNSC resolutions so that they cannot create any 
problems for the developing cooperation between [them].495 
3. Lack of Allied Consensus 
U.S. allies’ appetite for sanctions is also waning, despite their government’s initial 
support. South Korea relies on Iran to meet its energy needs, and is also maintaining its 
economic ties to Iran, despite supporting UN sanctions on Iran and imposing its own 
punitive economic sanctions against entities and individuals related to the Iranian nuclear 
program.496 India also seemed to signal its support for sanctions, following President 
Obama’s visit in November 2010 when India announced it would no longer use the Asia 
Clearing Union (based in Tehran) to handle overdue oil payment transactions, and that 
there were difficulties in finding an alternate payment mechanism.497 However, payments 
resumed in March 2011 through a Turkish bank, and by September, Iran’s central bank 
governor stated that India had paid its $6.3 billion debt in full.498 
The European Union’s member states’ participation in sanctions may also be 
faltering, despite their recent adoption of stronger sanctions. “In May 2011, the EU 
Council approved amendments to its sanctions, adopted in 2010, against Iran that made 
the European punitive measures even tougher. However, some evidence indicates that 
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there is no unanimity among EU members.”499 Due to the EU’s desire to find needed 
additional sources of natural gas, European companies have never completely cut their 
relationships to Iran and some are even considering moving businesses to neighboring 
countries (using local intermediaries as a business cover), or joining Chinese or Turkish 
firms as sub-contractors to avoid U.S. and UN sanctions.500 So, while U.S. allies have 
joined up for additional sanctions, lending credibility and legitimacy to the sanctions 
regime, actual enforcement by their institutions has been weak, and full participation and 
cooperation by their private sectors has been sporadic—there is simply too much business 
and security at risk to completely sever ties with Iran. 
C. SANCTIONS IMPACTS ON THE ACTORS IN THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
Experts agree that sanctions are affecting the Iranian economy but not seriously 
hurting it.501 “New international sanctions in 2010 have in practice increased the cost of 
doing business, limited FDI and technology transfer, and have affected international trade 
and financial transactions.”502 These are precisely the broad effects desired. Yet real GDP 
continues to grow, largely the result of increased oil prices, at 3.2 percent for 
2010/2011,503 and medium term growth is expected at 4.5 percent on the continued 
strength of oil prices and efficiency gains from subsidy reductions.504 This GDP growth 
continues, despite the high inflation rate (expected to be 23 percent in 2011/2012),505 and 
a continued high general unemployment level of 14.5 percent in 2010506 (25 percent 
among the youth).507 UN sanctions are not much more effective. “The UN sanctions have 
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a limited scope and focus on exports of goods and services that can directly contribute to 
Iran’s nuclear program … as a result of their limited scope, the UN sanctions have not 
imposed any severe costs on the Iranian economy.”508 A dissection of sanctions impacts, 
analyzed in relation to one or more actor groups is, therefore, required to determine who 
or what actors in the political economy are being effected by sanctions. 
1. Sanctions Effects on the Conservatives and Their Constituents 
The conservative clerical elite actors, as will be recalled from previous 
examination, broadly count the bonyads and bazaari merchants as client constituents and 
also have significant control over credit allocation among banking institutions. While 
economic sanctions are impacting these constituents, they are not weakening the political 
power of their conservative patrons, relative to the reformist actors. 
Little specific information regarding the impact of economic sanctions on the 
bonyads is available, due to their opacity and quasi-state connection within the economy. 
However, due to recent analysis indicating the Iranian economy continues to grow thanks 
to higher oil prices (3.2 percent in 2010–2011),509 these constituents are effectively 
shielded from the immediate effect of sanctions. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
consultation to Iran, during the summer of 2011, recommended increased privatization of 
small and medium enterprises across Iran (owned or controlled by the bonyads) and 
obtaining them listings on Tehran’s stock exchange to “[gain] access to new capital, 
increase work incentives, and reduce pressures for bailouts and quasi-fiscal activities.”510 
The privatization of these quasi state-owned enterprises would also allow for the phasing 
out of subsidies and facilitate growth (including job creation), but “the [Iranian 
economic] authorities believed that more financing and government intervention might be 
needed for enterprise restructuring,”511 reflecting their hesitancy to stray onto the 
Mullah’s turf and alter the economic wealth base of these small and medium enterprises. 
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Sanctions effects against the bazaaris are unclear, but appear irrelevant due to 
high oil prices (i.e., not significant enough to bring about any change in the balance of 
power in the political economy). As previously mentioned, the bazaaris are feeling the 
sanctions pinch, but it is unclear (but most likely) that only the weaker and un-connected 
bazaaris are the most affected by them. The stronger and more politically connected 
bazaaris are most likely able to take advantage of smuggling networks (and use of the 
IRGC’s ports). In October 2010, Iran’s own president of the chamber of commerce 
mentioned that “sanctions were driving up the costs of imports by 15 to 30 percent.”512  
Inflation was also discussed in Chapter III due to recent cash transfers in lieu of 
subsidies, and it was highlighted that this was eroding the wealth of many Iranian 
consumers and affecting the entire economy. Stricter enforcement of sanctions in the 
U.A.E. over the summer of 2010 has also led to Iranian bazaari importers turning to 
virtual loan-sharks and illicit shipping agents to move goods thru Dubai, being shunned 
by legitimate financiers and shipping agents, considerably raising their costs.513 As a 
client constituency of the conservatives, there is no apparent change in their loyalty, 
despite the sanctions squeeze on import/export finished goods commerce, the bread and 
butter of the bazaaris. Their representation in parliament, the Motalefeh faction, is still 
staunchly conservative and loyal to the clerical elite. However, the uncertain business 
environment resulting from sanctions has caused some bazaaris to feel detached from this 
representation,514 and the: 
 Bazaaris today seldom exhibit the [same] collective identity and public 
solidarity that occurred in past moments of Iranian political history. This 
stems partially from the new cleavages in bazaar networks that resulted 
from the [clerics] management of the economy and the picking of 
politically subservient economic winners. However, it also derives from 
significant changes in relations between the bazaar and the global 
economy.515 
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2. Sanctions’ Effects on the Neoconservatives and Their Constituents 
The neoconservative elite, as will be recalled from previous examination, broadly 
count the state security services as client constituents and have a growing control over 
credit allocation among parallel banking institutions under their direct control. They also 
have growing control over the energy sector, with IRGC-affiliated companies taking a 
larger, if unclear, stake in energy sector development. “Some believe the August 2011 
confirmation of Khatam ol-Anbia’s chief, Rostam Ghasemi, as Oil Minister, will bolster 
the role of the IRGC in Iran’s oil sector.”516 While economic sanctions are impacting 
their constituents, they are not weakening the political power of their neoconservative 
patrons relative to the reformist actors. Iran’s recent inflation epidemic could conceivably 
negate the ability of the security services to be paid on par with inflation, thus eroding 
their loyalty. However, as discussed in Chapter III, it is likely these forces are both a 
priority for the regime (as in all authoritarian states, they are a pillar of the ruling elite), 
and have also gained a considerable degree of self-sufficiency, and are thus able to 
finance themselves (especially, the IRGC and affiliated organizations). 
CISADA sanctions specifically target the IRGC and its affiliated business 
ventures, the key result being significant loss of foreign domestic investment within Iran. 
Iranian firms, themselves, do little business in the United States, so the effect on trade is 
limited to the reduction of foreign investment in Iran by foreign firms who wish to avoid 
being sanctioned themselves.517 “U.S. officials in 2011 say that Iran has lost close to 
$60 billion in investment as numerous major firms have either announced pullouts from 
some of their Iran projects, declined to make further investments, or resold their 
investments to other companies.”518 The NIOC and its subsidiaries and export affiliates 
(which are subordinate to the Iranian Oil Ministry) can also theoretically be targeted by 
ISA sanctions, despite the absence of a business exchange with U.S. companies.519 But 
again, these sanctions effects are largely mitigated by high oil prices and the 
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government’s ability to stimulate its own economic development and investment via 
these businesses by being awash in oil rents. By targeting these rents directly, it will be 
possible to “reduce [Iran’s] ability to import needed technology for its WMD programs 
and enlist and maintain the loyalty of security personnel.”520 
Some sanctions against this actor are symbolic in their application. One CISADA 
sanction, from September 2010, prevents the obtaining of travel visas by IRGC officials 
who were complicit in human rights abuses to the U.S., and the EU also imposed similar  
sanctions in April 2011.521 Further visa restrictions were issued in July 2011 by the U.S. 
and Britain, targeting 50 more “Iranian officials for participating in political repression in 
Iran.”522 
3. Sanctions Effects on Reformists and Their Constituents 
CISADA sanctions measures to support reformists exist, but are also not affecting 
the ability of reformists to gain economic or political strength relative to the other actors. 
Specifically, these seek to expand Internet freedom, limit Internet monitoring by the 
IRGC, increase U.S. broadcasting in Iran, identify companies selling media-monitoring 
software to Iran, and sanction regime officials who are involved in suppressing the 
reformists.523 
Some of these efforts do have promise, such as measures to expand the 
reformists’ (and the average Iranian’s) use of the Internet and communication in Iran. 
These efforts are intended to not only broadcast the reformists’ message to a wider 
audience, but to “to support the opposition’s ability to communicate, [and] to reduce the 
regimes ability to monitor or censor Internet communications.”524 Additional measures 
seek to “increase U.S. broadcasting to Iran and to identify … companies that are selling 
Iran technology equipment that it can use to suppress or monitor the internet usage of 
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Iranians.”525 Measures to freeze assets and ban travel of Iranian officials involved in 
human rights abuse/suppression of the opposition during the 2009 green movement 
uprising were implemented in CISADA and the European Union.526 
Unfortunately, none of these sanctions appears to be strengthening the reformists 
economically (the elite patrons or their client constituencies—educated youth and 
intellectuals). They do not loosen the economic control of the conservatives or 
neoconservatives across the economy. What these sanctions do, as in the case of South 
Africa, is provide a significant amount of disapproval and international illegitimacy to the 
conservative clerics and the neoconservative security actors. As in the case of South 
Africa, perhaps this could be used as a spark to light the tinderbox and bring about further 
change, due to the indirect credibility heaped upon the opposition of the incumbent 
regime actors, in Iran’s case, the reformists. As international sanctions are more accepted 
and continue to mount, the governance capacity assessment of the incumbent regime is 
eroded internationally, especially regarding its economic performance (ability to create 
jobs, control inflation, provide basic commodities). This indirect legitimacy conferred 
upon the reformists can be harnessed to promote change based upon economic grounds, 
which could resonate among Iran’s disenfranchised. 
D. POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS TO SANCTIONS AND OTHER ACTIONS 
As has been shown, current sanctions are having an economic effect but not the 
political one necessary to alter the structural power of capital power between the differing 
actor factions in Iran. The failure of sanctions to alter the power structure between the 
actors has resulted in no change in Iran’s nuclear or other contested policies. The 
conservatives and neoconservatives continue to control the majority of economic wealth 
and rents in the country and, therefore, continue to have the largest share of power and 
control within Iran. At best, sanctions have reduced the overall size of the economy and 
had some significant financial impacts, both in terms of delaying or preventing 
investment in Iran and reducing rents and economic activity. This section will look at 
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some possible ways to modify sanctions to possibly alter this power ratio, whether by 
reducing the economic wealth of the conservatives and neoconservatives and/or to 
separately grow the wealth of the reformist actors. The ultimate chances of economic and 
political success of these new efforts are difficult to determine, and their outcomes are 
uncertain. But, at the very least, they could alter the situational context in which the 
political actors compete over resources, although the outcome of these competitions is 
unknown. 
1. Take Advantage of the Long-Term Economic Decline of Iran’s 
Energy Infrastructure 
The Iranian energy sector may be more vulnerable than previously thought, of 
which current sanctions, internal political bickering, internal fear of foreign investment, a 
poor business environment, and inefficiencies in its own energy sector development are 
all exacerbating this long-term vulnerability.527 The Iranian elite actors rely on energy 
sector rents, especially the conservative and neoconservative actors who use this revenue 
to fund targeted social programs for their constituents (i.e., the neoconservatives and cash 
handouts to the poor) or fund failing quasi-state companies (i.e., the conservatives and 
their funding of the noncompetitive bonyad-associated companies).528 
Iran’s ability to match its petroleum sectors’ demand with supply is reflected in its 
inability to consistently match its OPEC production quotas.529 This failure to attract new 
foreign investment in its oil and gas fields, due not only to sanctions, but mostly to Iran’s 
unpopular buyback foreign investment program, is hurting the long-term maintenance of 
its oil exports.530 “Iran’s petroleum crisis is a strategic opportunity.”531 
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A lack of foreign investment, in both oil and natural gas fields and infrastructure 
across Iran, has led to a declining productivity of both.532 This lack of investment is 
manifested in several areas, such as the increasing depletion rates of older fields—due to 
lack of investment of foreign reinjection techniques, refinery leakage from antiquated 
equipment, and a, lack of new projects to boost supply.533 “NIOC has led no new major 
project since the 1979 Revolution.”534 
Most of this lack of investment is due to Iran’s constitution, which prohibits 
foreign ownership and therefore offers unattractive buyback contracts to foreign 
investors, which are rarely taken, some of which are even rejected by “some more 
conservative element in Tehran … if it believes the [NIOC’s] terms are too generous.”535 
Also, the IRGC’s GHORB is increasingly being brought in to make up the short-fall of 
investment in fields and infrastructure, but few details of financial or time-to-completion 
details can be found suggesting their technical capability is minimal.536 As previously 
mentioned, other foreign firms’ investment (specifically from Asia) is also possible but 
“many such deals are said to be in preliminary stages, and clear examples of ‘backfilling’ 
are few to date. Most of the companies that might backfill abandoned projects are 
perceived as not being as technically capable as those that have withdrawn from Iran.”537 
Given this environment, “zero future foreign investment thus appears plausible.”538 
Roger Stern’s 2007 study found that the net result of this lack of investment was a 
10–12 percent decline rate in Iran’s petrochemical exports, culminating in their eventual 
export standstill and extinction, with the price per barrel ultimately determining the 
“when.”539 “Oil recovery rates have declined, and, with no remedy in sight for the gas 
reinjection shortage, this decline may accelerate. Depletion rates have increased, and, if 
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investment does not increase, depletion rates will accelerate.” Lower oil prices will likely 
accelerate Iranian production to continue a short-term rent stream, while further 
accelerating the depletion rate of its fields and infrastructure. This further eliminates the 
long-term rents of the conservatives and neoconservative actors who control them. 
a. Recommended Actions and Chances of Success 
Existing U.S., UN, and other international sanctions are certainly doing 
their share of keeping out foreign investment. This, coupled with the fact that the 
capabilities of external backfill investment from both foreign third-party companies and 
IRGC affiliated companies are costly and incapable of restoring or expanding production, 
and are not nearly as capable, could lead to a near-term extinction of production, 
provided oil prices remain low.540 When this would happen ultimately depends on the 
price of oil—higher oil prices keep demand on Iranian oil fields and infrastructure low, 
thus maintaining a slower level of exports and thus the status-quo in the Iranian political 
economy. 
The best way to lower oil prices is to lower demand for Iranian oil, thus 
potentially bringing about a price attack, as happened to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s.541 A 
reduction of Iranian oil demand could, conceivably, force Iran to cut its supply (and 
reduce any existing investment in its energy infrastructure further) and raise the prices of 
existing supplies to maintain its oil rents at previous income levels. Given the history of 
OPEC nations to cheat, it is conceivable that other OPEC nations could be negotiated 
with to continue to sell their oil at market prices to capture the lost Iranian market 
volume. Iran, observing its loss of market share and dwindling rents, would then rush to 
produce at the reduced market price, flooding the market with oil and further reducing the 
price and Iran’s revenues and its ability to invest and expand its energy infrastructure, 
and also accelerating the depletion rate of its oil fields and infrastructure.542 However, 
reducing this demand will be extremely difficult to do, especially since China and other 
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developing Asian nations are now Iran’s largest oil export market.543 Diplomacy in this 
case is unlikely to make headway in convincing China and other Asian states to 
voluntarily reduce their demand for (specifically) Iranian oil, but it is a remote 
possibility, and could have a significant payoff, if it worked.  
Although difficult to achieve, the ultimate effect of these actions would be 
to reduce the investment in Iran’s energy sector and achieve a near oil export extinction 
and thus significantly reduce the rents to the conservative and neoconservative actors 
who primarily control this sector of the economy. This would reduce their ability to 
dispense patronage to their constituency groups. This, in its own right, would destabilize 
the political economy and possibly strengthen the political hand of the reformist actors in 
the process—as their orientation for market-based reform could finally take root. Iran 
balances its external accounts at $75 per barrel, and lower prices than this will destabilize 
its economy.544 
2. Continue to Target Iran’s Energy and Financial Sector with 
Multilateral Sanctions 
As mentioned, it is important to maintain existing sanctions, if only to keep out 
non-U.S. investors in the Iranian energy infrastructure. This is important and easy to 
justify, especially following the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) 
November 2011 report revealing “evidence to suggest that Iran may be pursuing nuclear 
weaponisation [sic] capabilities.”545 This report, the first time the agency has issued 
evidence attesting to weaponization, has resulted in a new round of international 
sanctions, including sanctioning Iran’s central bank.546 Existing sanctions have 
significantly curtailed Iran’s ability to clear oil payments in the international financial 
system, as well as reduced FDI in Iran’s energy sector. Expanding multilateral and UN  
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sanctions to further target Iran’s energy and financial sector would further reduce rents to 
the conservative and neoconservative actors, and possibly reduce demand for Iranian 
(specific) oil. 
a. Recommended Actions and Chances of Success 
With this new IAEA finding, it is critical that diplomacy be used to 
expand and strengthen UN and multilateral international sanctions against Iran, with the 
goal of altering the status quo of the political economy. Expanded sanctions specifically 
targeting the Iranian energy sector and its ability to attract further investment, as well as 
expanded sanctions targeting the financial sector, and further reducing Iran’s ability to 
process payments of its international oil rents, are perhaps the most visible, effective, and 
sellable forms of international pressure available. Sanctions that would embargo Iranian 
oil, thus raising the worldwide price of oil, are likely to have counter-productive effects 
both at home and abroad and would be opposed on principle.547 But with the continued 
international concern regarding Iran’s nuclear program, and the legitimacy of this new 
IAEA finding, this diplomacy and the expanded sanctions they bring about have a 
moderate chance of success. These actions further reduce rents that benefit (primarily) 
the conservative and neoconservative actors, which reduce their share of control in the 
Iranian political economy. 
Another potential action to take along these lines is to destabilize the 
exchange rate of the Iranian riyal and create a financial panic that would hopefully lead to 
a political panic, destabilizing the conservatives and neoconservatives, politically. This is 
possible now that Iran’s central bank has been sanctioned (by the U.S.) as of November 
2011, which “plays a role in keeping Iran’s currency stable.”548 This move, however, has 
humanitarian consequences that need to be considered as, “an unstable currency could 
harm Iran’s ability to import some needed foodstuffs and medical products.”549 “Iranians 
are highly sensitive to the stability of the exchange rate because it has a direct impact on 
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the price of imports and people’s confidence in the economy. Any fears regarding the 
foreign reserves of the country’s central bank could easily spark a currency run and 
encourage people to hoard foreign currency.”550 The possibility of achieving this action 
unilaterally is low, especially given Europe’s past opposition to sanctioning the central 
bank to begin with.551 And, this action would not guarantee a winning situation for the 
reformist actors who would likely be just as affected by this action. 
3. Fight and Win the Information War 
As discussed in Chapter II, examples can be drawn from the Iraqi and South 
African sanctions cases on the importance of utilizing the legitimacy of international 
sanctions to influence the actors we wish to promote. This legitimacy conferred from 
sanctions allows them to strengthen their own position in the political economy, thus 
achieving our policy goals. This can be done by fighting and winning the information 
dominance war—targeting the constituency clients and elites of the actors in a way that 
gives them the tools and courage they need to change the political economy themselves. 
In Iraq’s case, sanctions were used by Saddam to create and perpetuate a sense of 
being under siege by external enemies,552 “which the regime exploited to deflect 
criticism from its rule and to justify its own repressive behavior.”553  Sanctions also 
allowed Saddam to further solidify his control of the political economy due to the use of 
his co-opted smuggling networks. His control over imported goods allowed him to 
provide patronage to maintain the loyalty of his security forces and also appear as a 
provider to his people by dispensing aid from the oil for food program.554 All the while, 
Saddam was able to win the information war over sanctions—and convince the world 
that Iraq was a victim of American aggression, versus due to his own policies and 
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actions.555 Conversely, the United States’ and the United Nations’ efforts to counter this 
propaganda were feeble and uncoordinated and could have solidified support both 
internationally and among potential internal opposition.556 “For sanctions to truly serve 
the purpose of regime change, they should have been coupled with other instruments—
such as robust support for an effective opposition backed by regional actors—to form a 
coherent strategy to achieve that end.”557 These issues sound remarkably similar to the 
situation in Iran, and this formula sounds almost identical to what Iran needs. 
In South Africa, the opposite effect occurred from sanctions. The strong, 
international consensus against apartheid gave rise to an international social movement 
that pushed for stronger sanctions and eroded the legitimacy of the regime.558 This 
strengthened the hand of the black opposition group elites, giving them international 
legitimacy (e.g., Nelson Mandela), who would later credit their legitimacy benefits as one 
of the most important elements of their struggle. Although it was other economic forces 
(namely, the urbanization and collective bargaining of blacks as South Africa 
industrialized) that gave the opposition groups the economic base they needed in the 
political economy, the sanctions provided the elites with international and domestic 
credibility allowing for a unification of effort and agendas. The white Afrikaner regime 
had failed to effectively fight the information war and it was a significant part of its 
ultimate undoing. 
a. Recommended Actions and Chances of Success 
The U.S. and UN could make a more concerted effort to erode the 
legitimacy of the conservative and neoconservative actors by a sustained media effort that 
counters the regime’s control of information—providing messages and themes that 
promote the reformist opposition leaders and/or agendas that are complimentary to U.S. 
desired policy. Current efforts are not enough and do not appear to be having much of a 
political effect, as the reformists’ control of the political economy has not grown and 
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Iranian hardline policy has not changed. “Several measures to support the opposition’s 
ability to communicate, to reduce the regimes ability to monitor or censor Internet 
communications and to identify and sanction Iranian human rights abusers, were included 
in CISADA.”559 Can more be done? 
The Iran Freedom Support Act (IFSA, P.L 109-293), represented a 
congressional effort to promote the prospects for opponents to the regime. 
That law authorized “sums as may be necessary” to assist the Iranians who 
are “dedicated”’ to ‘democratic values … and the adoption of a 
democratic form of government in Iran’, and ‘advocates the adherence by 
Iran to nonproliferation regimes.’560 
However, as in past legislation (specifically, Speaker Gingrich’s very public 
announcement of an Iranian covert action campaign in 1995), it is likely intended to 
satisfy a domestic audience that something is being done against Iran. At the time, 
Gingrich pushed to have $18 million added to the CIA’s covert action program on Iran 
as: 
No one wanted to have to go before Congress and say that there was no 
CIA program against a country as troublesome as Iran, so the [Central 
Intelligence] Agency maintained one simply for the sake of it. The effort 
consisted mostly of anodyne efforts to introduce factually accurate 
information into Iranian news media and to expose Iranians to western 
culture.561  
The conservatives and neoconservatives used this overt-covert action program for their 
own domestic propaganda purposes562 and U.S. policymakers perhaps realized that 
achieving another Operation Ajax was unrealistic and even idiotic to ever attempt again. 
Yet, in concert with existing and expanded economic sanctions, a medium could be found 
in ensuring supportive themes and messages counter the regime’s propaganda on policies 
are sent, and if they not too extreme (advocating a violent overthrow of the regime), it 
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would likely find positive international support. These messages could lend legitimacy 
and perhaps some credible support for the reformist actor elites. 
4. Harness Globalization and Compete with the IRGC’s Control of 
Trade 
As has been shown in previous chapters, the conservative and neoconservative 
actors, via the IRGC, operates (and/or has coerced) smuggling networks that remain too 
opaque to effectively document. Due to their entrenchment in the Iranian political 
economy and their own ideological orientation, they will resist any diminishment of this 
control. Rather than continuing to sanction Iranian trade and isolate Iran from the global 
economy (which the IRGC simply smuggles through and controls to their own 
advantage), why not work with regional allies and attempt to establish new trade 
networks, ones that do not utilize IRGC-controlled ports or airports, and benefit some 
element of the reformist clients? As has been shown in previous chapters, there is a 
significant appetite for Western consumer goods in Iran. Sanctions are being utilized by 
the conservative and neoconservative elites, as in Saddam’s Iraq, to control the rationing 
of goods as a form of patronage to their politically connected clients.563  
The IRGC has a clear economic interest in a general sanctions regime… 
[it has] significantly weakened traditional players in the countries politics, 
such as the bazaar contingent … as these players retreat from the Iranian 
market, the IRGC not only fills the economic vacuum they leave behind, 
but also gains their political influence.564 
This trade to be opened up further would only be trade in consumer goods and 
could possibly go both ways following a vetting process by the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) of the trade deals. Consumer trade with Iran is currently minimal. “Total 
U.S.-Iran trade was about $300 million in 2010 ($208 million in exports to Iran, and $94 
million in imports) … commercial sales of food and medical products have been allowed, 
on a case by case basis, and subject to OFAC licensing.”565 Deals involving dual-use 
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items, trade with firms affiliated with the IRGC, items related to proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and technology and human rights abuse/travel restrictions would and 
should still remain sanctioned.  
Trade losses occur mainly to Iran’s exports of material manufactures ($6.6 
billion), foods ($3.9 billion), and machinery and transport equipment ($2.1 
billion). As expected, these losses fall heavily on export shipments to the 
United States ($1.3 billion) and the European Union ($2.8 billion). But the 
largest proportion of the losses are spread over export shipment to a wide 
number of Iran’s trading partners, including OPEC partners ($5.5 billion), 
the Russian Federation ($0.3 billion), and Japan ($0.1 billion). In 
comparison, import losses to Iran from the US economic sanctions occur 
mainly to the country’s imports of miscellaneous manufactures ($0.6 
billion), foods ($0.3 billion), and beverages and tobacco ($0.3 billion), and 
they fall particularly heavily on the imports in these categories from the 
European Union ($0.4 billion) and the OPEC countries ($0.3 billion).566  
In other words, trade could be used as a means to build badly needed wealth 
among the reformist base, which could be translated into political power. 
a. Recommended Actions and Chances of Success 
By opening up consumer trade further from its current minimal extent 
among a new network of reformist-oriented business partners in Iran (preferably linked to 
a reformist patron cleric in particular), Iran could be better integrated to the regional 
economy, possibly eroding some of the control of the conservatives and neoconservatives 
over trade and patronage networks. 
This would involve significant risk of loss, and its chances of success are 
slim since it would take time to build up these trade networks and alternate routes of 
supply—around the IRGC-controlled points of entry—would need to be found. Also, the 
guarantee that a reformist patron could provide long-term political cover (and control) of 
these networks does not exist. It would also require significant oversight of trade and 
U.S. businesses that OFAC is not likely staffed to provide. 
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5. Strengthen Sanctions’ International Enforcement/ Extraterritorial 
Application 
As has been shown, U.S. unilateral ILSA sanctions, implemented since the 
adoption of UNSC Resolution 1929, have “significantly broadened American 
opportunities for exerting pressure on Iran.”567 However, without more international 
support, “these measures appeared to be insufficient to influence Tehran to reconsider its 
approaches to the nuclear issue.”568 In other words, they are failing to influence the 
political economy of Iran, and reduce the amount of control of the conservative and 
neoconservative actors in favor of the reformists. 
The fact that four of Iran’s major trading partners supported the American ILSA 
sanctions and even adopted their own punitive sanctions against Iran, is a significant 
diplomatic development.569  
However, despite all attempts, the U.S. Government failed to persuade the 
People’s Republic of China to follow the example of Iran’s other major 
trading partners. This inability of the American authorities to make 
Beijing impose sanctions on [Iran], or at least follow the requirements of 
Washington concerning trade and economic cooperation with Tehran, has 
created a serious threat to the whole sanctions regime.570  
Despite China’s dependence upon Iranian trade, more must be done to pressure Beijing to 
support sanctions if there is any hope of their success, despite the U.S.’s “limited possible 
retaliatory measures”571 available against Beijing to support. 
More pressure must also be exerted on Iran’s regional and European trading 
partners to eliminate selective implementation of sanctions by their enforcement agencies 
and avoidance of sanctions by their private sectors. Also, lesser trading partners of Iran 
(and firms among its private sector) such as Turkey, Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, and 
Eastern Europe must also cooperate by not filling trading vacuums left by departing firms 
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among Iran’s major trading partners. Russian support is also not guaranteed. “In the 
aftermath of the recent Russian maneuvers in Georgia, Russian cooperation remains 
uncertain.”572 
Finally, convincing allies who support ILSA sanctions to also adopt 
extraterritorial sanctions would be an important development that further raises the costs 
of existing sanctions and UN resolutions. This would somewhat mitigate the effects of 
Chinese and other trade.  
If, for example, the U.S. partners followed the American pattern and made 
their own sanctions extraterritorial (applicable to third countries, their 
entities and individuals), this would considerably raise the price of the 
violation of the sanctions and would certainly reduce the number of 
Tehran’s loyal trading partners as well as black knights.573 
a. Recommended Actions and Chances of Success 
Strong diplomacy is the only course of action for these initiatives given 
the current global economic situation. The U.S. is already working closely with allies to 
cooperate with partners on sanctions and diplomacy has recently convinced some allies to 
adopt even stronger measures.574 However, economic or trade pressure against allies (and 
their private sector violators) to support even further sanctions against Iran is limited and 
ill advised,575 especially given the fragility of their involvement and support of Iranian 
sanctions to begin with. The U.S. state department must make the most of the recent 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) November 2011 report finding, indicating 
Iran may be pursuing nuclear weapons.576 This also remains the only avenue of 
approaching and gaining Chinese and Russian support for applications of sanctions. 
The chances of diplomatic success, however, are extremely weak given 
that some partners’ support of sanctions is extremely tenuous to begin with. 
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As for countries deliberately creating opportunities for Tehran to bypass 
the American sanctions, it is no secret that it would be extremely difficult 
to make them change their position. On the one hand, the UNSC 
resolutions proved to be ineffective as a means of putting pressure on 
them. Moreover, due to the positions of China and Russia and some 
temporary members of the Security Council, the adoption of a truly 
efficient resolution is almost impossible.577 
E. CONCLUSION 
Current economic sanctions against Iran are failing to alter the structural power of 
capital in Iran and thus achieve the intended political effects of altering the Iranian 
nuclear enrichment policy. This is due to the economic forces confronting them and 
sanctions inability to overcome these forces. They are failing to alter the political 
economy of Iran away from control by the conservatives and neoconservatives and 
towards the reformists. “Proponents [of Iran’s] nuclear program have had the upper hand, 
and they believe that pursuing it is well worth the sanctions, particularly since oil 
revenues in recent years have far exceeded the costs of sanctions.”578 
A “net assessment” analysis of sanctions impacts to determine what impact 
sanctions are having on the Iranian political economy does not exist either. Neither the 
U.S. government nor any other international institution has completed a detailed analysis 
on sanctions impacts on the Iranian political economy, although academic estimates do 
exist regarding the economic impact of sanctions. Moreover, there remains disagreement 
among these actors as to sanctions’ exact goals. 
Current sanctions broadly aim to affect three areas of Iran’s economy, but are still 
not enough to alter the structural power of capital and thus the Iranian enrichment policy: 
sanctions against Iran’s energy sector are deterring significant investment; financial 
sanctions are virtually stopping Iran’s ability to use the international financial system 
and; sanctions are lending a significant international consensus of legitimacy to the 
worlds’ position against the Iranian policy of enrichment. 
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Analysis of this chapter indicates that economic sanctions against Iran are being 
undermined by several political and economic forces. Sanctions’ biggest impediments to 
achieving their objectives are: they are not enforced properly among participating states 
and the international community; the trade relationships with Asian states, specifically 
China, and; contentious support for sanctions among allies. These factors are mitigating 
sanctions’ impacts against the Iranian political economy and thus the political goals of 
altering the Iranian enrichment policy.  
Possible modifications to sanctions and diplomatic initiatives that could be 
initiated are also unlikely to alter the structural power of capital in Iran away from the 
conservatives and neoconservatives, thus leading to reformists’ gaining of an economic 
wealth base that could be translated to political power. While some appear promising and 
could bear fruit in the short term, it is unlikely that in the long term they could be 
sustained due to weak international participation and the inability of the reformist patrons 
to provide long term political protection for their new constituents. 
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V. THESIS CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The thesis postulated that altering the control of the political economy of Iran in 
favor of the reformist actor group (and away from the conservative and neoconservative 
groups) was required to ultimately alter Iranian nuclear policy. The thesis further 
endeavored to show the failing role of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran to 
accomplish this task, and attempted to postulate some alternative approaches to sanctions 
that could alter the resources or situational context of the differing actor groups 
competing for power in Iran. 
1. Framework of Analysis 
In presenting the argument of this thesis, five variables were first identified that 
could impact a sanctions regime’s outcome (success or failure). This chapter will 
reexamine these variables in relationship to our reexamined Iran and attempt to validate 
the findings of sanctions’ effectiveness relative to Chapter II. Several historical sanctions 
cases were briefly examined to determine sources of success or failure of sanctions 
regimes to achieve their political objectives relative to these variables. Iran was examined 
as a fragmented autocracy, while Iraq was examined as a unitary autocracy and South 
Africa as a democracy. These cases highlighted the importance of building an opposition 
political challenger in the target country, specifically one aligned (and willing to bring 
about) the sanctions’ political objectives. Examination found that the most important 
strength of this opposition group was an economic base in the form of a client 
constituency. The South African sanctions regime success can be directly attributed to the 
growth of a political opposition, while Iraq’s sanctions regime failure can also be 
attributed to the absence of the growth of such opposition. 
The various political actors and their client constituencies in Iran were next 
examined, to include their interests, behaviors, and motives. Strengths and deficiencies of 
each group were noted, and areas of conflict and competition were highlighted to show 
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the degree of control of patronage networks between the patron actors and clients, which 
allowed for the greatest amount of political control. Finally, the relationships between 
actors and clients were examined to determine their vulnerabilities relative to the political 
competition within the Islamic Republic of Iran. Analysis found that the conservative and 
neoconservative actors had a firm political hold on Iran due to their significant economic 
constituency base, and the reformist actors had virtually no political hold due to their lack 
of a similar economic constituency base. 
A detailed analysis of the sanctions regime against Iran was then presented, 
specifically including analysis of sanctions’ effects against altering the balance of power 
within the Iranian political economy. Effects upon differing sectors of the Iranian 
economy were presented, along with an analysis of effects against each actor and their 
constituents. This analysis determined that sanctions were failing to effectively alter the 
economic wealth base of each actor in the political economy, and thus, no change in 
Iran’s nuclear policy has been observed. Finally, possible modifications to sanctions were 
presented (along with corresponding diplomatic actions) to potentially bring about the 
necessary change in the political economy to see a resulting change in Iranian nuclear 
policy. The ultimate possibility of success of these new actions is difficult to determine. 
This thesis postulated that the new sanctions and diplomatic measures could potentially 
alter the situational context with which the actors compete over resources, but there 
remains the possibility of unintended outcomes from these changes in the political 
economy that may not work in favor of the political goals desired, specifically Uranium 
enrichment. 
B. IRANIAN SANCTIONS REVIEW 
A brief reassessment of the five variables that impact the Iranian sanctions 
regime’s ability to bring about a desired political outcome is necessary, this time 
factoring in the actor-centric analysis and sanctions’ effects developed in Chapters III and 
IV. Findings largely confirm the earlier analysis from Chapter II. 
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1. Sanctions Remain Inadequate 
Chapter II found that sanctions were inadequate to meet the economic and 
political goals of altering Iranian behavior, specifically nuclear enrichment. A 
reassessment of Iranian sanctions, factoring in the extent of control of the political 
economy of the conservative and neoconservative actors, as well as the limited effects the 
sanctions are actually having to alter this balance of power, continues to find that 
sanctions are inadequate to sufficiently alter the political economy and thus Iranian policy 
and behavior. However, sanctions are achieving their intended economic effects. 
Specifically, they are reducing investment in the Iranian energy sector, as well as rents 
from it, reducing Iran’s ability to conduct transactions across international financial 
markets, reducing trade and Iran’s GDP. These effects are not enough to alter the 
asymmetric power balance between the actors, though, and control of the political 
economy resides with the conservatives and neoconservatives, and the reformist actor 
group is not benefiting from the economic impacts of sanctions. 
2. Mixed Effects of Legitimacy Persist 
An initial analysis of sanctions from Chapter II found they were having a mixed 
effect relative to their legitimacy. Domestically they were conferring legitimacy to the 
conservative and neoconservative actors due to their portrayal of sanctions as an external 
threat against inherent Iranian rights, while internationally they solidified a significant 
degree of worldwide consensus against Iranian enrichment. Analysis from Chapter III 
showed that the conservative and neoconservative actors are increasing their control and 
monitoring of Iranian media outlets (especially the Internet and social media), and 
analysis from Chapter IV showed that U.S. CISADA sanctioning efforts to mitigate this 
media control to assist the reformists was inadequate. Chapter IV also showed that the 






worldwide concern over Iran’s nuclear enrichment policy, thus confirming the 
illegitimacy of the ruling regime. Therefore, in the final analysis, the effects of sanctions  
continue to remain mixed—inadequate to confer the needed domestic legitimacy to the 
reformists as an internal opposition group, but adequate to confer worldwide consensus 
against enrichment. 
3. Enforcement of Sanctions Remain Weak 
Initial analysis from Chapter II showed that sanctions enforcement was improving 
but continued to be undermined by regional and global trade, especially with China. 
Additional analysis from Chapter IV confirmed these findings, and also specifically 
found that actual enforcement of sanctions among allies’ private sectors is not as strong 
as it could be, and that there was a lack of consensus of sanctions among allies 
participating in sanctions due to their own national interests. Therefore, in the final 
analysis, there is significant room for improvement in sanctions enforcement, as in actual 
practice, it is weak. 
4. True Popularity of Sanctions is Difficult to Gauge 
Chapter II showed that sanctions have gained a much wider level of international 
support, at least at the highest policy levels, due to legitimate concerns over Iran’s 
enrichment program. While this is true at the governmental policy level, additional 
analysis from Chapter IV shows that the degree of this popularity and sanctions 
enforcement is not as significant as at first glance. European consensus of sanctions is far 
from universal, and sanctions among Iran’s regional and Asian trade partners remain 
unpopular. This unpopularity among the private sectors of participating states has led to 
the backfilling of investment in Iran, as well as weak enforcement of sanctions among the 






analysis, the international popularity of sanctions is certainly not as steadfast as initially 
thought, and not enough to ensure conference of legitimacy to the reformist actors as was 
seen in the South African sanctions case. 
5. Entrenched Actors Control the Structure of the Iranian Political 
Economy 
The analysis in Chapter II indicated that the structure of the Iranian political 
economy was the ultimate inhibitor to sanctions’ effectiveness. Implied was that since the 
conservatives and neoconservatives controlled the sources of wealth, the reformists could 
not gain economic wealth, at their expense, and thus gain political power as well. The 
conservatives’ and neoconservatives’ control of the economy has allowed them to 
emasculate most of the private sector, making it dependent upon the state for work and 
revenues. More in-depth analysis from Chapter IV indicates that sanctions are failing to 
alter this structure, primarily due to the high level of petrochemical sales to China, Iran’s 
largest trading partner. These sales allow the conservatives and neoconservatives to 
continue their patronage networks to the client constituencies, allowing them to maintain 
control of the political economy. Weak enforcement of existing sanctions also plays a 
part in maintaining the conservatives’ and neoconservatives’ control of the structural 
power of capital in Iran, and thus the political economy. 
However, this does not mean sanctions have been completely ineffective. 
Sanctions have reduced the rents to the actors, and the size and strengths of the Iranian 
economy, and have isolated Iran, diplomatically from the international community. This 
isolation and greater dependence upon petrochemical rents (due to sanctions) has very 








witnessed recently (December 2011) with “divisions deepening between Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khameni and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his allies.”579 In other 
words, sanctions have indirectly increased competition between the actors for control of 
institutions and government offices to control greater rents. But the sanctions’ bite has 
not been great enough (primarily due to continued Asian petrochemical sales and weak 
sanctions enforcement) to cause this competition to crescendo into a coup d’état, 
constitutional crisis, or velvet revolution that would remove the conservatives from their 
position as the ultimate power brokers, or more specifically, removing the supreme leader 
from his office and replacing him with a neoconservative military cabal or clerical puppet 
of this actor group. 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
Chapter IV examined new sanctions’ modifications and diplomatic initiatives that 
could be introduced to alter the political economy in favor of the reformist actor group, 
and found that their ultimate chances of success were difficult to determine, but that they 
could perhaps alter the situational context with which the actors compete over resources. 
This ambiguity, however, is very likely not going to be enough to achieve the political 
goals of the Iranian sanctions regime. Economic sanctions that do not threaten the 
survival of the incumbent actor(s) in office (i.e., alter the political economy),580 or at 
least generate significant political costs to those actors, will ultimately fail.581  
The leadership would only concede if the cost of noncompliance exceeds 
the cost of granting the sender’s demands. For coercion to work, the 
political stability of the target should suffer more from coming under 
pressure than from conceding. The sender has some costs for imposing 
sanctions. Because of this, the sender would only engage in sanctions 
when it believes that there is some chance the target will concede.582  
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It has been shown in the research of this work that defined political goals of the Iranian 
sanctions regime cannot be agreed upon among both international (and even U.S. 
domestic) bodies. Therefore, the findings of this research indicate that until the exact 
political goals can be defined by all participating states, Iranian sanctions will remain 
inadequate; will fail to confer sufficient legitimacy on the reformist actors in Iran; will 
remain weakly enforced; will remain unpopular among the private sector with a 
questionable level of participation, and; will not alter the Iranian political economy in 
favor of the reformist actors. Therefore, the ultimate goal of the sanctions regime should 
be to help usher in the reformist actors to power in Iran—without an Operation Ajax style 
coup d’état—who would bring about the desired political goals of the sanctions regime. 
This is a difficult but not impossible task. Achieving the ultimate political objective of 
the sanctions regime (cessation of Uranium enrichment) is achievable because of the 
makeup of the political economy as a fragmented autocracy, provided sanctions could be 
designed in such a way as to strengthen the reformists while weakening the conservatives 
and neoconservatives. This thesis argues the following actions should be taken to achieve 
this goal. 
1. Binding UN Resolution Defining the Exact Political Objectives and 
Matching Sanctions 
Since 2006, the U.N. Security Council has passed six resolutions critical 
of Iran for its controversial nuclear program. Each resolution was designed 
to increase pressure on Tehran to suspend its uranium enrichment, and 
ballistic missile development programs, two of three critical steps in 
obtaining a nuclear weapons capability.583 
While defining the cessation of nuclear enrichment as the goal is part of this step, a clear 
matching of sanctions tasks to achieve this objective remains incomplete in the 
international forum (i.e., current sanctions are inadequate to achieve this objective as they 
do not impose sufficient political costs to the conservative and neoconservative actors 
pushing the enrichment policy). Therefore, the adoption and enforcement of binding 
international sanctions that most effectively achieves this goal is necessary. “The UN 
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sanctions have a limited scope and focus on exports of goods and services that can 
directly contribute to Iran’s nuclear program.”584 As has been shown in Chapter IV, U.S. 
unilateral sanctions, while more effective in imposing financial costs, are insufficient to 
achieve this objective alone. The body of states imposing the sanctions must recognize 
that the conservative and neoconservative actors in the Iranian political economy will not 
alter their enrichment policy and, therefore, the sanctions regime must seek to specifically 
weaken their economic constituency base, while simultaneously strengthening the 
reformist actor’s constituency base. Diplomacy is the only way to achieve this binding 
UN resolution, but as has been shown in Chapter IV, will be difficult to achieve given 
Iranian trade relationships and the dependence upon Iranian oil by some sending states. 
“In the near future, the continuation and effectiveness of the UN-sponsored sanctions will 
remain hostage to the state of U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China relations.”585 Therefore, the 
possibility of the UNSC passing such a binding resolution is extremely low. 
2. Embargo Iranian Oil and Tolerate the Long-Term Economic Costs 
As has been shown in previous chapters, unfortunately the costs of even the most 
effective international sanctions regime can be tolerated by the conservatives and 
neoconservatives due to Iran’s sales of oil. “Despite long-standing U.S. sanctions, Iran’s 
oil revenue is expected to rise by a third this year to U.S. $100 billion.”586 Therefore, in 
order to bring about a lasting change in the political economy, these sales must be 
embargoed, as was seen in Iraq prior to 1996. 
This move is not without risk and cost, but is necessary. “Such an embargo would 
constitute the most direct economic confrontation yet between Iran and the West and 
would amplify tensions as Iran repeatedly threatens to close the Straits of Hormuz (SOH), 
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through which passes about one-fifth of the world’s oil supply.”587 Should this oil supply 
come under threat, whether from embargo or from the closure of the Straits of Hormuz 
due to military conflict, the international oil markets would respond with a price spike. 
“The result could be catastrophic. Oil prices could jump U.S. $23 a barrel in the first few 
weeks of the conflict and by a jaw-dropping U.S. $175 if it persists, according to a survey 
of energy traders by Rapidan Group, a Washington-based consultancy.”588 Military 
postures in the U.S. central command area of responsibility must anticipate this threat and 
be prepared to forcefully open the SOH militarily. But how long could sanctions-sending 
states tolerate a sustained near-doubling of world oil prices? However, the ultimate 
effects of an Iranian oil embargo and their effects on world oil prices remain unknown, 
especially as other OPEC countries have pledged to make up for the loss with spare 
capacity.589 Still, there is a difference between what can be done and what is required. 
“Iran produced about 3.56 million barrels a day in November, according to data compiled 
by Bloomberg News. That’s more than the 3.12 million barrels a day of spare capacity 
available among OPEC producers.”590 
Other OPEC states are working on ways to mitigate an Iranian supply loss but 
there is no guarantee that they would or could make up the full difference, even if they 
operated at full capacity.591 Also, there is no guarantee that Asian states (especially 
China) will not continue to buy Iranian oil, further increasing the need for diplomacy to 
ensure participation among Iranian energy-dependent states to have an economic impact  
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on Tehran.592 Therefore, the potential for the worst-case scenario (a substantial increase 
in the price of oil) must be accepted among imposing states to achieve the desired 
political outcome. 
3. Tolerate Humanitarian Costs of the Sanctions Regime 
The international sanctions regime adopted, including the oil embargo, must be 
strictly enforced, and the financial costs to the sending states (along with the 
humanitarian costs to the Iranian populace) must also be tolerated until the political 
objectives are achieved. As will be recalled from Chapter II, the Iraqi oil embargo very 
nearly succeeded in eroding Saddam’s unitary control of the political economy prior to 
the humanitarian concerns that led to the oil for food program. The adoption of the oil for 
food program, based on humanitarian concerns due to Saddam’s effective control of 
propaganda, gave his regime an out—focusing the bulk of his limited resources on 
expanding his patronage networks and solidifying his unitary control of the political 
economy against rivals instead of being focused on feeding his population. His efforts 
showcased the suffering of the average Iraqi due to the effects of sanctions, versus from 
his own economic policy choices. Saddam had no intention of complying with the 
political goals of the sanctions regime against him, and only his removal from power 
would achieve the political objectives. The same situation can be inferred to be true in 
Iran, given the multiple statements between the conservative and neoconservative actors 
indicating they will never bow to the political or economic pressure of sanctions. 
As identified in Chapter IV, fighting and winning the information war is half of 
this battle. Iranian propaganda efforts will likely result in the same portrayal of suffering 
of the average Iranian citizen due to sanctions. Efforts must be made to counter this 
Iranian propaganda across the international community, instead showing that 
humanitarian costs are really due to the economic choices of the conservative and 
neoconservative actors. This information campaign could mitigate the calls for repeal of 
the sanctions regime that is effectively pressuring and weakening the conservative and 
neoconservative actors. However, a humanitarian crisis would eventually come to pass 
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and the international community must be prepared to accept this and stick with the 
sanctions regime until Iranian political objectives have been achieved. 
4. Undertake More Effort to Promote the Reformist Actors 
Research has shown that current sanctions efforts targeting the Iranian energy 
sector (reducing investment in the energy sector) and the Iranian financial sector 
(reducing rents to the Iranian government) are working to ultimately weaken the 
conservative and neoconservative actors. But more effort must be made to simultaneously 
strengthen the reformist actors, relative to the other actors, in the political economy. 
Thesis research has shown that the sanctions efforts are failing to provide needed 
domestic legitimacy to the reformist actors within Iran, mostly due to the portrayal of the 
sanctions regime as being imposed by the external enemies of Iran. This is due to the fact 
that the conservatives and neoconservatives are able to avoid the costs of sanctions with 
the sales of oil via their control of the political economy, and keep the economy running 
and avoid criticism and questioning of their own legitimacy. Without more economic 
problems, the conservative and neoconservative actors will be able to use oil revenues to 
“generate enough economic trickle-down to keep discontent at bay.”593 However, 
economic problems persist and contribute to infighting among the actors, reflected by the 
worsening inequalities among their constituencies. 
The conservatives and neoconservatives face legitimacy problems with ongoing 
high inflation, unemployment, and a destabilized currency (due to sanctions and a 
perception of the inability to effectively provide a solid macroeconomic solution)594 that 
could indirectly help the reformist actors, but this may not be enough to alter their 
relative power position. Steps are being taken to mitigate these economic deficiencies, 
although specific successes are hard to point out. Inflation is being fought with tighter 
credit and fiscal policies by the central bank,595 as well as administrative efforts such as 
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“numerous price measures, such as price monitoring and enforcement of price 
transparency and the accumulation of inventories,”596 but the official Iranian inflation 
rate of 20 percent is likely much higher by outside estimates.597 Unemployment is a 
serious concern, especially among the youth. “To achieve higher growth and create jobs, 
the authorities have adopted a comprehensive multi-pronged strategy … [aimed] at 
promoting a market based economy by reducing the role of government, privatizing 
enterprises, and increasingly allowing prices to reflect market forces.”598 This 
complements other efforts to increase FDI, reduce subsidies, and provide adequate 
unemployment benefits and job training to their labor market.599 Despite an allowance by 
the regime to allow their currency to depreciate by 11.5 percent in the summer of 
2011,600 the riyal plunged in value to its lowest level in history against the dollar, by 
December 2011, due to these ongoing economic problems, isolation from sanctions, and 
a perception that government officials are incapable of finding a solution.601 A rapid rise 
in both gold prices and the number of monetary exchange bureaus offering currency 
exchanges at unofficial rates has also been witnessed in recent months.602 However, 
while these problems have increased infighting among the actors, the makeup of the 
power structure within the political economy has not changed. The fact that oil prices 
remain far above the break-even amounts for budget and current accounts ($75 and $60 
per barrel, respectively)603 “has helped improve the current account and budget surplus,  
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and maintain comfortable international reserves.”604 In other words, high oil revenues 
continue to mitigate other economic problems that would normally hobble political actors 
in other political economies. 
Research in Chapter IV has identified several measures that could be taken to 
strengthen the economic and political base of the reformist actor’s constituencies, 
including harnessing global trade to compete against the conservative and 
neoconservatives’ control of the consumer goods trade and using more robust efforts to 
promote the domestic legitimacy of the reformists. Another potential action to weaken 
the legitimacy of the conservative and neoconservative actors is to use financial sanctions 
against the Iranian central bank to destabilize the exchange rate leading to a financial 
panic and political crisis. While the chances of success (and exact effects) of these 
actions remain unknown, they are perhaps the only (and best) chances of changing the 
control of the Iranian political economy that exists, short of armed conflict. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The findings of this thesis indicate that if the international community is 
concerned about the Iranian nuclear program (among other Iranian policy concerns) and 
wishes to use economic sanctions (not armed conflict) to change these policies, it must 
adopt stronger economic sanctions that alter the asymmetric balance of power in the 
Iranian political economy. Current economic sanctions, while having some economic 
effect, are not able to alter the Iranian political economy due to the conservative and 
neoconservative control of the political economy and institutions, and external 
petrochemical sales which solidify this control. Thus, Iran continues to enrich Uranium 
and ignore UN resolutions and international sanctions calling on it to cease this activity. 
Iranian enrichment activity continues to be a worldwide concern, and appears to 
finally be solidifying a consensus for additional sanctions to cause Iran to abandon this 
activity. Within the Persian Gulf, tensions with the Arab states continue to mount,  
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although it has been shown that some of these states remain large Iranian trading 
partners. Despite this, a U.S. and coalition military commitment to the defense and 
training of GCC states continues. 
Recently adopted sanctions efforts promoted by Mark Dubowitz, Director of the 
Iran Energy Project at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, who advises the U.S. 
congress and U.S. administration on Iranian sanctions, calls for diplomacy to divest U.S. 
allies (Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Europe, etc.), from buying Iranian oil, thus 
purchasing it elsewhere—leaving India and China (as the remaining purchasers) to 
collectively bargain down the price of Iranian oil and reduce oil rents to the regime.605 In 
the author’s opinion, these efforts could have some success in reducing Iranian oil rents, 
but at what rate is still highly unpredictable (due to an assumption of Chinese, Indian, and 
other states’ collusion with the program), which could have other unintended 
consequences, which can briefly be examined by the established framework developed 
earlier. 
In the author’s view, these sanctions will remain inadequate without a solid 
commitment by the participating states (and their private sectors and enforcement 
agencies) to abide by the new embargo, as well as a solid commitment by the non-
participating states to agree to collectively bargain down the price of the remaining 
Iranian oil supply available. Without these solid commitments, rent reduction available to 
the Iranian conservative and neo-conservative actors will be minimal, and will likely 
enhance a large smuggling syndicate of Iranian oil as was seen during the years of Iraqi 
sanctions that would take massive law enforcement efforts to contain. The author can find 
no such commitments from the non-participating states as of the writing of this work, and 
these new sanctions remain only in the discussion phase among potential participating 
states. Therefore, these new sanctions would not only continue to be inadequate to alter 
the Iranian political economy, but could also generate potentially huge unintended 
consequences. 
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Legitimacy effects of this new proposed sanctions regime, both internationally 
and domestically in Iran, could also suffer. Unless there is a solid commitment with 
participating states (to abide by and enforce the embargo) and non-participating states (to 
collectively bargain down the price of Iranian oil), the sanctions would not be seen as 
completely legitimate internationally. Also, within Iran, the conservatives and neo-
conservatives would continue to frame the sanctions as an attack on Iranian sovereignty 
(as was done successfully in Iraq). Without a massive capability to counter this Iranian 
domestic and regional propaganda, regional and domestic public opinion could possibly 
be swayed in the conservatives and neo-conservatives favor (as was also seen in Iraq by 
Saddam). As has been seen in the past, the first victims of punitive sanctions are the 
population of the target state, and their suffering would likely be used as a propaganda 
tool. Therefore, the legitimacy effects of this proposed embargo are likely to backfire 
without a firm commitment of participating and non-participating states, as well as a 
massive information operations campaign that complements the embargo to delegitimize 
the Iranian conservative and neo-conservative actors domestically (and regionally). 
Enforcement of current Iranian sanctions is already weak, and therefore 
enforcement of a voluntary embargo (without a UN mandate) would be extremely 
difficult and would require considerable diplomacy and enforcement cost. As was 
witnessed during the Iraqi sanctions episode—smuggling syndicates found numerous 
ways to bypass international enforcement—allegedly coopting even officials of the 
United Nations—on their way to pass thru or supplying states who were supposed to be 
participating in their enforcement. All this smuggling activity occurred during a time 
period of decreasing oil prices as well (late 1990s) and had the legitimacy and blessing of 
the United Nations. Therefore, assuming Mr. Dubowitz (Director of the Iran Energy 
Project at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) is correct—and non-embargo 
participating states would be able to collectively bargain down the price of oil and 
international oil prices remain stable or decline—the conservative and neo-conservative 
actors will very likely take a page from Saddam’s playbook and begin to foster 
smuggling syndicates to export their oil to maintain their rents. The key here is the word 
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voluntary—stopping this smuggling activity will be much easier with the legitimacy and 
support of a UN mandate to do so than without. 
As the true popularity and international consensus of current Iranian sanctions is 
difficult to gauge among participating states, at least one aspect of a voluntary embargo 
would be beneficial—participating states would certainly not voluntarily join unless it 
was in their interest (and their constituencies/private sectors interest) to do so. This is not 
to say that voluntarily joining the proposed embargo would not involve costs, but that the 
benefits of joining would outweigh such costs. Therefore, the voluntary embargo 
proposal of new Iranian sanctions would certainly serve as a convenient litmus test, state 
by state, for their true popularity and would make the identification of their support easier 
to gauge. 
Finally, these sanctions also still fail to alter control of the Iranian political 
economy away from the conservatives and neoconservatives, and thus alter their nuclear 
enrichment policy. This is due, primarily, to the determination of these actors to enrich 
Uranium as a national priority, the sanctions’ inability to seriously weaken these actors’ 
entrenchment in the political economy and the sanctions’ inability to lend economic 
support or legitimacy to reformist actors as an alternative political opposition. Oil 
markets are likely to respond with increased prices also, despite the theoretical  
proposition that no supply is actually being lost. Indeed, oil futures prices in New York 
had already inched up in response to this announcement of a potential divestment of 
Iranian oil by participating European states.606 
Should sanctions start to take effect and alter the political economy, seriously 
weakening the conservative and neoconservative actors’ hold, it is conceivable that a 
trade of Uranium enrichment for a cessation of sanctions could be made by Tehran. The 
primary interest of these actors is survival; therefore, this program is ultimately 
expendable. But the rate of erosion of this control is unpredictable (and it has been shown 
that net assessments of sanctions’ economic effects do not exist) and, in the author’s 
view, it is best not to stop a sanctions regime at such an offer. As seen in the Iraqi 
                                                 
606 Lakshmanan and Loder, U.S. Joins EU in Push for Iran Oil Embargo. 
 141
example—when sanctions bit and Saddam negotiated the oil for food program—his 
regime did not hesitate to cheat on the sanctions to ensure remaining in power at any cost. 
This lesson must not be lost on policymakers today, and the Iranian actors will likely 
follow the same trend—reconsolidating control of the political economy once the 
sanctions regime has ended and, eventually, reconstituting clandestine Uranium 
enrichment. The economic sanctions, and other efforts (diplomatic and other), must 
ultimately erode the power of the conservatives and neoconservatives, while promoting 
the reformist actors in the political economy to its ultimate control to achieve the desired 
political objectives. 
Therefore, the findings of this thesis indicate that not only must stronger sanctions 
be adopted and enforced—specifically ones that virtually embargo Iranian oil; other 
measures must also be taken to keep these sanctions in place. An embargo (or even 
partial embargo) on Iranian oil will bring significant instability to world oil markets and 
will involve significant financial cost to sanctions-participating states, which they must 
accept. It must also be recognized (by participating sanctioning states) that a 
humanitarian crisis will develop (as seen in Iraq) due to the conservatives’ and 
neoconservatives’ economic policy choices. Their propaganda efforts must be effectively 
countered and the sanctions used in a way to confer legitimacy to the reformist actors in 
the Iranian political economy. Other efforts to harness global trade to strengthen the 
reformist actors’ economic base must also be successfully calculated and undertaken. 
Until these additional measures are undertaken, the ultimate goals of Iranian sanctions 
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